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GREEK ECONOMICS

INTRODUCTION & TRANSLATION

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Of great riches there is no real use, except it be in the distribution ; the rest is but conceit. So saith Solomon : " Where much is, there are too many to consume it ; and what hath the owner, but the sight of it with his eyes ?" —BACON.

§ I

EVEN at the present time it is not uncommon to hear it said that Political Economy is a science which has only originated and developed during the last hundred and fifty years, and that the Greeks, in spite of their immense contribution to almost every branch of human knowledge, paid little or no attention to this science. There is some justification for this misapprehension, for it is perfectly true that no comprehensive Greek treatise dealing specifically with Political Economy has been preserved; nor, indeed, is there any evidence that such a treatise was ever composed by a Greek writer, in the way that Aristotle, for example, wrote works on Ethics or on Political Science. Political Economy, or Economics, as a separate subject divorced from other branches of philosophical speculation, dates only from the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. The Greeks had no word to express what is now meant by either of these two names. Perhaps the nearest approach to such a term is that used by Aristotle, *chrematistike*, which is more accurately translated “ the science of supply,” than, as has been done by some modern writers, “ the science of wealth.” The word *oeconomia*,

from which our own word "economy" is derived, meant to a Greek the art or science of managing the household; and it therefore does not express what we mean by Economics, except in so far as certain general principles may apply equally to the household and to the larger organism, the state, as demonstrated, for instance, by Aristotle. But the words of Plato and Aristotle, even when they are primarily concerned with other subjects, contain a considerable amount of speculation on economic questions, and, as will appear hereafter, they formulated a number of economic principles which were only rediscovered by modern economists.

The assumption of a close connection between Ethics and Political Science is characteristic of all Greek thought, at any rate down to the end of the fourth century B.C., and this connection is most clearly defined in the opening chapters of Aristotle's *Ethics*. After showing that *politike*, the science of the city-state, is the highest science, to which all other arts and sciences are subordinate, Aristotle proceeds (*Ethics*, i. 2, 7-8): "Since political science makes use of the remaining sciences that are concerned with action, and ordains what men ought to do and what they ought to refrain from doing, the end of political science will include the ends of all the other sciences and this end will, in consequence, be the Highest Good of man. Even if this end to be grasped and cherished is the same for the individual as for the state, nevertheless the end of the state is clearly greater and more complete. For though the Highest Good is a desirable end for the individual, it is even fairer and more divine for a nation and for a state." Consequently Aristotle defines Ethics as partaking of the nature of Political Science; since, while the *Summum Bonum* is the end of both, the

Highest Good of the individual is merged in the Highest Good of the community. If it be asked how this close connection between Ethics and Politics arose, the answer would be that it was partly due to the absence of family life in Greece, but above all it was the natural result of the Greek conception of the *polis* or city-state, which was often little more than a town. In consequence there was little or no room for representative government, and to Plato, as well as to Aristotle, a citizen, to be a citizen, must have a hand in the government. A further consequence is that in his *Ethics* Aristotle stresses particularly what may be called civic virtues (e.g. courage and magnificence) and, conversely, vices are weighed more as they affect society than the individual. It is only necessary to instance the pious frauds which Plato advocates (*Rep.* v. 459-60) to maintain the state religion intact.

It is the natural result of this attitude, which, while it is characteristic also of his predecessors, is most clearly defined in Aristotle, that the favourite form in which speculations on Political Science were cast was a dialogue or treatise describing and analysing the ideal city-state. This method of presentation is most familiar to English readers from works like Bacon's *New Atlantis* and More's *Utopia*. Clearly any description of the growth of the state, and of its most perfect form, was bound to include much that was not, strictly speaking, a part of Political Science; and it is particularly economic questions like community in property, the true nature of wealth, the origin of currency, specialisation in trades, and semi-economic problems like slavery, that form a considerable portion of Plato's *Republic* and *Laws* and Aristotle's *Politics*. Nor must earlier speculators like Phaleas and

Hippodamos be forgotten, though their proposals are only known to us from Aristotle's summary and criticisms.

Scanty though the evidence often is, it is abundantly clear that the great statesmen of the fifth and fourth centuries were by no means as ignorant or indifferent to economic laws as is commonly suggested. Their failures, judged by modern standards, were commonly due not to ignorance but to the imperfections of the Greek city-state, resulting not only in disastrous wars between rival cities but in even more destructive internal struggles between democratic and oligarchic factions, and, in consequence, in the almost complete absence of a national Hellenic unity.

The writings from which extracts are submitted in this little volume contain so many allusions to contemporary or earlier political, social and economic conditions in Greece that it seems desirable at this point briefly to indicate certain facts in Greek history down to 323 B.C., and to sketch shortly the economic history of Athens during the period of her greatness and decline; for not only is Athens the one Greek state about whose economic life we are adequately informed, but it is also the city in which Plato and Aristotle lived and with which they were most familiar. With the conquests of Alexander of Macedon the independent city-state virtually ceases to exist; the Greek cities are all, in a greater or lesser degree, dependent on great foreign monarchies—Macedon, Egypt, Syria—and the theories of Plato or Aristotle, which are based on the premiss that the city-state is the best and most highly developed form of social community, in many respects cease to be applicable to the new social order. Nor, it may be added, have any writings of the later period dealing with economic problems come down

to us. The *Eryxias*, though probably not composed before the beginning of the third century B.C., belongs in tone to the previous age.

§ 2

By the beginning of the eighth century B.C. the city-state is the normal form of political community, not only in Greece proper, but on the coast of Asia Minor. The three preceding centuries, about which less is known than about any other period of Mediterranean history or prehistory, were a period of constant migratory movements from Central Europe into the southern half of the Balkan Peninsula, and the result was not only the presence of a new racial element on the Greek mainland, but the emigration overseas to Asia Minor of many of the older mainland inhabitants. When the darkness which covers the period 1100–800 B.C. begins to be dispelled, the city-state is seen to be well established alike in Greece and on the Asia Minor littoral. The form of government is uniformly monarchic or aristocratic; the land, which is the main source of wealth, is in either case in the hands of a minority, a small number of aristocratic families. In many cases we may suspect that the minority is synonymous with the conquering immigrants who had subjected the earlier inhabitants whom they found in possession. The method of land cultivation in various parts of Greece bears witness to this fact. In Laconia some of the actual cultivators of the soil were dependents of the ruling class, enjoying personal liberty but with no civic status; but the more part were serfs, tied to the soil to this extent that only the state, not the individual land-holder, had complete power of life and death over

them, and only the state could remove them from the particular land on which they were settled, whether for agricultural work elsewhere or for military service in time of war. With the political expansion of Sparta, the leading state of Laconia, which ended in the conquest of Messenia on the west and Thyreatis on the east, the same system was enforced in the newly acquired territories. Generally speaking, the coastal districts were settled with the free dependents, while the interior districts were divided among Spartan citizens, for whom the lots of land were cultivated by the serfs or Helots, as they were called. This system became permanent in Sparta, and largely in consequence the constitutional development common to other Greek states left her untouched. Both in Crete and in Thessaly the agricultural labour was performed by bondsmen, whose condition and status in many ways resembled that of the Helots. In Attica, though the bulk of the land was held by a few aristocratic families, the cultivators were small farmers, free men, but of inferior civic status and always dependent in some degree on the land-owners. The tendency was for this dependence to become greater and greater. The tithes or dues exacted from the small farmer by the landlord were exceptionally heavy—according to one account as much as five-sixths of the total produce—and if the farmer got into arrears and debt and failed to meet his liabilities within a specified time, not only he himself but his family could be sold into slavery by the creditor. Conditions not unlike this must have obtained in many other city-states, and the resulting unrest and discontent of the oppressed majority had important results in several respects. The numerous colonies founded during the course of approximately

two hundred years, from the middle of the eighth to the middle of the sixth century, provided a remedy for the evils at home. Many of the impoverished members of the community found new homes elsewhere, where from dependents they themselves became masters and owners of land, and it was not only they who looked on this solution of their troubles as satisfactory, but the ruling class at home also, who by this means were rid of a dangerously discontented portion of the population. In many cases, however, the existing government at home had ere this been overthrown through popular insurrection. The ruling aristocracy was in some cases succeeded by a lawgiver elected by the people, with absolute powers for a limited period to revise the existing laws and often to frame a new constitution; in some cases the people's champion, when the ruling minority had been deposed, himself gained control of affairs with the help of foreign mercenaries and reigned as a despot, or, to use the Greek word, as a Tyrant. But the Tyrants in their turn warmly encouraged colonisation, partly because they too had discontented elements in the state of which they could thus conveniently rid themselves, partly because the foundation of colonies was of the utmost importance for the economic and commercial development of the states that they ruled. Thus gradually the coast of Thrace and the shores of the Black Sea on the north-east, and Southern Italy and Sicily in the west, afforded sites for numerous Greek settlements. If colonial expansion was one important cause of the great development of Greek trade and commerce in the seventh and sixth centuries, another was the introduction of coinage. The place where, and the date at which, this most momentous human invention was first made were disputed in antiquity

and are still uncertain. The oldest extant coins are certainly as early as the beginning of the seventh century, and there is no real reason to quarrel with the statement of Herodotus that the Lydians in Asia Minor were the authors of this invention. In any case, if they were the first to issue coins, the Greeks were not slow to follow their example. The growth of manufactures and industries and the development of commercial intercourse reacted on the existing forms of government and was one of the factors that made for the overthrow of the landed aristocracies in the manner already indicated. In Athens the first great improvement was the work of Solon. He held the chief magistracy at Athens in 594 B.C. with extraordinary powers to carry out much-needed reforms. As the result of his efforts the practice of contracting debts on the security of the debtor's person was stopped, existing debts were cancelled or reduced, and many of the unhappy persons who had been enslaved under the harsh old laws were redeemed from servitude. Solon is, moreover, credited with restricting by law the amount of land which could be occupied by a single person, and with forbidding the export of Attic produce other than olive-oil. The constitution he reformed by his fourfold classification of the free population according to the property that they owned; and, though election to office was still restricted to the wealthier classes, all alike were admitted to the *ecclesia*, or popular assembly, and had the right to vote there. Solon's reforms, important as they were, failed to effect a permanent settlement. Of the two extracts from his poems translated below, one is an eloquent warning against the dangers of the "new wealth" which was the result of Athenian commercial expansion, the other gives a charming description

of what were then regarded as the typical occupations of men.

Class interests then were still too strong, and a period of civil strife followed Solon's tenure of office, ending here, as in other Greek states, in a Tyranny. The reign of Peisistratus was momentous for the growth of the Athenian state. It was he who abolished the old system under which nominally free small farmers and agricultural workers were obliged to pay the bulk of their produce in tithes to the land-owners, for Solon had only forbidden their enslavement in case of default. The departure from Attica of his wealthy political opponents enabled Peisistratus to confiscate their estates there. The land so acquired he divided into small lots and assigned them in part to the farm labourers who had previously been working on these and other estates, in part to impoverished dwellers in Athens itself. The new farmers were now the owners of their lots and were only required to pay a land tax of ten per cent.—later perhaps reduced to five per cent.—of the produce. Moreover, Peisistratus in many cases advanced money to the new farmers to enable them to get the necessary implements and stock. It was in his reign that the Athenians first secured several foreign settlements in Thrace, a humble effort at colonisation it is true, when compared with the activities of Corinth or Miletus at this period, but one that was of vital importance for Athenian commerce. Solon had already induced his countrymen to abandon the standard of weights and measures and of coinage very generally used on the mainland, except by Corinth, and in its place to adopt the so-called Euboic standard used not only by the flourishing commercial cities of Euboea, but by the Greek states of Asia Minor and by Corinth. The change

was designed particularly to facilitate commercial intercourse with the prosperous communities of Asia Minor, and was not the least important of Solon's reforms.

But despotic rule, though it might be, as at Athens, highly beneficial in many respects, in none of the numerous states where Tyranny was a step in the constitutional development lasted more than a century, in some cases considerably less. By the beginning of the fifth century, when the mainland Greeks were first threatened by the aggression of a foreign power, Persia, the form of government in the majority of the city-states was either a democracy or a moderate oligarchy. The successful repulse of the Persian invader in 490 and again in 480-79 awoke a national consciousness among the Greeks that had hitherto been dormant or obscured by the narrower jealousies of rival city-states. The Greeks of Asia Minor, who for the past century had been tributaries of Oriental powers, first of Lydia and then of Persia, regained their independence. Though the feeling of national or racial pride of the Hellene in contrast to the non-Hellenic or "barbarian" nations of the east was thus aroused, it did not, unhappily, result in a national union of the Greeks amongst themselves. The direct outcome of the second defeat of Persia and the liberation of the Asiatic Greeks was the formation of a confederacy under the leadership of Athens, which included many of the cities on the coast of Asia Minor and of Thrace, Byzantium and the majority of the islands in the Eastern Mediterranean. Within thirty years what had begun as a league of equal and independent states had become an Athenian empire, thanks to the genius of Athens' military commanders and statesmen in the fifth century. The fortification of Peiraeus, completed *circa* 477 B.C., gave Athens the

finest harbour in the eastern Mediterranean; it remained only to connect Athens herself with Peiraeus by fortified walls, and this work was completed in 458, a date at which Athenian naval supremacy was virtually assured. Thus it was natural that Athens should become the greatest commercial state in Greek lands, and no less natural that her ever-growing prosperity should arouse the jealousy of her neighbours; while the often high-handed treatment of her allies and subjects aroused resentment within her own empire, which was, if anything, more dangerous than the hostility of rival commercial states like Corinth. The crisis came in 431, and for nearly thirty years Athens was engaged in a struggle for her empire and finally for her own political existence against the united city-states of the Peloponnese and Boeotia under the general leadership of Sparta. The year 405 saw the end of the contest, and for a time Athens was politically impotent. The remarkable thing is that her commercial recovery was so rapid. The political history of the first half of the fourth century is a dreary succession of struggles between a few of the leading states of Greece. Spartan domination in Greece, which endured some thirty years, was finally broken by Thebes in 371, and Thebes is then the leading state for some ten years. The foreign policy of Athens in this period varied, being at times pro-Theban, at times pro-Spartan; but the main aim of her statesmen was the restoration to a semblance of its former glory of a maritime league under Athenian headship. The formation of the second Athenian Confederacy took place in 378-7, and not only important states like Byzantium, Chios and Rhodes became members but some of the Cyclades and a number of smaller cities on the Thracian coast. The terms on which the league

was formed were carefully framed to prevent a repetition of the arbitrary methods which Athens had employed towards the members of the Confederacy of Delos in the previous century. Even so some of the old abuses made their appearance again, and in 358 several of the most powerful of the allies declared war on Athens; a peace was not patched up till 355, after the financial resources of Athens had come near to the point of exhaustion. The lack of union among the Greek states and the exhaustion of all of them after years of continuous warfare facilitated the task of Greece's northern neighbour, Macedonia. The genius of Philip II. consolidated Macedonia as a united and homogeneous kingdom and created a national army superior to any military organisation known up to that time. Once his own kingdom was secure, Philip proceeded methodically, partly by diplomacy, partly by force, to assert his supremacy over the Greek states. With his victory at Chaironeia in 338 over the allied Greek cities a Macedonian hegemony over the whole of Greece was established.

It is extremely difficult to estimate with any certainty the population of Attica at any given period. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War in 431 it has been calculated that there were in Attica about fifty-five thousand male citizens above the age of eighteen. If, as seems probable, these formed about one-third of the entire citizen population, we get a total citizen body, men, women and children, of one hundred and sixty-five thousand. The number of adult male resident foreigners —metics as they were called—may have been about twenty thousand; if the proportion of these to their womenfolk and children was the same as in the case of

the citizens, the total metic population was about sixty thousand. The number of male and female slaves at the same period is more problematic ; it is not likely to have been much less than one hundred and twenty thousand, and may have been slightly more. Whatever the exact numbers of the Attic population in 431, it is at any rate certain that, by the beginning of the next century, the total of citizens had very seriously declined. The disastrous epidemic—its exact nature is still a matter of dispute—which first made its appearance in Attica in 430 and recurred on several occasions during the following years, exacted a very heavy toll of lives. Equally serious was the loss of man-power caused by the Athenian catastrophe in Sicily and by the final struggles of Athens against her enemies between 412 and 405 B.C. It seems probable that the adult male citizen population was reduced well-nigh by half, and that thirty thousand is the maximum that can be postulated during the fourth century. If the citizen body decreased in numbers, the tendency was for the resident aliens constantly to increase. The settlement of foreigners at Athens had been looked on with favour by the state ever since the time of Solon and Peisistratus, and the conditions on which they were allowed to take up residence were not unfavourable ; at any rate, if modern judgment is inclined to think that the benefits were all on one side, that of the Athenian state, this was evidently not felt by the metics of those days. Clearly it was profitable to settle at Athens in spite of the heavy financial liabilities which the wealthier foreigners, like the wealthier Athenian citizens, had to meet without the corresponding civic privileges of the latter.

The slave occupies an important place in Greek life,

and already in the society portrayed in the Homeric poems, that is to say, before the dawn of the strictly historic period, slavery is a regular institution. It is the tendency among many modern writers to minimise the extent to which slaves were kept in Greece, at any rate before the second half of the fifth century, relying largely on the fact that there are few references to slavery in the earlier literature and laying undue stress on such statements as that the earliest Greek slave-mart was at Chios in the sixth century. But the argument *ex silentio*, even if the early literary records were far fuller than they are, is quite unconvincing. After all, why should we expect references to domestic slaves any more than to any other social institution, which was too much a part of everyday life to call for special notice? The statement about Chios may be true enough, but at the most it proves that the slave trade, depending on the kidnapping of non-Hellenic peoples of the North and East, was not earlier than the sixth century, while slavery in the earlier period was confined to persons captured in war. At Athens again the stringent laws of debt in the pre-Solonian period resulted in the enslavement of many persons. Subsequently Greek sentiment changed to this extent, that, generally speaking, in the fifth and fourth centuries it disapproved of the enslavement of Greeks. The majority of slaves were of non-Hellenic race, while Greeks allowed their fellow-Greeks to be ransomed, when captured in war. Even here, however, there were exceptions, as when a subject state was punished for revolting by the enslavement of its population. When Plato argues against the enslavement of Greeks by Greeks, he is only voicing the feelings of the generality of his countrymen. When the number

of slaves at Athens is calculated on the basis of the citizen population—in any case a highly speculative statistical effort—it is forgotten that the resident aliens also could and did own slaves both for domestic and industrial purposes. Slavery in Athens was essential to the economic life of its citizens.

The civic population of Attica in the Periclean age was composed of a minority of wealthy persons whose income was derived partly from the land, partly from investment in industrial enterprises, and of a majority of small farmers and “craftsmen,” a name which included not only the potter, the carpenter and the worker in metals, but the physician and the artist, the statuary as well as the stonemason. By all some slave labour would be required to carry on their business, and the same would be true of the resident aliens who engaged not only in commerce, but in manufacture and industry to a considerable extent. The names of some of the potters who worked at Athens and whose signed works are still to be seen in the museums of Europe are certainly non-Athenian.

From the middle of the fifth century two changes gradually took place, both of which tended to reduce the number of free craftsmen: the first was that the increase of wealth among a minority of the population led to the establishment of large manufactories run by slave labour, and even the manager and supervisors, if not slaves, were freedmen; secondly, the smaller industrial enterprises came more and more into the hands of metics, freedmen and slaves, the last-named being often set up in business by their masters and paying them a percentage of their earnings. The free Athenian, when not required for active service or in office, spent

his time more and more in the assembly, the council and the law-courts. The last two services had been paid ever since the time of Pericles; pay for attendance in the *ecclesia* was introduced not later than the opening years of the fourth century. A recent writer has calculated tentatively the minimum earnings on which a man could live in the middle of the fifth and in the fourth century. He concludes that for little more than bare subsistence it was sufficient in the earlier period for a man to work one day in three; in the later period prices had seriously risen—we know, for instance, that corn had advanced from three to five drachmas a *medimnus*, while there is no evidence for a corresponding rise in wages—and, while the unskilled man had a hard time, the skilled man could still rest three days for every eight that he worked. Such earnings were irrespective of money received from the state for the services already indicated. In the year 410-9 we first meet with state maintenance of needy citizens. The amount paid, two obols (3d.) a day, is small and the payment was justified under the stress of war; but the principle was bad and in the future involved the state in heavy outlay. Even less defensible is the *theoricon* or festival money. Instituted by Pericles, it was at first limited to a small fraction of the population. But in the fourth century not only was the amount increased, but the whole practice of state payments for the entertainment of the citizens was greatly extended, and a special fund was established, presided over by a special board of financial officers. Any surplus revenue was paid into the fund, and if there was no surplus, some department of state had to suffer. Not till it was too late did Demosthenes succeed in persuading his countrymen to use this fund for military purposes.

It is natural to ask what were the sources of revenue which enabled the state to meet these vast liabilities, to pay the citizens for their service and to defray the cost of constant warfare. In the age of Pericles the great source of income was the tribute of the allies and dependents of Athens. Originally fixed at four hundred and sixty talents (*circa £110,000*) per annum, it was probably not seriously increased till 425 B.C. In that year a re-assessment was made which, on the average, doubled the amount demanded from each city. It is, however, doubtful whether a total of one thousand talents (£240,000) was ever reached, and more than doubtful that it was ever exceeded. In the following century the amount realised from the contributions of the second Confederacy is quite uncertain; forty-five and sixty talents are named in 355 and 347 B.C. respectively. Before the war of Athens with her allies the amount may perhaps have totalled eighty to one hundred talents.

Another important source of revenue was the royalties from the silver mines at Laureion in the South of Attica. These mines had been worked ever since the sixth century, but it was particularly since the Persian wars that this industry was more highly developed. The mines were owned by the state but leased to private citizens, who worked them with slave labour. Indirect taxes of various kinds—*e.g.*, a two per cent. tax on all imports and exports, —court fees and fines, and rents from houses or lands owned by the state also contributed a substantial sum to the exchequer. Regular direct taxation there was none, but the state called on those of its citizens whose property exceeded a certain amount to defray the cost of various public services or liturgies. The lowest capital which rendered its possessor liable to perform a liturgy

appears to have been three talents (£720). The purpose of these services was either to defray the cost of important items in the great religious festivals—the training and equipment of choruses for performances of tragedy and comedy is the best known instance—or to pay for the upkeep of warships in time of war. In either case the saving to the exchequer was considerable, and it must be remembered that the institution of these services dates back to a time when, if the financial burdens of the wealthier classes were heavier, their political privileges were also far greater. By the beginning of the fifth century this was no longer the case, but the performance of a liturgy was regarded as a civic privilege conferring distinction on the performer rather than as a financial burden. It was only after constant wars had impoverished the wealthier classes that the financial liability was more regarded than the resultant honour. The occasional tax on property, *eisphora*, which is so familiar in the fourth century, was only levied on rare occasions in the fifth. Like the liturgies it only affected citizens of the wealthier classes with a certain minimum of property, and it is the only form of direct taxation, if we except the small poll-tax which resident aliens were required to pay. These last named, provided their possessions amounted to the required minimum, were also liable to the liturgies and property tax. The grant of exemption from these state services was a signal mark of distinction conferred sparingly on citizens, and very rarely on foreigners, who had rendered eminent service to Athens.

Athens was not an agricultural state, and in the fifth and fourth centuries more than half her food supply was imported. The most essential commodity, corn, came from the Black Sea, and direct control over, or, failing

that, good relations with Byzantium was always an important feature of Athenian policy. Her own exports were olive oil, figs, honey, pottery and, on a smaller scale, certain other manufactured goods, *e.g.*, armour and certain kinds of woollen manufactures. The excess of imports over exports must have been considerable, but it must be remembered that, as a set-off to this, large sums came to Athens, partly from tribute, partly through the numerous strangers who visited the city on business or on pleasure. Besides, much of the prosperity of Athens was due to the fact that Peiraeus was the great emporium or distributing centre for merchandise. The products of Asia Minor and Syria were here reshipped for ports in the Peloponnese and further West. In this connection one may emphasise the superlative excellence—commercially, not artistically—of the Athenian silver currency. Athens very wisely did not allow her currency to depreciate, and even in the financial stress of the closing years of the fifth century no attempt to debase the silver coinage was made; as a temporary measure gold and bronze coins were struck for a short time. Thus it is that Xenophon, writing (*Ways and Means*, 3) at a time when Athens was politically a mere shadow of her former self, can still claim, and no doubt justly, that Athenian money, in contrast to the currencies of other cities, was accepted everywhere. If a modern parallel be sought, it is only necessary to recall the readiness with which English gold (before 1914!), bank notes, and even cheques are accepted even in remote parts of the world.

The merchant was often also the owner of the ship, and in many cases accompanied the merchandise which he was exporting. Specialisation in one commodity was probably the exception rather than the rule, most

merchants dealing in a number of different goods. The "commercial magnates" had agents in various places who disposed of the cargoes for their principal in the ports to which the goods were shipped. We hear also of partners working in two different places. The enterprising made great efforts to keep themselves informed of prices and the state of the markets in different ports, but the absence of modern "facilities" greatly restricted the possibilities of carrying out a successful "coup." "Corners" in an essential commodity like that attributed by Aristotle (*Pol.* i. 11) to Thales early in the sixth century cannot have been of frequent occurrence, but there is one transaction of a later date about which there is some valuable literary evidence. The speech *Against the Corn-dealers*, written by Lysias for a client or clients whose names have not been preserved, belongs in all likelihood to the year 388, and is translated below because of its intrinsic interest. Anytus, one of the leading Athenian statesmen of the time, appears to have been one of the "corn-inspectors" in 388. It was a bad harvest year and, in order to keep down prices, he seems to have given permission to the retail corn-dealers to form a "combine" against the importers, with the object of buying the available stock as cheaply as possible. Anything in the nature of a "ring" was, however, forbidden by law, and the importers, who are clearly the persons for whom Lysias wrote his speech, took legal proceedings. The aim of the speech-writer is obviously to gloss over Anytus' connection with the transaction. The verdict, and consequently the fate of the dealers, are unknown.

The *Ways and Means* of Xenophon is a pamphlet written in 355 B.C., only a year or so before the author's

death. It is composed in the form of a speech and may well have been intended as a memorandum for Eubulus, then the chief financial magistrate at Athens, or for one of his supporters. Many of the suggestions contained in it seem sane enough, but we do not hear of their adoption, wholly or in part. Some of Xenophon's statements, however, do not bear examination. The soil of Attica, which he belauds, was notoriously poor in antiquity, just as it is at the present day; hence ever since the sixth century the Athenians had concentrated on olive-culture, for which the conditions were good, in preference to growing corn. The statement that the silver mines were inexhaustible is also more than questionable. At the beginning of our era the mines were yielding little return and by the second century A.D. their working ceased altogether. It is perhaps worth mentioning that since the end of last century they have again been worked, but for lead, not silver. Again, Xenophon's argument that silver would never depreciate—although he admits the economic law in the case of gold—is too puerile to require further discussion. The proposed method of organising and increasing the slave-labour seems practical, but it may be suspected that, in view of the general financial exhaustion alike of state and individuals, it would have been a matter of some difficulty to raise the necessary capital at the time at which he wrote.

§ 3

In considering briefly certain salient points in the economic theories of Greek writers that have survived, it will be convenient to touch first on Xenophon's treatise on household management. The introductory

chapters contain a noteworthy attempt to analyse what is properly meant by wealth. Whether or not the views put in the mouth of Sokrates are the views of that philosopher or Xenophon's is a highly controversial question which cannot here be discussed. Probably they are Xenophon's.

The principle that any possession, to constitute wealth, must be of use to the possessor is clearly stated, and the difference between value in use and value in exchange is indicated, though it was left for Aristotle to give a more penetrating analysis of this. The highly poetical picture of the efficient user of wealth and of his antithesis, the waster, illustrates well the ethical point of view of the Greeks, when inquiring into any of the problems that concern the social community. Again, what could be more vivid than the description of the way in which civic and social obligations are the inevitable concomitant of wealth and influence? In the lengthy passage in which Socrates discusses the reasons for the disparity between rich and poor, unhappily only the human factor is considered but not the general economic problems involved. Lastly, in the short passage in Chapter 4 we meet the same dislike for crafts and trades that confronts us in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, and to which reference must be made again.

The authorship of the dialogue called *Eryxias*, and preserved among the works of Plato, is quite uncertain. That it was from the pen of Plato himself was doubted already in antiquity, and modern criticism agrees in excluding it from Plato's genuine writings. Again, its date cannot be fixed precisely, but in all probability it was composed at the end of the fourth or the beginning of the third century B.C. The author is clearly familiar

with the Platonic dialogues, on one of which the *Eryxias* is more particularly modelled, but he lacks the precision of the master, so that at times he becomes redundant, at times very obscure. For a translator the difficulty is increased by the author's unfortunate habit of using the same word in the same paragraph to signify both "wealth" and "money," an ambiguity which Plato would certainly not have tolerated. If the style and composition are modelled on Plato, the views expressed have most affinity with the opening chapters of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*. The writer was, however, a person of considerable power of original thought, and his work contains several economic theories not found in either of his models or in Aristotle. The *Eryxias* has an additional interest for the modern reader, because it is the only Greek treatise extant which deals exclusively with an economic problem; the point of view is nevertheless characteristically Greek, for the whole argument is ethical in tone.

Starting with an inquiry into the relation between riches and virtue, Sokrates is led to the conclusion that wisdom is the most precious of all possessions, and that the wise man is also the happiest and the richest. When Eryxias objects that the wise man might still lack the wherewithal to live, Sokrates proceeds to analyse what men mean by wealth. The author is the first to formulate the view that the ability to perform a certain function which is of service to other men, and of which a man can dispose in return for what he needs or for money, should be reckoned as wealth to him. The examples he gives are those of the skilled pilot and the skilled physician; in more modern parlance, the trained ability of the "professional" man is wealth just as much as the commodities turned out by the craftsman or the factory,

provided that there is a demand in the community for the professional services of the one and the commodities of the other. It is the difference between material and immaterial wealth enunciated in its simplest form. Sokrates comes to the conclusion that wealth is good for some and bad for others, and then proceeds further to what is, after all, the main question, what is meant by wealth. The common fallacy that wealth is equivalent to money is skilfully exposed. It is pointed out that certain states had currencies which were useless as mediums of exchange outside their particular territories. Plato had introduced a local currency of this sort in his state in the *Laws* (742 A). A lengthy argument leads up to the conclusion which had already been stated more briefly in Xenophon, that any possession to constitute wealth must be of use to the possessor. The last part of the dialogue, besides elaborating the points already made, is a plea for simplicity of life, which suggests that the writer had to some extent been influenced by the teaching of the Cynic school of philosophy.

It is not easy to decide whether theories of communism had, to any great extent, occupied the minds of thoughtful Greeks with a bent for advanced ideas before the end of the fifth century. A practical experiment in this direction appears to have been made about 580 B.C. by some Greek settlers in Lipara, the largest of a group of small islands off the north coast of Sicily. The whole territory of this little settlement was state-owned and cultivated by a part of the population, while the other part was on military service, especially against hostile Etruscan seafarers. The produce was consumed at common messes, a custom far more familiar from Sparta and Crete. The original arrangement, however, did not last; then the

largest island was divided into private allotments, but a redistribution took place every twenty years. The smaller islands of the group continued at first to be jointly used; later they, too, were apportioned in separate lots. Something of the same spirit animated the members of the philosophic brotherhood founded by Pythagoras at the end of the sixth century. "The goods of friends are common" was one of their favourite maxims, and they practised what they preached.

That such ideas were current at the beginning of the fourth century is proved by one of the latest of Aristophanes' comedies, the *Ecclesiazusae* or *Women in Parliament*, as it has been neatly translated. A skit on theories of communism, such as this is,—it was produced in 393 or 392 B.C.—with its proposals for government by women, disfranchisement of men and community in all property, would lose much or all of its point unless the poet was definitely satirising ideas current at that time. That it is a skit on Plato's *Republic* is chronologically improbable, for that work is not likely to have been finished till 387; that it satirises opinions which Plato had expressed in the lecture-hall, before publishing them in the *Republic*, is even more unlikely, for at that time Plato was not yet the well-known figure that he afterwards became. It is in every way more probable that Plato's views in the *Republic* are a serious reply to contemporary or nearly contemporary skits, including Aristophanes', on communistic theories. Whether or not it is Aristophanes himself whom Plato rebukes for "plucking unripe fruit of laughter" (*Rep.* v. 457), it is at any rate not uninteresting to see the wit and the philosopher side by side, and a short passage from the *Ecclesiazusae* has therefore been included in this volume.

The *Republic*: In his analysis of the growth of the *polis* in the second book Plato ignores the smaller unit of the household. At the beginning of the same book the current view of the nature of justice, and how it came into being, is stated. "Men say that to act unjustly is by nature a good thing, but to suffer injustice is bad; the evil of the latter, however, greatly surpasses the good of the former, so that when men both do and suffer injustice and have a taste of both, those who are unable to escape from the latter and grasp at the former think it to their advantage to make a mutual compact not to do or to suffer injustice. From this, men say, there originated legislation and contracts between men, and that which the law ordained men called lawful and just" (*Rep.* ii. 359 A). This statement implies that the origin of society is to be found in contract, but clearly this is not Plato's own view. In his later work, the *Laws*, his theory is seen to be the same as Aristotle's, namely, that the *polis* or city-state grew out of the family. In the *Republic*, where the picture of the ideal state, however important in itself, is nevertheless incidental to the main theme of the work, there is no need to trace the steps by which the simplest form of city-state was evolved. Plato contents himself with stating that such an association of men is the result of their natural needs, which can only be satisfied by mutual co-operation. The conclusion to which he is led—and he states his case with a lucid precision that has never been surpassed—is that division of labour and specialisation in every craft are essential to the state. This view is, however, based not merely on the resulting economic advantage, namely that it ensures the maximum of production and that of the best quality, but also on the natural differences which

are supposed to exist between individuals (*cf. Rep.* ii. 370 and also *Laws*, viii. 876). The threefold division of the inhabitants of the state corresponds to, indeed it is the natural consequence of, Plato's theory of the soul, which, he says, is composed of an irrational, a semi-rational and a rational part. The first is the source of all the appetites, the second is "spirit" ¹—that which inspires men to fight, but, if unallied to reason, is also responsible for various passions in men—and the third is reason. Of the three classes in the ideal state of the *Republic*, the guardians, the auxiliaries and the producers, the last-named is composed of all those who are not specially adapted to govern nor yet to serve the state in a military capacity; it is their function to produce the commodities essential for the whole community. Two points that arise in this part of the book may be noted in passing: in 371 Plato defines the purpose of money as a medium of exchange and in the same passage it is implied, if not directly stated, that exports and imports must balance one another. The passage in the *Laws* (viii. 877 B), advocating "free-trade," may be compared with advantage.

In the later part of the third book of the *Republic* Plato argues very eloquently that the brotherhood of man does not mean that, in the phrase so familiar in extreme democracies, ancient and modern, one man is as good as another. A man's social service must depend on his abilities; and it is not aristocratic prejudice but a profound belief in the variability of natural characteristics in men which inspired Plato when he wrote the myth of Mother Earth and her children.

¹ The word is used in the same sense as in such phrases as "a man of spirit," "a spirited horse," not in its theological sense.

The community in goods, which Plato postulates for the guardians and auxiliaries, as is made clear at the end of Book III. and the beginning of Book IV., is not proposed as a remedy for economic troubles; the real reason for it is ethical, and the same is true of the community in women and children in Book V. The ruling class must not have private interests of any kind, such as result from the ownership of property or from family life, for if they had, such interests would inevitably be an obstacle to their whole-hearted concentration on the duties which they owe to the state. Aristotle, in criticising Plato (*Pol.* ii. 5), finds fault with him for not stating whether communism is to apply to the third class. Is not Plato's silence equivalent to a negative? The craftsmen and merchants are the producers and the only economic class, and because the first and second classes, who are not concerned with the economic life of the state, are organised on a basis of communism, that is no reason why the same arrangement should hold good of the producing class. Plato contents himself with again stressing the need for a division of labour and specialisation, which will do away with disputes and will also obviate excess of wealth or poverty, both of which endanger the state (*cf.* iv. 421-2). It must not be forgotten that Plato, in considering various types of rule not merely theoretically, but with knowledge of the constitutional and political development of divers Greek states, was led to the belief that, to attain the best government, it was essential that the same persons should not control the political and economic functions of the state. Only if the ruling class is free to specialise in its own "craft," which is to rule, can its government be the best and be free from corrupt influences. There is perhaps more

justification for Aristotle's stricture that in the Platonic commonwealth there would be a sharp line of cleavage between two sections of the community, whose interests and outlook would be different, and the effect on the community as a whole would be not unification but disunion, a thing which Plato himself previously condemned.

The community in women and children is again a logical result of Plato's earlier contention. It is just as important that the rulers should have no home-ties to distract them as it is that they should have no property. If his views on this question seem strange or even repulsive to a modern reader, it must be remembered that neither at Athens nor elsewhere in Greece did family life play an important part in the social organisation of the community. In Athens, and in most states with the exception of Sparta, women remained in the seclusion of their homes. The lawful wife of a citizen took no part in the social life of the community, or only on rare occasions, such as the Panathenaic festival. The view that the sole purpose of marriage is to continue the race was held by Plato as it was by the rest of his countrymen, and when family life meant so little, its absence would hardly be a serious loss. At the same time in his advocacy of the "emancipation" of women so that, conformably with their natural ability, they should take as active a part in the life of the state as the men, Plato is centuries ahead of his time, and the same may be said of his plea for a eugenic race, even though we disagree with the means to the end which he proposes. For we feel that Plato is wrong and Aristotle is right when, in his criticism of the *Republic*, he stresses the importance of the family.

The *Laws* : But in the *Laws* Plato himself, without

abandoning his eugenic ideal or his insistence on the co-operation of women with men in the state, yet modifies his views. In the state there portrayed the family plays an important part, and perhaps the only serious objection that can be brought against marriage and family life in the *Laws* is that so much state-control is both impracticable and undesirable. Plato, as he is careful to explain (*Laws*, v. 739), regards this state as second-best; the ideal state to him is still the commonwealth which he had delineated more than thirty years before. In one way his own political sympathies are more apparent in his later than in his earlier work. The state of the *Laws* is meant to be a compromise between the unattainable ideal of the *Republic* and states as they actually existed in historic Greece. Consequently Plato's aristocratic sympathies are more evident, and this is particularly noticeable in the classification of the members of this community. In the *Laws* the producers cease to be citizens; commerce and industry is to be left to resident foreigners whose sojourn in the country is limited, save in exceptional cases, to twenty years, and whose activities are to be strictly supervised. Passing strangers are permitted to come for commercial purposes. The cultivation of the soil is left to the slaves, whose position is very like that of the Spartan Helots. In the *Republic* there are no slaves, unless it is to be assumed that the third class had them, though this is nowhere stated; in the *Laws* the only slaves of whom we hear are those employed in agriculture; there is no reference to domestic slaves. In the very striking passage (xi. 918 ff.) on retail trade we meet the same antipathy to trade and commerce that was remarked in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, and that appears also in Aristotle. In actual Greek states the

attitude to the “vulgar” or “mechanical” crafts and to trade seems to have varied considerably. Agriculture was almost universally looked on with approval (*cf.*, for instance, the remarks in *Xenophon, Oecon.* 4) and, in a lesser degree, the operations of the wholesale merchant. In Corinth and in Athens, particularly in Athens of the fifth century, the feeling that those who engaged in trade and skilled manual labour were “inferior” hardly existed except among a minority. Nor did such occupations in any way reduce a man’s political rights in democratic Athens, and that is surely the root of the matter. In the ideal or quasi-ideal state portrayed by the philosopher political inferiority or complete absence of civic status is the lot of the “craftsman”; in the democratic city-states of Greece his vocation may have implied, in the view of some, social inferiority; politically, he is equal to the highest in the state. The mere prejudice against such callings, if it is unaccompanied by loss of political privilege, is surely not peculiar to ancient civilisation. It still exists, as readers of *Evan Harrington* will remember.

Property, in the *Laws*, is privately owned, but private ownership is to be combined with use in common; thus, for example, the produce from the land must be assigned for use at the common messes, which will exist not only for the men but also for the women. While the amount of real estate is the same for all the citizens, equality in personal estate is felt to be impracticable, but a maximum, which any one citizen can acquire, is fixed, namely, property four times the value of his lot of land.

The *Politics*: In his great work on political science Aristotle begins by tracing the origin of the city-state from the household. There is an intermediate stage, the village, which arises from a collection of households and

is ruled by the oldest progenitor. Originally the *polis* exists merely to minister to life, and it only gradually develops so as to minister to good or noble life. The theory of the household is concerned with persons and with property; with regard to the former there are three forms of "association" or relation involved, that of master and slave, husband and wife, father and child. Aristotle then proceeds to examine the first of these two relations, and from a discussion of slavery goes on to property, leaving the other two forms of association for consideration at the end of Book I.

In his defence of slavery he emphasises that only those who are of non-Hellenic race should be used as slaves, but his contention that "slaves by nature" exist follows logically from his postulate that all forms of society are composed of two parts, rulers and ruled. Still, if Aristotle defends slavery, he is also anxious for its reform, and supposing that a political society, such as he portrays, had ever existed, it may be said that slavery in it would have been deprived of most of its objectionable features. It is quite another question whether the slavery existing in such a state would have been any more satisfactory from the economic standpoint than the "unreformed" slavery in existing cities. There is no reason to suppose that it would. In practice slave labour for agriculture was found to be unsatisfactory not only in Greece but in Rome, and the best types of slaves in existing states — those with considerable intellectual or artistic attainments — who were generally of Greek, or partly of Greek birth, would be excluded from the Aristotelian state.

From a consideration of slavery Aristotle proceeds to the question of property and wealth. Here he distinguishes between a natural and unnatural form of the

science of supply, and so between "natural" and "unnatural" wealth. In tracing the growth of the second form of the science he gives a wonderfully lucid analysis of exchange, of value in use and in exchange, and of the invention of money as a medium of exchange. The whole of this passage in the *Politics* should be compared with a short section in the *Ethics*. The subject of the fifth book of that treatise is Justice, and Aristotle distinguishes carefully between Distributive Justice and Corrective Justice. It is the second of these two types of Justice which is the principle of commerce, for it does not take any account of persons but, where inequality has been caused by injustice, it aims at re-establishing equality by arithmetical proportion, that is, by taking away so much from one side and adding it to the other. In a digression Aristotle works out in some detail the operation of this kind of Justice in commercial transactions, and it is this passage together with the chapters in the *Politics* which forms his main contribution to economic theory in the strictly modern sense of the term. His objection to all forms of commercial transaction of which the purpose is not merely to furnish the persons concerned with what they need for their personal use, is ultimately based on an ethical principle that not production, but action or conduct is the end for man. For the same reason the producers in his ideal state are outside the citizen body; except for that part of them who are to be slaves Aristotle gives us no information as to their social organisation or even who they will be. Presumably they will, in the main, be foreigners.

To his criticisms of earlier speculators in the second book of the *Politics* some reference has already been made. His objection to community in property, on the ground

that it is contrary to certain feelings deeply rooted in human nature (*Pol.* ii. 4 and 5), commands assent, as do his strictures on the scheme of Phaleas and the conclusion that the only true safeguard against dissension in the state is education. Summing up Aristotle's criticisms of his predecessors Newman very truly says of him: "In effect, he rests the institutions of the Household and Several Property on their true basis—their value to man as a means to perfect life, or, in modern language, as a means of civilisation."

On the description of the ideal state and its capital it is perhaps hardly necessary to dwell at length; it will suffice to enumerate certain points of particular interest. Unlike Plato, Aristotle is not a "free-trader" (*Pol.* iv. (vii.), 6). Although he had criticised Plato's proposal in the *Laws* that the lots of land should be held by each citizen in two half portions in different parts of the country, he himself lays down a similar arrangement (*ibid.* 10). His directions for choosing a site for the city, depending, of course, on the climatic conditions of Greece, for its defence and, above all, for an efficient water-supply, with the truly "modern" device of two supplies, one for drinking and one for other purposes, if the amount of wholesome water available is limited, are all admirable; and, lastly, in advocating common messes Aristotle is perhaps thinking rather of the actual practice as it existed in Sparta and in Crete than imitating Plato.

In conclusion it may be well once more to stress two closely-related facts which determine the character of Greek thought on economic problems and at the same time differentiate it from the modern science of economics: firstly, the city-state, not individual man, is, as it were, the unit which the Greek thinkers constantly have in

view in speculating on political science; and, secondly, their view-point is predominantly ethical in tone. The modern economist regards man, it is true, as a member of society, but begins his investigation with the individual, not with the whole of which the individual is a part; again, if Nicholson remarks of one school of economists, "In my opinion one of the greatest merits of the old English school is the sharp distinction drawn between economic laws and moral ideals," it may be said that, whatever modifications of the older doctrines more recent writers on political economy may have adopted, this separation of economic science from ethics sharply distinguishes all alike from the Greek theorists.

Hence, for example, though Plato in a closely-reasoned argument advocates the division of labour, the reasons he gives for it are ethical; he does not attempt to weigh the economic advantages or disadvantages of such a course. Since he is little concerned with the producers in the state, we do not expect to find him enunciating, for instance, such a doctrine as that the division of labour is limited by the extent of the market. Similarly the reader is doomed to disappointment if, in studying the distribution of land and its cultivation in the *Laws*, he expects to find any reference to the law of diminishing return. Again, in their excessive anxiety to keep the civic population as static as possible, Plato and Aristotle are actuated partly by political, partly by ethical considerations, and, in any case, their point of view is limited by their conception of the city-state as the best form of social community. There is no reference to the economic questions involved; for example, that the population of their cities is necessarily determined or limited by the means of subsistence.

But when the writer quoted above remarks, “If old utopias are read at all, it is generally as part of the literature or of the history of philosophy, and not as practical guides to economic reform,” one would venture to suggest that the generalisation, or implied condemnation from the point of view of the modern economic theorist, is too sweeping. The value which a modern student puts on the economic speculations of the Greeks must depend on the estimate which he forms of their political science. If the latter is of value—and he would be rash who would deny it—the former also, which are an integral part thereof, must necessarily be of more than merely historical interest.

GREEK ECONOMICS

SOLON

Fragments 4 and 13 (ll. 41-76)

The numbers are those in the last edition of Bergk's *Poetae Lyrici Graeci* (cf. Bibliography at the end of this volume).

OUR city ne'er shall perish by Zeus' ordinance and the will of the immortal blessed Gods; for Pallas Athene, great-hearted guardian and daughter of a mighty sire, extends protecting hands over her. But the men of the city themselves, hearkening to the call of wealth, are minded by their folly to destroy a mighty city. Unjust is the counsel of the people's chiefs; them there awaits the taste of many sorrows born of their great insolence. For they know not how to check their greed or to order the good-cheer that they have, in quiet enjoyment of the feast. They are rich by trusting to deeds of injustice and they steal and rob from this source and that, sparing neither the treasure of the gods nor of the state. They do not keep unshaken the venerable foundations of Justice, who, though silent, knows their present deeds and past; but in the fulness of time assuredly she comes to exact full punishment. This is the plague that even now is coming upon the whole city, and there is no escape from it. Swiftly has the city been drawn into base slavery which arouses strife among kinsmen and slumbering war that destroys the fair manhood of many. Through foes

in conclaves that are dear to the heart of wrong-doers a lovely city quickly wastes away.

These are the ills that are rife among the people; of the poor many are going to foreign lands sold as slaves and bound by shameful fetters. Even thus the ills of the state come home to every man; no longer can the court-yard gates keep them out but they have leapt over the lofty wall and assuredly come upon a man even though he fly and hide in his inmost chamber. This is the warning my heart bids me give the men of Athens: bad laws bring ills innumerable upon a city, but good laws display all things in good order and in their proper place and simultaneously lay shackles on the unjust; they make rough places smooth, check greed, blot out insolence, and cause the growing flowers of guilt to wither; they make straight crooked customs, quell deeds of arrogance and end deeds of faction; they end the wrath that comes of grievous strife and under their sway all things are rightly and prudently ordered among men.

The divers Callings of Men

If a man be needy and the toils of poverty constrain him he thinks he will acquire much wealth in any way he can. Many are the men and many the aims of their striving. One roams o'er the fishy sea in ships, yearning to bring home gains, driven on by relentless winds, sparing his life not a whit. Another cleaving the fruitful earth serves for a year the owners of the curved plough. Another, skilled in the works of Athene and Hephaistos, master of many crafts, brings together a livelihood with his hands. Another, taught gifts by the Muses of Olympus,

has learnt the measure of fair wisdom. Another has been made a seer by the lord Apollo who works from afar and who knows the ill that comes from afar upon men, the ill that even the Gods attend on; for the decrees of Fate assuredly no omen or sacrifice shall avert. Others possess the craft of Paion, the skilled in many drugs, even the physicians, and no assured end to their task is theirs; but often great suffering arises from a little pain, and none, though he give soothing drugs, could assuage the ill; but another, racked by an evil unrelenting sickness, touched by the physician's hands is quickly made whole.

Now fate brings good and ill alike to mortal men, and what the immortal Gods bestow no man can shun. But with the beginning of wealth danger attends upon every enterprise and no man knows where he is like to stop. One, striving to act well but lacking forethought, is plunged into great and cruel destruction; to another who acts ill God grants good luck in every undertaking, to release him from his folly. But to wealth men have set themselves no clear bounds; for those of us who now have most substance but redouble our zeal for more. Who could sate all men? Gains in truth the Immortals have bestowed on mortals; from them Destruction arises, Destruction who, sent by Zeus as punishment, comes now upon this man, now upon that.

LYSIAS

Against the Corn-dealers

The circumstances under which this speech was delivered have been briefly indicated in the General Introduction. Lysias, like his father Kephalos, whose name has become immortal because the scene of Plato's *Republic* is set in his house (and Plato has drawn a charming picture of the old man), was a resident foreigner at Athens, and, after the loss of his patrimony in the revolution of 404, became a highly successful professional writer of law-court speeches. The speeches were delivered by the clients for whom they were written.

GENTLEMEN of the jury, many persons have approached me and expressed surprise that I denounced the corn-dealers in the senate; they added that you, if you think that the dealers have committed a serious offence, are equally of opinion that any person speaking about these matters is an informer. Consequently I wish in the first place to state the reasons by which I have been compelled to denounce these men.

When the committee of the senate referred the question to the whole of that body, the anger felt against the corn-dealers was such that some public men expressed the view that they should be handed over without trial to the Eleven¹ for capital punishment. I for my part thought it dangerous that such action on the part of the senate should become customary. I therefore rose and said that my view was that the dealers should be tried according to the law. I considered that, if they had committed offences deserving of death, you would be just as capable as we of giving a just verdict; but, if they have committed no wrong, they should not go to their death without

¹ A board of officials at Athens in charge of the prison and responsible for the carrying out of capital sentences.

trial. As the senate were convinced by my arguments, my opponents tried to get up an accusation against me, saying that I spoke as I did in order to protect the corn-dealers. Now, in actual fact, I made my defence before the senate when the matter came up for decision. For it was when no one else spoke, that I rose and denounced the dealers, and made it perfectly clear that I was not speaking on their behalf, but upholding the existing laws. For this reason I took the initiative, since I feared their charges. And I think it shameful to desist, until you have recorded whatever verdict you wish about them.

To Witness : Now in the first place do you come up here and answer me. Are you a resident alien ?

Yes.

What are the conditions of your residence ? That you should obey the laws of Athens or do what you please ?

That I should obey the laws.

Then do you expect anything but death if you have committed any offence against the laws for which death is the penalty fixed ?

I do not.

Answer me then; do you admit that you joined with others in buying up more than the fifty bushels of grain allowed by the law ?

I did so on the instruction of the magistrates.

Now, gentlemen, if he can show the existence of a law authorising corn-dealers to form a syndicate to buy up corn, if instructed to do so by the magistrates, I ask you to acquit the accused. If not, justice demands that you should condemn them. For we have set before you the law which forbids any person in the city to combine with others to buy up more than fifty bushels of grain.

Well, gentlemen, this indictment of mine should suffice, since the accused there admits that he bought as one of a syndicate, and the law clearly prohibits that, and you have taken an oath to record your verdict in accordance with the laws. Nevertheless, to convince you that the defendants are also making lying statements against the magistrates, I must speak to you about them at somewhat greater length. When the accused brought this charge against the magistrates, we summoned the latter and questioned them. Two of them said that they knew nothing about the matter, but Anytus stated that, during last winter when grain was dear and the dealers here were outbidding one another and fighting amongst themselves, he advised them to desist from their trade rivalry, thinking that it would benefit you, who purchase from these men, that they should buy as cheaply as possible. For the dealers were to sell at a price not exceeding the price they paid by more than an obol ($1\frac{1}{2}$ d.) a bushel. I will bring Anytus himself before you to give evidence that he did not instruct the dealers to form a syndicate to buy and hoard up grain, but merely advised them not to bid against one another; also that he made this statement when a previous senate was in office, while the dealers are known to have formed their syndicate during the present session.

[*Evidence of Anytus*]

Well, you have heard that it was not on the instructions of the magistrates that the dealers bought up grain. But I am of opinion that, if they are speaking the truth to the best of their ability about these matters, they would not defend their own conduct but would condemn the action of the magistrates. For where laws have been

explicitly framed about certain courses of action, should not the penalty be enforced alike against those who disobey the laws and those who instruct others to act in contravention of them?

However, gentlemen, I do not think that the defendants will have recourse to this argument. Perhaps they will say, as indeed they did in the senate, that they bought up the corn to show their loyalty to Athens, so that they could sell to us at the lowest price. I will give you strong and convincing proof that they lie. If their transaction was made in your interests, they ought to have been seen to be selling at the same price for a considerable number of days, until the stock that they had bought up was exhausted. As it was, there was sometimes a variation of a drachma (10d.) in the selling-price on the same day, just as though they had bought their corn up bushel by bushel. To prove this, I will call witnesses. Personally I think it scandalous that when the defendants are called upon to pay property-tax, about which all are likely to know, they protest and plead poverty; but when engaging in transactions for which the penalty is death and concealment is in their interest, they assert that they broke the law to show their loyalty to you. And yet, you are all aware that the defendants have absolutely no right to speak in this way; for their interests are the very opposite to those of the rest of the population. They make enormous profits on any occasion when news is brought of a national calamity and they sell their grain very dearly. So pleased are they to see your misfortunes that they get information of some of these before other people; others they themselves invent, for example, that the grain-fleet in the Black Sea has been wrecked or captured by the Lacedaemonians as it sailed out of the straits, or that the

markets have been shut against Athens, or that our treaties (with states on the Black Sea) are on the point of being cancelled. In fact, so great is their hostility that they use the same opportunities to plot against you as your enemies do. For when your need of grain is greatest, they grab all that there is and refuse to sell, so that we may not dispute about the price but be content to go our way after buying from them at any figure they like to fix. In a word, at times, though Athens is at peace, these fellows reduce her to a state of siege. Their knavery and malice has been known in Athens so long that, while in the case of other commodities you have appointed the market-inspectors to exercise supervision, in the case of this trade alone you elect grain-inspectors besides. Often enough you have punished the latter who were citizens, because they failed to keep the malpractices of the dealers in check. And yet, what punishment should the transgressors themselves receive at your hands, when you put to death even those who fail to supervise properly? You must reflect that it is impossible for you to give a verdict of acquittal; for, if you acquit the defendants when they admit that they have formed a ring against the merchants, it will be thought that you are taking hostile action against the importers. If the dealers' defence were other than it is, no one could blame a jury for giving a verdict in their favour; for it is your prerogative to believe whichever side you like. But as it is, how could your conduct be regarded as other than monstrous, if you let men, who admit that they have broken the law, go scot-free? Remember, gentlemen, that you have condemned many in the past who have been accused of this offence and have brought evidence in their own defence, because you thought the prosecutors' statement more

trustworthy. And yet, would it not be an astonishing thing if, when trying the same class of offence, you preferred to condemn those who deny the statements made against them? Furthermore, gentlemen, I think you all realise that trials for offences of this sort concern every member of the community, so that all may learn your decision and suppose that, if you condemn the defendants to death, others will behave better. But if you let them go free, you will by your verdict have given them complete licence to do whatever they please. Gentlemen, you ought to punish the defendants not merely for past offences, but as an example of what will happen in the future. Thus only will these people be just bearable. Reflect that very many persons are risking their very lives in this trade and so great is the advantage they derive from it that they prefer to hazard their existence day by day than to stop making illegal profits at your expense. Even if they entreat and supplicate you, you would not be justified in having any compassion for them, but should reserve that for the citizens who have died owing to the defendants' knavery and for the merchants against whom they have formed their combine. To these last you will be doing a service and will increase their readiness to serve you, if you punish the defendants. If you do not, what judgment do you think that they will form about you, when they learn that you have acquitted the petty shopkeepers who agreed to plot against the importers? I do not know what more I need say. In the case of other offenders, when they are on trial, information must be obtained (by the jury) from the prosecutor; but the misdeeds of the defendants are known to all of you. If you condemn them, you will be upholding justice and will pay less for your grain. If not, you will pay more.

XENOPHON

Ways and Means to increase the Revenues of Athens

I HAVE always considered that there is a close correspondence between the character of the constitution of a state and the natural disposition of its ministers. As, however, some of those who have had the control of affairs at Athens were in the habit of saying that they were as familiar with justice as other men, but asserted that, owing to the poverty of the people, they were compelled to show some injustice to their allies, for this reason I made it my business to consider whether the Athenians could in some way live entirely on their home-resources —that would also be the most equitable course—and I reflected that, if this were the case, a remedy would be forthcoming for the poverty of our citizens and at the same time for the suspicion with which our fellow-Hellenes regard us.

It at once occurred to me, when thinking over what I had in mind, that our country is adapted by nature to afford the most ample revenues. To prove the truth of my assertion I will first describe the physical character of Attica. In the first place the products themselves bear witness to the great mildness of the climate. In truth, plants, which in many places could not even sprout, here bear fruit. Like the land, so, too, the sea that encircles it is all-productive. Furthermore, all the good things which the Gods afford in their seasons, all these in Attica begin at the earliest and cease at the

latest moment. But the country is not merely rich in products which annually bloom and wither, it also possesses resources which last for ever. Nature has given it an abundant supply of stone, from which are fashioned fairest shrines and altars and most beauteous images to the gods. Many Hellenes, and non-Hellenes too, have need of that stone. Again, there is land which, if sown, bears no fruit, but, when quarried, supports many times as many persons as it would if it were corn-land. Further, it is assuredly by some divine providence that it is veined with silver. Though many cities are our neighbours both by land and by sea, not even a small vein of silver ore runs through one of these. One would be justified in the view that Athens is situated in the centre of Hellas and of all the inhabited world. For the further men are from it the more severe is the heat or cold to which they are exposed, and all who wish to make their way from one end of Greece to the other, sail by or pass through Athens, which is like the centre of a circle. Besides, though Athens is not surrounded by the sea, yet, being accessible to all winds like an island, it imports what it needs and exports what it wishes; for Athens is near the sea. By land, too, it receives much by way of commerce, being in fact a mainland city. Further, the majority of Hellenic cities have non-Hellenic neighbours who cause them trouble, but the neighbours of Athens are the very cities which are farthest away from the non-Hellenic tribes.

2 And so, for all these advantages, as I have said, I consider that the country itself is responsible. But if, in addition to the native advantages of the land, we were first to direct our attention to the resident foreigners—for this source of revenue appears to me to

be amongst the best, seeing that these men, though they are self-supporting and of great service to the cities where they live, receive no payment but pay the poll-tax—the following provision would, I think, be adequate, namely, if we abolished, firstly, all regulations which, while in no way beneficial to the city, seem to inflict disabilities on the foreigners, and, secondly, the liability of foreigners to serve as heavy-armed troops side by side with the citizens. While he is absent the foreign resident encounters great risks and the departure from his children and his household is a serious matter, too. Moreover, it would also be to the city's interest if the citizens served with their fellows and were not ranged, as is now the case, by the side of Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians and other non-Hellenic persons from every quarter; for many of the resident aliens are non-Hellenic. In addition to the advantage that the foreigners would be exempted from serving with citizens, it would increase the glory of Athens if her citizens in war should resolve to rely on themselves rather than strangers. If, in addition to allowing them to partake of the other privileges in which it is right to give them a share, we admit them to the cavalry, I think we should make them more loyal and at the same time render the city stronger and greater. Again, as there are many sites unoccupied by houses inside city-walls, if the city granted to those, who on tendering their request appeared to be worthy of the privilege, permission to acquire land, provided their intention was to build, I think that, for this reason too, more and better-class foreigners would be anxious to settle at Athens. And if we set up official wardens of the foreigners like the wardens of orphans, and some privileges were assigned to those who could point to the largest number of foreigners

under their care, this too would increase the loyalty of the foreigners and, in all probability, all those who are without a city of their own would be anxious to become residents at Athens and would increase the revenues.

3 To prove, moreover, that the city is most convenient and profitable for commercial business, I will now mention the following points. In the first place, I suppose, she provides the best and surest anchorage for vessels, to which sailors can safely come when it is stormy and moor. Further, in the majority of cities merchants are compelled to lade with goods in exchange for their cargo, for the currency they use is not honoured outside their own country; but in Athens merchants, in return for their merchandise, can export whatever men need of a large variety of goods, and if they do not wish to take wares in exchange for wares, they can make a good bargain, too, if they export silver. For wherever they dispose of it, they secure a considerable interest on their capital. Again, if one were to assign prizes to the magistrates who control the market for the justest and quickest settlement of disputes, so that anyone who wished would not find his departure by sea delayed, merchants would come here for trade in far greater numbers and with far more readiness. It would be a sound and proper course to bestow free seats at the festivals on merchants and ship-owners as a mark of distinction, or at least that any persons who are thought to be benefiting Athens by the noteworthy amount of their shipping or merchandise, should from time to time be invited to state banquets. If they received these honours, they would hasten to come to Athens as to friends, not merely for profit but for the sake of these distinctions. Now, the greater the number of foreign residents and visitors, the greater the

amount of merchandise imported and sent abroad and sold would be, the greater also the sum accruing from rents and customs. To effect such increase in our revenues no previous outlay is required but only liberal-minded legislation and supervision. As for other sources of revenue, I realise that they will require some outlay of capital. However, I have good hopes that the citizens will readily contribute for that purpose, when I reflect how large were the sums paid in property tax when Athens aided the Arcadians at the time when Lysistratus was in command (B.C. 366), and again at the time of Hegesileos (B.C. 362). I know, too, that men of war are often sent on expeditions involving heavy expenditure, and they are sent, although it is doubtful whether the issue will be success or disaster, but quite certain that the citizens will never recover what they have paid in property tax nor have a share in any material gains that result. They would not derive such favourable returns from any investment as from money advanced to raise this fund. The man whose contribution amounts to ten minae (£40) gets perhaps twenty per cent. per annum interest, that is to say, three obols a day, which is as much as he would get from a loan on bottomry; again, a contributor of five minae will get more than thirty-three and one-third per cent., while the majority of Athenians will annually be assured of more than cent. per cent. on their loan. Those who advance one mina will receive nearly two minae and that without leaving Athens, which is the safest and most lasting investment on earth. I think, too, that if the contributors' names were likely to appear for a time in the public records as benefactors of the city, many strangers also would contribute, and further, some cities would be eager to be enrolled as subscribers.

In fact, I hope that even some kings, despots and satraps would be anxious to share in these advantages.

Now when the capital has been raised, it would be a sound and advantageous course to build hostellries for ship-masters round the harbours in addition to those that already exist; further, to provide merchants with suitable accommodation for buying and selling, and state-controlled hostellries for visitors. If houses and shops were also equipped for the retail dealers both in Peiraeus and in Athens, not only would it improve the appearance of the city but large revenues would result. I fancy it would also be a good experiment if the city, just as she owns a navy, were able to acquire a state-owned mercantile fleet; these vessels could then be hired out on security like other contracts given by the state. If this proposal were shown to be feasible, much revenue would accrue from this source also.

4 Again, if the silver mines were equipped as they ought to be, I consider that much wealth, even without other sources of income, would be available. I wish to explain to those unacquainted with the facts the resources of the mines. Once you know these resources you will be better able to decide how to make the best use of them. That the mines have been productive for many years everyone knows; no one in fact even tries to state when they were first worked. Though the silver ore has been mined and brought to the surface for so long, you should remark how small is the proportion of slag-heaps to the hills that are still unworked and contain silver ore. In truth the district which is rich in silver is clearly not reduced in extent but is constantly being widened. At a time when the largest possible number of persons was engaged there, no one was ever short of work, but the

work to be done was always greater than the available labour. Even at the present time no owner of slaves in the mines reduces their number, but constantly acquires as many additional hands as he can. For in truth, when a few persons mine and explore, the wealth that is brought to light is also small; when many are engaged, the ore is seen to be many times more prolific. Consequently this is the only commercial enterprise that I know where no one feels envious towards those who try to carry out new developments. Again, the landowners could all tell you how many teams and how many labourers are required for their estates. If anyone employs hands in excess of requirements, it is reckoned as a loss. But in the silver mines all the employers say that they are short of workers, for here the case is different to that in other industries. When there are too many coppersmiths and copper articles become cheap, they go bankrupt; similarly with iron-founders. And when corn and wine are plentiful and these commodities are cheap, agriculture ceases to be profitable and many abandon working on the land and turn to wholesale and retail trade and to money-lending. But in the case of silver ore, the more is discovered and the more silver is extracted, the greater is the number of men who take to this industry. In truth, when a man has acquired sufficient furniture for his house, he does not purchase any more; but so far no one has acquired so much silver that he no longer requires more. If some have a superabundance, they take as much pleasure in burying the superfluous portion as if they used it. Besides, when cities are prosperous, men need silver in a very great degree. The men wish to spend it on fine arms, well-bred horses, houses and splendid furniture and equipment; the women turn

to costly garments and gold ornaments. Again, when cities are in straits owing to bad harvests or war, and still more when the land is not under cultivation, they need money to purchase essential commodities and to hire mercenary troops. If anyone were to say that gold coin is as serviceable as silver, I should not contradict him, but I know this, that when an abundance of gold makes its appearance, its value depreciates and it sends up the price of silver. My reason for explaining these facts is to induce us confidently to employ as many persons as possible in the mines and confidently to develop the industry there, since the silver ore will never give out and silver will never lose its value. I think the city was aware of these facts before my time; at any rate she allows any foreigner who wishes to carry out mining operations on the same terms as her citizens.

In order that I may also explain more fully about maintenance, I will now show in detail how the mines might be run most profitably for the city. I do not claim that any of the facts which I intend to enumerate ought to cause astonishment, as though I had found out something that was difficult to discover, for some of the facts that I shall name can still be observed by everyone at the present time; as to the others, which happened in the past, we are told that things then were much the same as now. However, one must surely wonder at the city in that, though she sees many of her private citizens becoming wealthy, she does not imitate them. Those of us who have an interest in such matters have, I suppose, heard that in former times Nikias, son of Nikeratos, acquired a thousand workmen in the mines, which he hired out to Sosias, the Thracian, on the following terms: Sosias was to pay Nikias one obol a day net for each

workman and was to keep the number of men employed always at that figure. Hipponikos, too, had six hundred slaves hired out in the same way, who brought him in a mina (£4) a day clear, and Philemonides had three hundred bringing in half a mina, and others, I suppose, had incomes in this way according to their resources invested. However, what need is there to relate past history? there are at the present day many workmen in the mines hired out in this way.

In fact, in carrying out my proposals the only new feature would be this, that, just as private citizens by acquiring slaves have assured themselves of a perpetual income, so the city too should acquire slaves to be owned by the state until there would be three slaves to every Athenian citizen. If my suggestion is practicable, anyone who likes can consider each detail separately and record his verdict. It is obvious that the state would find it easier to defray the cost of the slaves than private persons; in fact, it would be a simple matter for the council to issue a proclamation stating that anyone was at liberty to bring his slaves, and then to buy up those brought forward. When once the slaves have been bought up by the state, why should anyone be less ready to hire them from the state than from private owners if he is going to hold them on the same terms? After all, men rent consecrated lands and buildings from the city, and bid for the farming of public taxes. To ensure that the slaves hired from the state be kept up to full strength, the state can take sureties from the hirer just as it does from the tax farmers. Yet it would assuredly be easier for a tax farmer than for a man hiring slaves from the state to evade the law. For how could one trace the exportation of coin belonging to the state, when it is

the same in appearance as privately-owned coin? But in the case of slaves branded with the state stamp, especially if anyone selling or exporting such were liable to a penalty, how could anyone steal them? So far it is clearly possible for the city to acquire slaves and guard against their loss. Again, if anyone is anxious on this point, whether, when many workmen are available, those ready to hire them will also be numerous, let him reflect on the following facts and take courage. Many of those who are already engaged in mining operations will hire state-owned slaves in addition to those privately owned, for the capital they have invested is large; many of the slaves in the mines are growing old, and further, many other Athenians and foreigners as well, who would not wish or be able to do manual work, would be glad to earn their living with their brains, as managers. However, if at first a body of twelve hundred state-owned slaves were established, from the resulting revenue in the course of five or six years not less than six thousand might reasonably be acquired. From this number, if each brought in an obol a day clear, the annual revenue would be sixty talents (£14,400). If twenty talents (£4,800) of this sum are devoted to the purchase of other slaves, it will still be possible for the city to use the remaining forty for other needful purposes. When the number of slaves has been brought up to ten thousand the annual revenue will be one hundred talents (£24,000).

Moreover, anyone who remembers the amount of the dues derived from slaves before the Decelean war, could bear witness to the fact that the state will receive many times more than the amounts I have indicated. Another fact is important evidence, namely, that although innumerable persons have been employed in the mines

during the whole period, the mines themselves are in no way different now to what they were in the memory of our ancestors. All the facts of the present day, too, show that the number of slaves there could never be in excess of what the mines require; for the miners find no limit of depth and no limit to the galleries they can cut. Moreover, it is just as possible now as formerly to open up new veins. No one then knows or can tell whether the districts that have already been worked contain more silver ore than the unworked parts. Why, it may be said, are not many new cuttings opened now as formerly? The reason is that the contractors of mining rights nowadays are poorer, for it is only in recent times that they have carried on operations again, and also the opening of a new cutting is attended by great risk. The man who finds a rich working becomes wealthy, but the man who does not, loses all the money he invests in the enterprise. This risk the people of the present day are not ready to face. However, I think I can make a suggestion about that, so that the opening of a new vein of ore will be a perfectly safe undertaking. There are of course ten Athenian tribes; if the state gave to each of these the same number of slaves and the tribes divided the risk when they opened new cuttings, then if one tribe found a rich vein of ore, it would afford advantage to all the tribes; if two or three or four or half the tribes were lucky, clearly the mining operations would become still more profitable. Moreover, that all the ten tribes should fail is contrary to the experience of the past. In the same way private persons by combining and dividing their chances could engage in the venture with more security. Furthermore, there is no need to fear either that a state company thus established will damage the interests of

private lessees or *vice versa*; but just as allies add to their mutual strength the greater the number who band together, so, too, in the silver mines, the more numerous the persons are who engage in this industry the greater the wealth they will discover and bring to light.

Now I for my part have stated that I think, if Athens were rightly organised, there would be sufficient to maintain all her citizens at the public expense. Nevertheless, if some should calculate that a very large capital would be required to carry out all these undertakings and think that the contributions that would come in would be insufficient, even so let them not despair. The case does not stand thus, that all these improvements must be carried out simultaneously, failing which they will be of no advantage. Rather, whatever number of buildings are erected or ships constructed or slaves purchased, these will at once be a source of profit. To tell the truth, in this respect it is indeed more profitable to proceed step by step than to undertake every matter at once: if we all build houses at the same time, we shall render the enterprise more costly and less efficient than if we do so bit by bit; if we all tried to acquire a vast number of slaves, we should be forced to buy inferior slaves and at a greater price. If we execute to the best of our ability undertakings with which we are familiar, we can then proceed to further developments; if any enterprise turned out a failure, we should desist from it.

Again, if all these ventures were going on at one time, we should have to provide all the capital at once; but if some are nearing completion while others are projected the existing revenues would help to provide the necessary capital. What perhaps appears to everyone to be the greatest danger is that, if the city acquired too many

slaves, the works would be overstuffed, and of this anxiety we should be rid if we did not employ year by year more men than the works require. Thus I think that to proceed on these lines is the best, as it is the easiest, way. Again, if it be thought that, because of the property-tax levied during the present war, it would be impossible to contribute anything at all, then do you administer the city for the coming year with a sum not exceeding that brought in by taxation before the peace; but additional sums resulting from the fact that the country is at peace, from the grant of facilities to resident aliens, merchants, and from the fact that more persons are importing and exporting a greater quantity of commodities, from the increase of harbour dues and markets, these take and apply them to such uses that the revenues may become as large as possible. If some again fear that these undertakings may become nugatory on an outbreak of war, let them reflect that, if these developments were being carried out, the war would be far more dangerous to our assailants than to Athens. What more serviceable possession is there against a war than man-power? It would then be adequate to enable the state to equip a large number of vessels. Many of the men, provided they were well looked after, could also serve as infantry and so give trouble to the enemy. My own calculation is that, even if a war broke out, it would be possible to keep the mines under our control. There are, of course, fortified posts round the mining district; there is one on the south at Anaphlystos, another on the north at Thorikos. The distance between these two points is about seven and a half miles. If then there were in the centre at the highest point of Besa a third fort, the gangs could be collected in one out of all these strongholds and, if there were signs

of hostile attack, it would take but a short time for everyone to retire into safety. Even if the enemy invaded the country in very large numbers, they could carry off any grain, wine or cattle that they found outside; but if they took possession of the silver ore they would have nothing but stones to live on. Moreover, how could an enemy ever advance as far as the mines? The nearest foreign city, Megara, is, I suppose, a good deal more than sixty miles from the mines; the nearest city after Megara, Thebes, is rather over seventy-five miles away. If the enemy march from one or other of these places against the mines, they will have to pass Athens. If they are few in number, the probability is that they will be wiped out by our cavalry and patrols, while to advance in large numbers and leave their own territory unprotected would be a dangerous operation; for Athens would be a good deal nearer to the cities of our opponents than they themselves would be when they are in the mining district. Suppose they did come, how could they stop there without supplies? To go out foraging is dangerous alike for those engaged on that quest and for the fighting force; if all of them go foraging then their situation will resemble that of besieged persons rather than besiegers. Not only then would the rent derived from hiring out slaves increase the resources of the state for maintaining its citizens, but if a large population collected in the mining district considerable revenue would accrue from a market held there, from state-owned houses near the mines, from furnaces and so forth. The district would itself become an exceedingly populous city, if thus organised, and these lands would be quite as valuable to the owners there as city land is to the Athenian land-owners. If my proposals were carried into effect, I maintain that Athens

would not only become more wealthy but she would improve in discipline, organisation and military efficiency. For the men told off for physical training would perform their duties far more conscientiously, once they receive maintenance in the gymnasia, than they do when in training for the torch-race; those detailed to be frontier guards or to serve as light-armed troops or military patrols in Attica would perform their several tasks more readily if state-maintenance were assigned to them while performing their several duties.

5 If it seems proven that, to secure a full return of all the revenues, peace ought to be assured, would it not then be worth while to appoint Guardians of the peace? Were this office to be appointed it would render Athens at once more pleasant a place and one more frequented by strangers from all parts. Suppose it be argued that, if Athens were continually at peace, her power, reputation and prestige in Greece would decline, in my opinion this view is quite beside the mark. For, I suppose, it is the cities which have been at peace for the longest time that men call the most prosperous, and of all cities Athens is naturally the most fitted to prosper in time of peace. If she were at peace who would not have need of her, beginning with shipmasters and merchants? Would not the magnates in grain, wine or olive oil do so, or the owners of numerous cattle or the men who can turn their acumen and their money to good profit? Nay, more, the same is true of craftsmen, teachers of higher education and philosophers, of poets and those who produce their works, and of those who are eager for everything, sacred or profane, that appeals to the eye or to the ear. But again, those who need to sell or buy many commodities quickly, where would they find what they need better

than at Athens? If no one disputes these arguments, but on the other hand some wish Athens to recover her empire and think that she would achieve this by war rather than by peace, let them first reflect on the Persian Wars, let them ask themselves whether it was by compulsion of or by good-will towards our fellow-Hellenes that we attained to our naval hegemony and control of the federal funds. Again, as Athens lost her empire because men thought her rule too harsh, did we not, as soon as we desisted from unjust dealings, again become the leading naval state at the invitation of the islanders? Did not even the Thebans, in return for benefits received, bestow on the Athenians the leadership? Nay, further, the Lacedaemonians, when they were not hard pressed but treated with generosity by us, suffered the Athenians to make whatever dispositions as to leadership that they wished. At the present time, owing to the turmoil in Hellas, I think it has fallen to the lot of Athens to win back the other Hellenes without trouble, danger or expense. For firstly it is in her power to try and effect a reconciliation between warring states, and secondly she can restore harmony where a state is disturbed by internal factions. If you make clear to the world your anxiety that the holy site of Delphi should become, as it was in former times, independent, not by warring amongst ourselves but by sending envoys all over Hellas, I, for my part, should not be surprised if you should get all the Greeks to become unanimous allies bound by oath to proceed against any who should try, now that the Phocians have left it, to occupy Delphi. If, further, you make it plain that you are anxious for the establishment of peace by land and sea, I think that, after their own country, all men would pray for the preservation of Athens. Again,

if anyone considers that in respect of the wealth that results war is more profitable than peace, I know of no better way of putting his view to the test than by reviewing the former enterprises of Athens and their outcome. He will find that formerly in time of peace much wealth accumulated in the Acropolis, but in war-time all this was spent. He will ascertain on inquiry that even at the present time owing to the war many sources of revenue have dried up, and those dues that have come in have been spent for all manner of purposes. But when peace on the sea has been restored, revenues have increased and the citizens have been able to put the monies of the state to whatever use they wished. If I were asked: "Come now, if anyone does Athens an injury, do you still say that we ought to continue at peace with him ?" I should not say so, but rather I maintain that we should punish such persons far more quickly, if we did no injuries ourselves to any man, for they would have no allies.

6 Well, then, if none of my proposals is impossible or difficult, but if by carrying them into effect we become better friends with the rest of the Hellenes and live in greater security and enhance our reputation, if the people have abundant means of subsistence and the wealthy are rid of expenditure on wars, if owing to the abundance of wealth we celebrate our festivals with more magnificence even than now and repair shrines and rebuild fortifications and docks, if we give back to priests and council and magistrates and knights their ancestral privileges, is it not then worth while taking these schemes in hand that we may live to see in our own time the secure prosperity of Athens ? If you should decide to carry out my proposals, for my part I would counsel you

to send to Dodona and to Delphi, and to inquire of the gods if it shall be for the good and prosperity of Athens to be so organised now and for the future. If the gods signify their approval, then again I say that we ought to inquire whose special patronage among the gods should we try to obtain, and so ensure the best and most perfect carrying-out of our projects. Whatever gods the oracle shall name, to these we must make auspicious sacrifice and then begin our task. If we act with the gods' consent, then we may expect our undertakings continually to progress for the good and prosperity of Athens.

XENOPHON

Oeconomicus

The greater part of this dialogue, as it deals with the practical management of the household and the farm, is outside our subject. The opening chapters, however, contain an inquiry into the meaning of "household" and "household management," together with a consideration of the true meaning of wealth and the responsibilities which come with the acquisition of riches.

The precise date of the composition of this work is uncertain; probably it was written about the year 370 B.C. The speakers in the earlier chapters of the dialogue are Sokrates and Kritobulus.

- 1 I ONCE heard Sokrates discoursing as follows on household management: Tell me, Kritobulus, he said, is household management the name of a branch of knowledge as we speak of the science of medicine and the art of metal-working and carpentry?

I think so, Kritobulus replied.

Can we then, just as we are able to define the function of each of these arts, define the function of household management?

I should say, Kritobulus answered, that the function of a good householder is the efficient direction of his own household.

Would he not, Sokrates continued, be able to direct another's household as efficiently as his own, if he wished and were entrusted with the task? For the skilled carpenter can work just as well for another as for himself and the household manager might do likewise.

I agree, Sokrates.

Then a man familiar with this art, though he might own no wealth of his own, might earn a wage by directing just as well as by building another man's house?

Bless me, yes, said Kritobulus, and he might earn very good money, if, after taking over the household, he could control the needful expenditure and then, by having a surplus, increase the resources of the household.

What do we mean by a household? Is it the same as a house or does it include all the property which a man owns outside the house itself?

In my opinion, Kritobulus rejoined, everything a man possesses is part of the household, although it may not even be in the same city as the owner.

Then some men also possess enemies?

Decidedly, and some of us a goodly number.

Shall we then say that a man's enemies form part of his possessions?

Nay, it would be ridiculous, said Kritobulus, if the man who was going to increase my stock of enemies, were also to obtain a wage for this.

Since we are agreed that a man's household is synonymous with his property.

Yes, said Kritobulus, his good property. I should certainly not call anything evil that he had in his possession.

I suppose you mean by his property all those things that are useful to him?

Yes, he answered; the things that do him harm I should regard as loss rather than as wealth.

Suppose then that someone buys a horse and does not know how to use it but falls off and comes to grief, does not the horse constitute wealth for him?

No, not if wealth is a good thing.

Then the earth does not constitute wealth to a man if his cultivation of it results in loss to himself?

No, even the earth is not wealth if, instead of supporting a man, it causes him to go hungry.

Then the same is true of flocks; if a man, because he is ignorant how to make right use of them, incurs loss the flocks will not represent wealth for him?

They would not, I think.

You then, it would seem, regard serviceable things as wealth, harmful things as not wealth.

Exactly.

Then the same things to a man who knows their several uses are wealth, to a man who is ignorant thereof are not. For example, to a man who is a respectable performer on the flute, flutes are wealth; to a man who does not know how to use them they are no better than useless stones, unless he can sell them. We are clear then on this point, that to a man who does not know the use of a flute, flutes constitute wealth if he sell them, but if instead of selling he keep possession of them, they do not.

Our argument, Sokrates, progresses quite consistently, seeing that we declared that wealth was equivalent to those things that are of use to us. The flutes, if they are not sold, are not wealth, for then they are useless; if they are sold they are wealth.

To this Sokrates added: Yes, if a man knows how to sell them; but if he were to dispose of them for something of which he did not know the use, then according to your argument the flutes, even though sold, would not be wealth.

You seem to imply, Sokrates, that even money is not wealth if the owner thereof is ignorant of its use.

Yes, and you seem to be in full agreement with me

that wealth consists of those things from which a man can derive advantage. Suppose he made such use of his money that he brought about the deterioration alike of his body, his soul and his household—as for instance if he spent it on a courtesan—how could the money then be regarded as a benefit to him?

Not in any way, unless we say that *hyoscyamus*, which drives those who eat of it mad, is to be called wealth.

In short, Kritobulus, if a man be ignorant of the use of money, then right away with it and let it cease to be wealth. What shall we say that friends are, if a man knows how to make use of them so that he derives benefit from them?

Wealth, decidedly, said Kritobulus, and that in a far greater degree than cattle, if they are in truth of greater service than cattle.

And further, in accordance with your argument, enemies, too, are wealth to the man who knows how to derive advantage from his enemy.

So I think.

Then it is the part of a good household manager to know how to use even his enemies so that he is benefited by them.

Most emphatically.

In truth, Kritobulus, you see how many households of private persons, and of despots also, have increased in prosperity as the result of war.

All these statements, Sokrates, seem admirable to me, but what are we to say to this? When we observe some men endowed with certain knowledge and resources with the help of which, if they work, they can increase the prosperity of their households, and yet we remark that they are loath to do so, and in consequence we see that

their knowledge is useless to them, does it not mean that neither their knowledge nor their property constitutes wealth for them?

It seems to me, said Sokrates, that you are trying to introduce the question of slaves, Kritobulus.

That is by no means my intention, he said. But there appear to be a certain number of persons of good birth who, I see, are skilled some in military craft, some in peace-time arts, and yet they refuse to turn these to account because, as I believe, they have no masters over them.

But how could it be that they have no masters, was Sokrates' reply, if, while they pray for prosperity and desire to do actions from which they will derive good, they are still prevented by their rulers from doing so?

Who, then, may these invisible rulers of theirs be? Kritobulus asked.

Nay, by my troth, said Sokrates, they are not invisible but extremely visible. What is more, they are intensely mischievous and are well known to you, if you look on sloth, effeminacy and indifference as mischievous. And besides these there are certain tricky mistresses who masquerade as pleasures, dice-playing and profitless associations among men, and these, as time progresses, reveal themselves even to those whom they have deceived, as pains disguised as pleasures which master men completely and hinder them from profitable works.

Nay, but other men, Sokrates, are not prevented by these from working, but they show keen attention to work and to devising means to better their resources, and yet they fritter away their estate and become entangled in embarrassments.

These too are slaves, said Sokrates, and slaves of cruel masters, some of luxury, some of lechery, others of

drunkenness, others of foolish and costly ambitions; these rule the men whom they have subdued so harshly that while men are in their prime and able to work, they compel them to bring all the fruits of their work and pay them, like a tax, to their own desires; but when these passions see that men through advancing years are powerless to work, they leave them to their fate to pass a miserable old age and try to make other men again their slaves. But, Kritobulus, it is our duty to fight for our liberty against these passions with no less vigour than against armed men who try to enslave us. Chivalrous enemies, when they have subjected their adversaries, in many cases make them better by prudent guidance and help them to lead a more easy life for the future. But the mistresses whom we have named, so long as they rule a man, do not cease from mutilating his body, his soul and his household.

2 After this Kritobulus continued somewhat as follows: I think I have sufficiently learnt your views on these topics. When I examine myself, I seem to find myself reasonably temperate regarding those passions, so that if you would counsel me what action I should take to improve my household, I do not think I should be prevented by those whom you call our mistresses from carrying out your advice. So, with all confidence, give me what good counsel you can. Is your verdict, Sokrates, that we are rich enough, and think you that we need no further wealth?

For myself, Sokrates answered, if you are speaking about me, I do not consider that I need any more wealth than I have, but am rich enough; but you, Kritobulus, seem to me to be very poor, and I assure you there are times when I feel sorry for you.

Kritobulus replied with a laugh: Good gracious, Sokrates, what do you suppose your belongings would fetch if sold, and what mine?

I suppose, if I found a good buyer, I should realise for everything, my house included, five minae (£20). But your property, I am quite aware, would fetch more than a hundred times this amount.

And when you have come to this decision, you think you have no need of further wealth and you pity me for my poverty?

Yes, for what I have is enough to satisfy my needs. As for the style of living you affect and the reputation you have to keep up, why, if you acquired three times the amount you now have, I do not think it would be enough for you.

How so? said Kritobulus.

Sokrates explained: In the first place I observe that you are obliged to sacrifice often and on a lavish scale, otherwise, I suppose, neither gods nor men would tolerate you; secondly, it devolves on you to entertain numerous strangers, and that in a sumptuous way. Furthermore, you have to give banquets to your fellow-citizens and to do them good turns, otherwise you will not have a supporter in the place. In addition to that I note that the state requires you to pay heavy contributions in the form of rearing of studs, training and equipping of choruses, direction of gymnastic schools and patronage of resident foreigners; and then in time of war I know that they will assign a trierarchy to you and levy property tax of such magnitude that you will find it hard to bear. Whenever men think that you are discharging your obligations in niggardly fashion, your punishment at the hands of the Athenians will be as

severe as if you had stolen what was theirs. And beyond all this I see that you think yourself wealthy and do not concern yourself with the best means of utilising your wealth but all your thoughts are centred on pursuits of boys, as if you had full liberty to do so. These are the reasons for which I pity you, in the fear that you may come to some irremediable harm and land yourself in grave difficulties. For myself, even if I had some additional wants, I know and you, too, are aware that there are those who would help me so that, by making what to them would be a small contribution, they would flood my daily life with affluence. But those friends of yours, though for their style of living they are far better situated than you for yours, nevertheless look to you for help.

Kritobulus replied: Sokrates, I have no answer to these remarks of yours, but this is your opportunity to be my "patron," so that I may not in reality become a pitiable object.

When he heard this, Sokrates said: Do you not think your own behaviour strange, Kritobulus? A little while ago when I described myself as wealthy, you laughed at me as though I did not know what wealth is, and you were not satisfied until you had catechised me and forced me to admit that I did not own one hundredth part of your possessions. But now you tell me to be your "patron" and to take good care that you do not literally become a beggar.

Yes, Sokrates, he answered, for I note that you are expert in one profitable business, the art of creating a surplus. Consequently I hope that the man who can produce much out of little, will find it a great deal easier to create a large surplus out of much.

Do you not then remember that a short while back,

when you would not give me leave even to give a grunt of protest, you argued that to one ignorant of their proper use horses are not wealth, nor is the earth, nor are flocks, nor is money or anything else whatever, if he does not know how to use it? Well, it is from this kind of wealth that incomes are derived. But how do you think that I should be able to use any one of these, I who never owned one of them at all?

Still, we concluded that even if some men do not happen to own wealth, yet there is such a thing as a science of household management. What then prevents you from being acquainted with that?

The very thing, i' faith, which would prevent a man from learning how to play a flute if he never acquired flutes himself and no one else had ever put his own at his disposal to learn on. My own position with regard to household management is just like that; for I never possessed wealth as an instrument on which to learn that science nor has anyone else ever entrusted his estate to me to administer until now, when you are ready to do so. Moreover, those who are beginning to learn the harp are wont to spoil their instruments. Well now, if I should learn that science in your household, I might perhaps ruin your household completely.

To this Kritobulus answered: You are all eagerness to try and escape and not help me in any way to bear more easily my necessary responsibilities.

Bless me, that is not my intention, but so far as I have the power I am most ready to lend you a guiding hand. But I think that if you had come for fire and had not found any at my house, you would not find fault with me if I took you elsewhere where you could obtain it; and if you had requested me for water and, because I had

none myself, I had guided you elsewhere for it, I am sure that in that case too you would have found no fault; and if you wished to learn music from me but I pointed out to you others who were far more skilled musicians than I and who would be grateful to you if you expressed your willingness to learn from them, what fault could you find with me then for my actions ?

None with justice, Sokrates.

Then, Kritobulus, I will show you many others who are far more skilled in these matters which you now importune me to teach you. I admit that I have made it my business to learn who in the city are most proficient in the several branches of knowledge. I was filled with astonishment when I ascertained on some occasion that when a number of men are concerned in one and the same undertaking part of them are quite poor and part are exceedingly rich, and the meaning of this seemed to me to be a question worthy of inquiry. As I pursued my inquiry, I found that all this happens quite naturally. I saw that those who proceeded unmethodically suffered losses, and I realised that those who attended to their affairs with minds alert, managed them more expeditiously and easily, and with more profit. I think that if you learnt from them, supposing you wished to do so, you would, unless God oppose, become a very skilful man of business.

3 When he heard this Kritobulus said: Now in very truth I will not let you go, Sokrates, until you explain before our friends here what you have promised.

Well, Kritobulus, Sokrates went on, suppose I show you first of all two sets of men, one of whom at great cost builds useless houses while the other with far less outlay constructs houses that contain everything that

is needful, will you admit that I am directing your attention to one of the cases which concern the household manager?

Most certainly, said Kritobulus.

Or again, if after this I point out to you the sequel, the former persons possessed of a varied abundance of furniture, yet when they require them, unable to make use of them and ignorant whether they are in good condition, and for that reason greatly harassed themselves while greatly harassing their servants; the latter owning not more but less than those, yet having everything that they need ready for instant use.

Is not then the reason for these differences, Sokrates, simply that with the former everything has been thrown down haphazard, while the latter have everything arranged in the proper place?

Yes, i' faith, said Sokrates; and everything has been arranged not in the place where it happened to come but in that to which it properly belongs.

I think, he replied, that here, too, you are speaking of one of the matters that concern the householder.

Well, now, if I further portray to you the slaves in these two types of household, who in one case are complete bondsmen and in consequence frequently try to run away, but in the other enjoy some freedom from control and are ready to work and abide where they are, will you not again consider that I have shown you a noteworthy example of household management?

Yes, i' faith, Kritobulus replied, most decidedly so.

Or again, if we take two neighbours working their farms, the one asserting that agriculture has been his ruin and in a state of helpless distress, the other satisfying all his needs abundantly and well from this vocation?

Again I say yes, Kritobulus rejoined, for it may be that men spend what they get not only for proper purposes but on things which harm themselves and their estate.

Yes, said Sokrates, maybe there are such men also; but I am not referring to such, but to those who have not even the wherewithal to spend on necessities, though they assert that they are farmers.

Sokrates gives one or two further illustrations of good and bad household "economy" and digresses on the thrifty and the thriftless housewife, a subject dealt with more fully in the latter part of the dialogue. The short passage which follows on craftsmen is of great interest as it reflects the same attitude of mind which is found in Plato and Aristotle, and which indeed was the attitude of the majority of Greeks to manual work, however highly skilled.

Sokr. I think I can direct you to the ablest workers severally in the remaining arts and sciences, if you think that you require further guidance.

4 Nay, but what need is there, Sokrates, for you to point out all these? For it would not be easy to find workers of the required standard in all the arts, and to become an expert in all oneself would be impossible. But it is those arts which men look on as fairest and to which it would be best for me to apply myself, which I would have you point out to me together with their craftsmen, and you yourself, as far as you can, give me additional help by your teaching.

Your proposal, Kritobulus, is good, he said. For the arts that men call vulgar are commonly decried and are held in disesteem by the judgment of states, with good reason. They utterly ruin the bodies of workers and managers alike, compelling men, as they do, to lead sedentary lives and huddle indoors, or in some cases to

spend the day before a (furnace) fire. Then, as men's bodies become enervated, so their souls grow sicklier. And these vulgar crafts involve complete absence of leisure and hinder men from social and civic life; consequently men such as these are bad friends and indifferent defenders of their country. Moreover, in some states, particularly in those accounted warlike, no full citizen is permitted to practise the vulgar arts.

Which, then, are the arts, Sokrates, which you advise us to pursue?

Come, Sokrates replied, let us not be ashamed to follow the King of Persia's example. For men say that he considers agriculture and the art of war as among the fairest and most necessary pursuits, and himself pays special attention to both of these.

THE DIALOGUE CALLED *Eryxias*

For the date and authorship of this dialogue the reader is referred to the General Introduction.

The speakers are Sokrates, Kritias, Erasistratos and Eryxias, from whom the dialogue receives its name. Prodikos, whose conversation with an exceptionally precocious young gentleman is reported by Sokrates, was one of the best-known teachers of Higher Education in the latter half of the fifth century. He appears also as a speaker in the genuine Platonic writings, but is treated by Plato with more courtesy, in spite of the philosopher's dislike of these "Sophists." From the reference to Syracuse at the beginning it appears that the conversation is imagined to take place sometime between 431 and 421.

392 **I**t chanced that as Eryxias of Steiria and I were walking in the portico of Zeus the Liberator, Kritias and Erasistratos, son of the elder Erasistratos' nephew, Phaeax, approached us. It happened that Erasistratos had just then returned from Sicily and those parts. As he came up he said, Greeting to you, Sokrates.

And to you, I replied. Well, have you any good news from Sicily to tell us?

Certainly; but please let us sit down first, for I am weary after my yesterday's journey from Megara.

By all means, if you wish.

Well now, he said, what would you like to hear first from there? What the Syracusans are doing or what their attitude towards our city is? In their feelings towards us they seem to me to be very like wasps; I mean that if anyone provokes wasps in a half-hearted way and angers them, they are quite unmanageable until he takes the offensive and destroys them nest and

all. Just so it is with the Syracusans; unless we concentrate our efforts and proceed against them with a very powerful fleet, there is no possibility that they will ever submit to us. Instead we are making them angry by petty annoyances, the result of which can only be to exasperate them to the utmost. At the present time they have sent envoys to us with the object, as I suspect, of tricking Athens in some way.

In the middle of our conversation the Syracusan representatives happened to go by. Erasistratos, pointing to one of them, said: That fellow, Sokrates, is the richest man in Sicily and Italy. How could it be otherwise, seeing that he owns vast lands which would bring affluence to any man who liked to put a large part under cultivation? In fact, his landed property is second to none owned by any Hellene and, besides that, he has an unlimited quantity of those other possessions which go to make up wealth, slaves, horses, gold and silver.

393 When I saw Eryxias starting off to gossip about the Syracusan's property I asked: Tell me, Eryxias, what is his reputation in Sicily?

He is thought to, and does, surpass all other Sicilians and Italians in wickedness even more than in wealth; in fact, if you like to ask a Sicilian whom he regards as the most wicked man and the richest, the answer would invariably be this fellow.

Now I thought that the subject of his conversation was not trivial but one that appeared to be of great importance, namely, virtue and wealth, so I asked him which man he would call the richer, one possessed of a talent of silver or one who owned land worth two talents.

The owner of the land, I suppose, he replied.

Then, I said, if we apply the same argument a man

possessed of garments or bedding or other such articles more precious than that stranger's would be richer than he.

To that too he agreed.

Suppose you were given the choice of these possessions, which would you want?

The most valuable, he replied.

In which way would you think that you were wealthier?

As I explained.

Well, just now we are agreed that the richest man is he who owns the most valuable possessions?

Yes.

Then a man in good health is richer than a sick man since health is worth more than the sick man's riches. All men without exception, I imagine, would prefer to enjoy good health and to have but a little money to owning the riches of the King of Persia and being sick, because they clearly regard health as a more valuable possession. For no man would choose health if he did not think it preferable to wealth.

No, he would not.

Thus, if we should discover yet another possession more precious than health, its owner would be the richest.

Yes.

Suppose someone were to approach us now, saying, "Sokrates and Eryxias and Erasistratos, could you tell me what is the most precious possession man can own? Is it that, through the acquisition of which man can best decide how to direct his own affairs and those of his friends in the most excellent manner?" What should we say this possession is?

In my view, Sokrates, happiness is man's most valuable possession.

And a very good reply too, I answered. But now, do we consider those persons happiest who enjoy the greatest prosperity?

I think so, at any rate.

And those are the most prosperous who make the least number of mistakes regarding themselves and others, and bring most of their affairs to a successful issue?

Certainly.

Then, in the case of those who know what is bad and what is good, what ought to be done and what not, right conduct prevails in the highest degree and error on their part is of rare occurrence. To this also he agreed. Thus, then, the wisest men and the most successful and the happiest and the richest are all one and the same, if it be admitted that wisdom is the most precious possession.

Yes.

But, Sokrates, said Eryxias breaking in, what benefit would it be to a man to be wiser than Nestor, if at the same time he lacked the necessaries of life, food, drink, clothes and similar requirements? What use would wisdom be to him? Or again, how could he be the richest of men when, in the absence of all necessaries, he would be no better than a beggar?

It struck me then that there was something in Eryxias' remark.

Well, I said, would the possessor of wisdom, if he lacked the things you mention, be in the position of a beggar? Suppose a man owned Pulytion's mansion and that mansion were filled with silver and gold, he would want for nothing, would he?

Certainly, he rejoined, nothing prevents the man in question from disposing straightway of his property and replacing it by the commodities that he requires for his

daily subsistence, or else by currency in exchange for which he will be able to procure those commodities, and so being well supplied with all forthwith.

Yes, I said, if there happened to be actual men who wanted such a mansion to be theirs in preference to the wisdom of Nestor. But if there are men disposed to rate the wisdom of Nestor more highly and all the benefit resulting from it, he could dispose of these even more easily, if he happened to be in need and wished to sell the wisdom and the advantages derived therefrom. Or is the use of that house an important and necessary matter, and do the amenities of life enjoyed in such a house, in distinction to a small humble dwelling, make so great a difference, while the need of wisdom is of little value and it makes little difference whether a man is wise or ignorant about the most vital matters? Or is it that men are contemptuous of this faculty and refuse to buy it, while there are many who are eager to purchase the cypress-wood used in the house and Pentelic marble? If a man be an expert pilot or a skilled physician or able to make the most admirable use of some one of the various arts, is he not far more valuable than the most important of the objects which make up property? Again, the man who can give prudent counsel for himself and his neighbours to ensure the greatest prosperity, would not he be able to dispose of this asset, should he wish to do so?

395 Here Eryxias broke in, scowling as though he was suffering an injury: If you had to tell the truth, Sokrates, would you maintain that you are richer than Kallias, Hipponikos' son? And yet, you would not admit that you were more ignorant on the most important matters but wiser; and that does not make you one whit the richer.

Perhaps, Eryxias, you think that these arguments

which we are discussing now are but idle sport, on the ground that a situation such as is suggested could not really arise, but that they are like the pieces in draughts which a player can win and so bring about his opponent's defeat, so that the latter can make no counter-move. Maybe with regard to the wealthy you think that the same facts hold good, but that these arguments, which may be true or false, are of such a kind that a man by using them can get the better of his opponents in the discussion, namely, that the wisest and the richest are one and the same; and yet his arguments are false and his opponent's true. And this would perhaps not be surprising, but much the same as if two men were speaking about letters and one asserted that "Sokrates" begins with an S, the other that it begins with an A, and the second argument, proving that A was right, prevailed over the former.

Then Eryxias looked round at the company, and with a laugh and a blush remarked, as though he had not been present at the previous discussion: Sokrates, I never thought that our arguments would be such as never to convince anyone here or be of any benefit to him. What man, if in his right mind, could ever be convinced of the identity of the wisest with the richest? Nay, rather, as we are on the subject of wealth, I think we ought to discuss what are the good and the bad sources of wealth, and the particular question whether it is good or bad to be wealthy.

So be it, I replied. For the future we will be more cautious, and you have done well to warn us. But now, as you began the subject, why do you not yourself try to state whether you think it is a good or a bad thing to be wealthy? The more so, as you do not consider that our previous discussion had a bearing on this question.

My view, he replied, is that to be wealthy is a good thing.

He wished to say something more, but Kritias broke in, saying: Tell me, Eryxias, do you really think so?

Most emphatically; I should be mad else, and I imagine that no one would fail to agree to this view.

396 And yet, the other rejoined, I imagine that there is no one whom I could not drive to the admission that to be wealthy is bad for some men. If, then, it were good, it would not appear bad to some of us.

Thereupon I said to the two of them: If you two disagreed on the question, which of you spoke with more accuracy about the art of riding and what was the best method of doing so, if I happened to be a "horsey" man myself, I should try to put an end to your disagreement. I should be ashamed to be present and not do my utmost to prevent your difference. Or if you were disputing about some other topic and were likely to part as enemies rather than friends, if you could not agree on the question, I should do the same. But now, since you happen to differ about a thing of which one must make use throughout life and it makes a great difference whether we ought to care for it, on the ground that it is advantageous, or not—moreover, it is one of those things that the Hellenes regard not as insignificant but as of the highest moment; for fathers, as soon as their sons have, as they think, reached years of discretion, counsel them to reflect how they will attain to wealth, because if a man has of it, he is of some consideration, if he has not, he is of none—if, I say, our topic is so serious and you, while you are in harmony on other questions, differ on this one which is so important, and in addition your dispute about wealth is not whether it is black or white, or light

or heavy, but whether it is bad or good, so that if you are at variance about things bad and good, you would end by being bitter enemies though you are now kinsmen and intimate friends, I, so far as in me lies, will not suffer you to quarrel one with another. If I could do so myself I would give you the solution and so end your difference. As it is, since I do not happen to be able to do so and either of you thinks that he can make the other agree to his view, I am prepared to the best of my ability to take a hand to bring about your agreement on this problem. And so, I said, do you, Kritias, try to bring us to your point of view, as you undertook to do.

Well, he replied, I should like to ask Eryxias here, as we did at first, whether he thinks that there are just and unjust men.

Most decidedly there are, Eryxias said.

In that case do you regard injustice as evil or good?

Evil, of course.

If a man by bribery induces his neighbours' wives to commit adultery, and that, too, when both the city and the laws forbid such conduct, do you think that his action would be unjust or not?

Most certainly unjust.

Then, if the unjust man, who would also be following his inclination, happen to be rich and able to spend his riches, he would commit wrong? But if it were not his lot to be rich, since he would not have the money to spend, he would not be able to satisfy his desires and so would not do wrong. Consequently it would be more advantageous for him not to be rich if thereby he is less able to satisfy his desires and those desires are wicked. Again, would you say that sickness was bad or good?

Bad, of course.

Well, do you think that some men are intemperate?

Yes.

Then, if it were better for this man's health to do without food, drink and other things which he regards as pleasures, but he could not abstain because of his intemperance, would it not be better for him to lack the means of acquiring these things rather than that he should have abundant means?

In that way he would not have the power to do wrong, however great his wish to do so.

Kritias appeared to have argued his case in so excellent a manner that Eryxias, had he not been ashamed before the company, would inevitably have got up and hit him. So convinced was he that he had been deprived of some great thing, when it was made clear to him that his former opinion about wealth was wrong. When I noticed Eryxias' state of mind, being anxious to prevent a further development in the shape of abuse and wrangling, I said: A wise man, Prodigos of Keos, was using this argument yesterday in the Lykeion, but everyone present was so disposed to regard his words as nonsense that he failed to convince anyone of the truth of his statements. Moreover, quite a young lad came up, a regular chatterbox, and sat down; he began to laugh and make fun of Prodigos and to shake his confidence by asking for reasons for his views. In fact he succeeded in gaining far more approval from the company than Prodigos.

Well, could you repeat the argument to us? said Erasistratos.

Willingly, if I can remember it. It was something after this style, I think. The lad began by asking in what way Prodigos thought wealth was evil and in what way good.

Prodikos, in reply, said—even as you did lately: Wealth is good for good and liberal men and those who know how to use their riches, but it is bad for the wicked and ignorant. The same, he added, holds good of all other things; such things are bound to be what their users are themselves (good or bad). I think that Archilochos' remark:

Like unto the tasks they meet with so men's thoughts are
wont to be,
was well spoken.

398 Now, said the lad, suppose someone were to make me wise in that wisdom in which good men are wise, he would perforce have to make all other things good to me, not because he had paid any special attention to those other things, but merely because he changed me from an ignoramus into a wise man. Just as if someone now were to make me expert in grammar or in music, he would of necessity impart to me everything connected with grammar and music; thus, when he makes me good, he at the same time makes things good to me.

Prodikos, however, did not entirely assent to this; still he acquiesced in these views.

Do you then consider, the other said, that just as building a house is man's task, so it is his task to do good things? Or must things necessarily continue to be what they were at the outset, good or evil?

Prodikos, I think, began to suspect where the argument was likely to lead and, in order that he might not be openly confuted by a boy before the whole company—for he would not have thought that this mattered, if he had been alone with him—gave a very cunning reply, that it was man's task to do good things.

Then, said the other, do you hold that virtue must be taught or that it is inborn?

It must be taught, I think.

Then, would you not regard a man as a silly fellow who thought that, by praying to the gods, he could become skilled in grammar or music, or could acquire some other science which a man must master either by learning it from another or by finding it out for himself?

Prodikos agreed to this too.

Then you, Prodikos, continued the lad, when you pray to the gods that prosperity and good things may be yours, pray for nothing more nor less than to be a good and upright man, that is, if things are good to the good and upright, and bad to the wicked. If, then, virtue must be taught you would obviously be praying merely to be taught what you do not know.

I thereupon remarked to Prodikos that, in my opinion, it was no bad thing for him to have been shown to be mistaken in this view, that we immediately obtain from the gods that for which we pray. If, I said, on each occasion that you go to the Acropolis, you earnestly pray and beseech the gods to give you good things, without however knowing if they are able to grant you what you happen to ask, it is as if you were to go to the grammarian's door and entreat him to impart to you the science of grammar, though you had not concerned yourself with it in any other way, but as soon as you had received it would be able to follow the grammarian's profession.

As I was saying this, Prodikos was preparing to deliver a counter-attack on the lad in order to defend himself and bring forward the views which you lately expressed; 399 for he was irritated at being shown to be praying in vain to the gods. But at this point the director of the gymnasium came up and asked him to leave the gymnasium,

on the ground that his discourse was not suitable for lads and, being unsuitable, was clearly harmful for them.

My purpose in relating this to you is that you observe the attitude of men to philosophy. If Prodigos had been present and uttered these remarks of yours, the company would have thought him out of his mind and, in consequence, he would have been ejected from the gymnasium. You, however, appear to have put your case so cogently that you have not only convinced the audience but have obliged your opponent in argument to agree with you. It is well known that in the courts of justice, if two persons happen to be giving evidence on the same matter, one of whom gives the impression of being good and upright, the other of being a rascal, the jury will not more readily be convinced by the rascal's evidence but perhaps will come to the very opposite conclusion. If the upright witness made the same statement, very likely they would regard it as true. So perhaps your hearers are similarly disposed to you and Prodigos. They thought the latter a Sophist and a braggart, you they look on as an estimable man and a dutiful citizen. Again, they think that they must take into consideration not the actual argument but the character of the speakers.

Nevertheless, Sokrates, Erasistratos replied, even if you are speaking in jest, there is, clearly, in my opinion, a good deal in Kritias' statement.

I assure you, I am not jesting in the least, was my reply. But to revert, as you two have carried on the discussion so admirably, why do you not complete the rest of the argument? I think that part of your investigation is still wanting. You appear to be agreed on this point, that wealth is good for some and bad for others. It remains to investigate what wealth itself is; for unless

you know this first, you cannot reach unanimity on the question whether it is bad or good. I, for my part, am ready to join in your investigation to the best of my ability. First, then, let him who asserts that wealth is good, explain to us what he means by wealth.

Well, Sokrates, Erasistratos said, I do not claim greater importance for wealth than the rest of mankind do. To have money in abundance, that, men say, constitutes wealth. I imagine that Kritias here too regards wealth in much the same light.

Even so, I replied, it still remains for us to investigate the nature of money in order that the two of us may not a little later on again be seen to disagree. For example, 400 the Carthaginians use a currency of the following kind: something approximately as large as a stater is tied up in a small strip of leather, but no one but the makers knows what the object inside is. Then, when a seal has been affixed thereto, it is used as currency and any man owning a great number of these tokens is thought to possess much money and to be very rich. But amongst us, if anyone owned a great number of such pieces he would be no richer than if he had a collection of mountain-pebbles. In Lacedaemon iron by weight—and that, too, the otherwise unserviceable part of the metal—is used, and the man who owns a heavy load of such iron is esteemed rich; elsewhere that possession would be valueless. In Aethiopia engraved stones are employed, which a Lacedaemonian in his own country could not use. Among the nomads of Scythia any man who possessed Pulytion's mansion would be thought no richer than a man owning Mount Lycabettus with us. Therefore obviously these various objects cannot all be possessions if some of the owners are no richer on their account. But, I said

each of these is regarded by some as money, and their owners as rich; by others they are not looked on as money nor are the owners esteemed wealthy, just in the same way as the same things are not good or base in everyone's eyes, but different things are differently regarded by men. If we desire to investigate why houses do not represent wealth to a Scythian, though they do with us, or why leather represents money to a Carthaginian or iron to a Lacedaemonian but in neither case does so with us, should we find a solution in some such way as this: if any Athenian were to own a thousand talents' weight of stones such as lie about here in the market-place, which we do not use for any purpose, would he for that reason be deemed to be richer?

I should certainly not so regard him.

But if he possessed a thousand talents' weight of fine white marble we should say he was very rich?

Undoubtedly.

Well, then, is your reason for this that the one is useful, the other useless to us?

Yes.

Thus, too, among the Scythians houses for this reason do not represent wealth, because they have no need for them. A Scythian would not prefer the most exquisite house to a leather wrap because, while the one is useful, the other is useless to him. Again, we do not regard the Carthaginian currency as money, for we could not purchase with it any of the things we need, as we can with silver coin; consequently it is useless to us.

That is reasonable enough.

Thus, what happens to be useful to us constitutes wealth, what is useless does not.

Eryxias interrupting said: How so, Sokrates? Do we

401 not sometimes in our relations to others find a use for conversation, injurious treatment and so forth? Should we count these as wealth? Yet they clearly have their use.

Even now and so it is not clear to us what wealth is. That things, if they are to constitute wealth, must be useful; on that, everyone is more or less agreed. But what kind of useful thing is wealth, since it is not all? Come now, suppose we carried on our argument again thus, we may find some answer to our inquiry: What is the use of wealth and to what end has the acquisition of wealth been invented, as drugs have been discovered to counteract disease? Perhaps by this line of inquiry the question will become clearer to us. It appears to be essential that whatever happens to make up wealth must also be useful, and further, what we call wealth is a species of useful things. It remains to investigate for what service are the useful things, which make up wealth, of use? Perhaps everything which is used for production is useful, just as every creature which has life is an animal, but a species of the genus animal we call man. Suppose we were asked: What thing is that by whose removal we should have no need of medical science and of its instruments? We should be able to reply that this would happen if diseases were expelled from our bodies and did not occur at all, or else were expelled as soon as they appeared. Thus, it would appear, among the sciences medicine is the one useful for this purpose, namely, to expel disease. Again, if we were asked by the removal of what thing could we dispense with wealth, should we have a reply ready? If not, let us consider the point in this way: If a man could exist without food and drink, and feel neither hunger

nor thirst, would he require any of those commodities or silver coin or anything, to enable him to obtain victuals?

I think not.

Then the same will hold good of other articles (besides food). If we did not require for our physical well-being any of the things we now need, nor yet warmth or coolness or any of the other conditions of which man feels the want, what we call wealth would be useless to us, supposing, that is, that no one required any of the things for whose sake we now desire to possess wealth, namely, to satisfy the desires and requirements of the body for which we severally crave. If the acquisition of wealth is an advantageous thing for this purpose, namely, attention to the requirements of the body, if this purpose were removed root and branch, we should not require wealth and maybe wealth would not exist at all.

That is clear.

In that case, I imagine, it is clear to us that those things which are useful to this end constitute wealth. He agreed to this definition of wealth, not but what my little argument rather perturbed him. What is your answer 402 to the following? Should we maintain that the same thing can at one time be useful, at another time useless, to bring about the same result?

I should not maintain more than that, if we need the same thing to bring about the same result, then it appears to me to be useful; if not, not.

In that case, if we could fashion a statue of bronze without fire, we should have no need of fire for its production, and fire would be useless to us if we did not need it? The same argument holds good in the other cases.

Obviously.

Then whatever is superfluous for the creation of a thing we should also regard as useless for that purpose?

Yes.

Then if it were obvious that without silver and gold and other such materials, which we do not themselves employ for our body as we do food, drink, clothing, bedding and houses, we could satisfy our bodily needs so that we should no longer require those metals, then we should not regard them as useful for that purpose, if we could carry on without them.

We should not.

In fact, we should not even look on them as wealth, being of no use. On the other hand, those things would constitute wealth in our eyes by means of which we could obtain what was useful.

Sokrates, I could never be convinced that gold, silver and similar materials are not wealth. However, I am firm in the belief that those things which are useless to us are not wealth, and that money which is useful to this end belongs to the most useful things; not that these things are not of service to us for life, if by their means we can obtain its necessities.

Come now, what would you say of the following? Are there not men who teach music, grammar and other arts who, by charging fees for this, provide themselves with the needs of life?

There are.

These men, then, by means of this art of theirs and in exchange for their art, can obtain the necessities of life, just as we can in exchange for gold and silver.

I agree.

If therefore they acquire what they use for their daily life by this means, the means itself will be of use for life.

For we said that silver was serviceable on this account, because it enabled us to provide ourselves with bodily necessities.

Quite so.

If, then, these arts are included among things useful for that purpose, clearly they constitute wealth for the same reason that gold and silver do. Obviously those, too, who possess them are richer thereby. But a little while ago we were reluctant to accept the statement that the 403 wisest are richest. The inevitable conclusion, however, from the argument on which we are now agreed is that sometimes the more knowledge men have the wealthier they are. If we were asked whether we thought a horse useful for everybody, what would you say? Would you not reply that it would be useful to those who are skilled in the use of the horse, but not to those ignorant of this?

I should.

Then, I said, by the same argument a drug is not serviceable to everyone, but only to him who happens to have acquired the knowledge of its proper use?

I agree.

And thus it is in all other cases?

So I suppose.

Thus gold, silver and the other things that are considered to be wealth are only of use to the man who happens to know how they must be used.

Precisely.

Well now, a little earlier we thought it was the function of the good and upright man to know where and how to use these several things.

I agree.

Then to such men, and to them alone, these things will also be useful, provided they are skilled in the use

of them. If these things are only useful to them, then they alone will regard them as wealth. Nevertheless, I imagine, if a person unskilled in riding, who possesses horses which are useless to him, is taught by another to ride, the teacher has made him wealthier, if he has made that which previously happened to be useless to him useful; that is to say, by imparting knowledge to someone you also make him wealthier.

So it would seem.

Still, I think I would take an oath on Kritias' behalf that he has not been convinced by any of these arguments.

Bless me, no; I should be mad if I were convinced. But why have you not concluded that argument that those things which seem to be wealth, to wit, gold and silver and so forth, are not wealth? For I have been greatly charmed to listen to the statements which you have just been putting forward.

Thereupon I replied: I think, Kritias, that you had the same pleasure in listening to me that you would have from the minstrels who recite Homer's lays, seeing that none of my arguments appears true to you. Still, come now, what would you say to this? Would you admit that certain objects are useful to builders towards the construction of a house?

I should.

Further, should we say that those materials which they use for building are useful to them, that is to say, stones, bricks, timber and so on? Or again, the instruments with which they construct the house and the things by which they procured the stone and timber, and further the instruments by which these were obtained?

All these, he said, are, I think, useful for the end in view.

Then, said I, in the case of the other industries also, not only those things which we employ for the several works are useful, but the instruments with which we obtain these, without which nothing could be done?

Most decidedly.

Then again there are the instruments by which these 404 instruments are obtained, and we can go back still farther so that we end by having an infinite number of such—all these must clearly be of use for the performance of the work?

There does not appear to be any objection to this view.

If then a man had food, drink, clothes and whatever else he is likely to use for his body, would he have any need of gold, silver or any other medium with which to provide himself with what he now has?

I think not.

Then there would appear to us to be no occasion when a man requires any of these for his bodily needs?

No.

Then if we regard these as useless for that purpose, we ought never again to consider them useful? For we postulated that the same thing cannot be at one time useful, at another useless, for the same purpose.

Thus, he answered, your contention and mine coincide. For if these things are useless for this purpose, they could never again become useful. Now I maintain that for some purposes bad things are required, for others good.

But is it possible for an evil thing to be of use for producing something good?

I should hardly think so.

Should we describe those actions as good which a man performs for the sake of virtue?

Yes.

Can a man learn any of those subjects which are taught by word of mouth, if he has entirely lost the power of hearing?

Most emphatically not.

Then we should regard the power of hearing as one of those things useful for acquiring virtue, if virtue is taught by hearing and we employ this sense for receiving instruction.

So it seems.

If then medical science is able to arrest the sick man's disorder, we should regard it too at times as one of the things useful for virtue, if by its aid a man's hearing were restored?

That seems reasonable enough.

Again, if we procured medical science in exchange for wealth, we should look on wealth also as useful for virtue?

That also is true, he said.

Or again in the same way the instruments by which we acquire wealth?

Yes, every one of them.

So you consider that a man might make money by means of evil and shameful transactions and in exchange for it might acquire the service of medical science, thereby being enabled to hear, though he was previously unable to do so; and then could employ that same sense for the acquisition of virtue and other like qualities?

I think so certainly.

Can that which is evil be of use for the acquisition of virtue?

No.

Then it necessarily follows that the instruments by which we provide ourselves with things useful for various

purposes, must also be useful for the same purposes; for it would seem that at times evil actions may be useful to attain something good. This point may become rather plainer in the light of the following question: If these things are useful for acquiring the several objects without which the latter would not exist, assuming that the former were not pre-existent, tell me now, how would you describe them? Is it possible for ignorance to be of service for the acquisition of knowledge, or sickness for health, or vice for virtue?

I should say not.

And yet we should agree that the following is impossible, namely, that knowledge can reside in a subject in whom there has not previously been ignorance, or health in one who has not been sick, or virtue where there has been no vice?

He agreed, as I thought.

Then it would not necessarily follow that the antecedents essential to the existence of a thing are also of use to it; otherwise we should regard ignorance as useful for knowledge, sickness for health, and vice for virtue.

Kritias was very sceptical towards these arguments which proved that all these things did not constitute wealth. But I, realising that to convince him was much the same as "to boil a stone," as the saying is, continued: Let us bid farewell to these arguments since we cannot agree whether these things constitute wealth or not. What would be our answer to the following question? Which man should we consider the happier and the better, one who would want the greatest possible amount of bodily necessaries for daily life, or one who would be content with the smallest and most trifling quantity?

Perhaps the best way to contemplate the question would be to compare the man himself under different conditions and see under which he is better, when he is sick or when he is in health.

But that, he replied, does not require much contemplation.

Maybe, I answered; everyone can readily understand that the condition of a man in health is better than that of a sick man. But under which circumstances do we have greater and more varied wants, when we are sick or when we are in health?

When we are sick.

When we are thoroughly indisposed, then our desires and wants in all that appertains to the pleasures of sense are greatest and most numerous?

Certainly.

Then, on the same principle, as a man is clearly in the best state when his wants of that kind are least, we may argue thus in the case of two persons where one has many and excessive desires and wants, while the other has few and lives a quiet life. For example, some men are gamblers, some topers, some gluttons; all these conditions are nothing but desires.

Certainly.

But all the desires are nothing but the lack of something, and those who are most subject to these desires are in a more evil condition than those who experience them as little as possible?

406 Decidedly I admit that such persons as you have named are very bad, and the more they answer to your description the worse they are.

Then do we consider it impossible for things to be useful for an end, unless we happen to require them for that end?

Yes.

Then it follows that if these things are likely to be of service to us to minister to our bodily requirements, we need them for that purpose?

I think so.

In that case the man to whom the greatest number of these things are useful for this end, would clearly need the greatest number to achieve that end, if it is necessary to feel the need of all useful things.

That seems to be clear.

Then in accordance with this argument it clearly follows that those who possess much wealth also want many necessaries for their bodily comfort; for it is plain that wealth is that which is useful for this purpose. Thus we are obliged to regard the rich as being in the worst condition, seeing that they are in want of a great many of such things.

ARISTOPHANES

Ecclesiazusae (ll. 588-610; 651-666)

For the plot and date of this play *cf.* the General Introduction. The speakers in the extract given below are Praxagora, the leader of the new Women's Commonwealth, Blepyros, her husband, and Chremes, a friend of Blepyros.

Praxagora. [Addressing the Chorus as well as her husband and his friend.] Well then, none of you is to contradict or interrupt, until he understands the idea and has heard the speaker. What I would propose is that everyone should share in everything and all should have the same to live on, instead of one man being rich, another down-at-heels, or one man farming large estates while another hasn't land enough to take his coffin, or one being waited on by hosts of slaves while another hasn't so much as a single serving-man. I'd fix a common standard of life for everyone, and no distinctions!

Blepyros. How do you propose to do that?

Praxagora. There, I have not stopped you interrupting after all; I was just going to tell you about the common life. First I'll make the land and money and whatever else men have, common to all; next, from this common store we women'll feed you men like good housewives, thrifty and attentive.

Blepyros. Suppose one of us has no land, but only silver coin and golden sovereigns, hoarded away where none can see?

Praxagora. He shall put them in the common store.

Blepyros. And if he doesn't, he'll keep them by perjury, which is how he got them at first.

Praxagora. At any rate they'll be no earthly use to him.

Blepyros. How do you make that out?

Praxagora. No one'll do anything wrong through being poor. All shall have everything, loaves, kippers, cakes, nice clothes, wine, garlands of flowers and nuts; so what advantage will it be to him not to put what he has in the common store? If you've thought of any reason, tell it me.

Blepyros. Nowadays isn't it the very people who have "the goods" who do the stealing?

Praxagora. They may have, comrade, under the old régime, when we followed those old-fashioned laws. But now, with all life in common, what good will it do him not to comply?

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Blepyros. What about the land, who's going to cultivate that?

Praxagora. The slaves; your job, when the sun's low down, will be to go comfortably to supper.

Blepyros. But where shall we get our clothes from? I must ask that.

Praxagora. Those you've got will do you at first; the next lot we'll make.

Blepyros. One more question: Suppose a man's prosecuted before the magistrates, where is he to get the money to pay the fine? To take it from the common store wouldn't be fair.

Praxagora. In the first place there won't be any prosecutions.

Blepyros. That'll be hard lines on a lot of us.

Chremes. I thought that, too.

Praxagora. What, my poor man, should there be prosecutions for?

Blepyros. Good heavens, lots of things. To take one instance, suppose a man borrows and then denies he did it.

Praxagora. From where's your creditor to get the money for a loan, if everything is in the common store?

Chremes. [To *Blepyros.*] Upon my soul, she's telling you all right.

Blepyros. Let her tell me this, then. [To his wife.] Suppose some fellows who've dined well and got a bit above themselves knock someone else about, where's the fine to pay for the damage to come from? I don't think you can answer that.

Praxagora. We'll stop it out of his food. For when a man's short of that, he won't be in such a hurry another time to get above himself, if it's his belly that pays.

PLATO

Republic

The primary subject of discussion in the *Republic* is the nature of justice. In the first and opening portion of the second book several definitions of justice are successively put forward by different speakers in the dialogue. All these definitions are discussed at considerable length and refuted by Sokrates, who finally suggests that it is possible to predicate justice of a state as well as of an individual. By thus widening the scope of the inquiry a more satisfactory definition of justice and its opposite may, he thinks, be found. The other speakers agree, and Sokrates then proceeds to inquire into the origin of the city-state. The speakers in this part of the dialogue are Sokrates and the brothers Glaucon and Adeimantus. Sokrates as the narrator of the dialogue speaks throughout in the first person.

BOOK II

369 B 5 A city, said I, in my opinion comes into being because individually we are not self-complete, but have a variety of wants. Or what other cause is there, think you, for the founding of a city?

None, he replied.

Thus, then, as men have many wants and one takes to himself one man, another another, one man to supply one need, another to supply another, they collect a number of associates and assistants into a single dwelling-place—to a joint settlement of this kind we give the name of city. Is it not so?

Certainly it is.

Then men give or receive in exchange, whatever they exchange, because they think that it is to their advantage.

Certainly.

Come then, said I, let us describe our city from the beginning. Our mutual needs will, it appears, lead to its formation.

Quite so.

Well, then, the first and most imperative need is the provision of food so that men may exist and live.

Undoubtedly.

Secondly comes the need of a dwelling, and in the third place the need of clothing and similar articles.

That is so.

Come then, said I, how will our city be equal to providing so many things? Will there not have to be a farmer and a builder and again a weaver? Shall we add to them a shoemaker also and another who looks after our bodily wants?

Certainly.

Then a city in its simplest form would be composed of four or five persons.

So it seems.

How now, should each of these put his work at the disposal of all? For example, should the farmer, who is the only one, produce corn for four and spend the four-fold time and labour on corn production and then share it with the others, or should he disregard them and only produce for himself a quarter of this corn in a quarter of the time and spend the other three parts of the time in producing a house, clothes and shoes and, instead of taking the trouble to share with others, make his own articles himself solely for his own use?

370 Adeimantus answered, Perhaps, Sokrates, the former method is easier than the latter.

Decidedly, said I, there is nothing unusual in it. For on hearing your reply I, too, recall to mind that in the first place, every man does not by nature exactly resemble his fellow, but men's natures vary and different men are fitted to perform different functions. Do you not agree?

Certainly.

Well, then, would a single man produce better results when he practises many handicrafts or only one?

When he practises only one, he said.

In truth this also is, I suppose, apparent, that if a man lets slip the opportunity for doing anything, it is for ever lost.

It is.

The work to be done will not, I suppose, wait the convenience of the worker, but the worker must closely attend the work to be done and treat it as a whole-time task.

He must.

In this way more commodities are produced and are better and more easily made, that is to say when one man makes one thing, following his natural bent at the right time without concerning himself with other occupations.

Undoubtedly.

Then, Adeimantus, we require more than four citizens to produce the commodities of which we were speaking. For the farmer presumably will not make his own plough if it is to be good, nor his hoe nor any of the other implements used in farming. Nor again will the builder make his own tools, and he too requires a great number: and the same applies to the weaver and to the shoemaker.

True.

Then carpenters and bronze-workers and other similar craftsmen will become associates of our little city and will swell its population.

Certainly.

Still, it would not yet be very large if we added to these neatherds, shepherds and the other sorts of herdsmen so that the farmers might have oxen for ploughing, the

builders as well as the farmers beasts of burden for draught, and the weavers and shoemakers wool and hides.

And yet, he replied, if it contained all these it would not be a small city.

To tell the truth, said I, it is well-nigh impossible to found the city itself in a district where imports will not be required.

It is.

Then additional citizens will be needed besides, who will import the required commodities to it from other cities.

They will.

And yet if the agent departs empty-handed and takes with him none of the commodities required by those from whom our citizens import what they themselves need, he will also leave there empty-handed. Is it not so?

I think so.

In that case our citizens must not merely produce enough for home consumption, but a quantity of articles of the requisite kind for those persons of whose services they stand in need.

They must.

Thus our city wants a larger number of farmers and other craftsmen.

Certainly.

And, what is more, an additional number of agents who are to import and export their several commodities. These are the merchants, is it not so?

Yes.

Then we shall require merchants.

Certainly.

And if the commerce is carried on by sea, a large

number of other persons familiar with maritime transport will be needed besides.

A large number, decidedly.

Well now, in the city itself how will the inhabitants exchange the commodities that they severally produce? It was for the sake of these products that we established the principle of association and founded a city.

Clearly, he said, by buying and selling.

This then will give rise to a market and to a currency as a token of exchange.

Certainly.

Then, supposing the farmer or one of the other craftsmen brings some of his commodities to market but does not arrive there at the same time as the people who wish to exchange with him, shall he sit in the market-place and neglect his trade?

Certainly not, said he, but there are persons who, seeing what has happened, detail themselves for this service; in well-administered cities these will in general be the physically weakest who are unfit for any other occupation; for they have to stay there in the vicinity of the market-place to receive wares in exchange for money from those who wish to sell, and to give wares in exchange for money to those who wish to buy.

Then, said I, this need will give rise to shopkeepers in our city. For we call those persons shopkeepers, do we not, who plant themselves in the market-place and attend to buying and selling, while those who travel to other cities we call merchants?

Exactly so.

Further, there are still, I think, some other workers who in respect of their mental capacities do not deserve to be associates in our city but whose bodily strength is

equal to physical labour. Now, these, who sell the use of their strength and who call the price of this hire, are, I believe, called hired labourers.

Quite so.

Then presumably a city contains also a complement of hired labourers.

I suppose so.

Well then, Adeimantus, has our city now grown large enough to be complete?

Perhaps it has.

In that case where in it is justice and injustice to be found? With which of the persons whom we have been considering has it simultaneously taken its rise?

372 For my part, said he, I do not know, Sokrates, unless it be somewhere in the mutual intercourse of these very persons.

Perhaps you are right, I replied. We must carry on our inquiry and not hesitate.

Firstly, let us inquire how men thus equipped will pass their life. Will it not be in producing corn, wine, clothes and shoes? And when they have built themselves houses they will in the summer generally work in scanty attire and barefoot, but in the winter adequately dressed and shod. They will get food by preparing meal from barley and flour from wheat. And when they have kneaded fine barley-cakes and baked loaves, they will drop them on reeds of some kind or on clean leaves, and reclining on couches made of bryony and myrtle-boughs, they and their children will feast; and afterwards they will drink and crown themselves with garlands and praise the gods. They will have pleasant intercourse one with another and will not beget children beyond their means but will guard themselves against poverty or war.

Thereupon Glaucon remarked in reply, It seems you make your citizens dine without any relish.

Quite true, I replied. I forgot that they will also have a relish. Clearly they will make salt, olives, cheese, roots and vegetables into such boiled messes as can be cooked in the country. We will give them dessert as well, consisting of figs, pulse and beans, and they will roast myrtle-berries and acorns by the fire as they sip their wine in moderation. And so they will pass their life peacefully and healthily, and passing away in old age, no doubt, they will hand on the same kind of existence to their descendants.

Here Glaucon said, If you were forming a city of swine, Sokrates, how else but on this diet would you feed them?

But, Glaucon, said I, how should we proceed?

In the manner sanctioned by custom, he replied. These men, unless they are intended to lead the roughest of lives, should, I think, recline on couches and have their meals off tables, and have the cooked meats and dessert which men have nowadays.

So be it, said I, I understand. We are not, it appears, inquiring into the growth of a city merely, but of a luxurious city. Perhaps it is well to do so. For, if we investigate such a city too, we may perhaps see clearly how justice and injustice are implanted in cities. Well, the true city, in my opinion, is that which we have described; it is in fact a healthy one. But if you wish it, let us also consider one that is inflamed; there is nothing to prevent us. Some persons then, it seems, will not be satisfied with what we have described nor with this manner of life, but will in addition require couches, tables and furniture in general, also cooked

dishes, perfumes, incense, courtesans and cakes, all in varied profusion. Truly we must no longer confine ourselves to the necessities of which we spoke at first, to wit houses, clothes and shoes, but we must requisition the arts of painting and embroidery and acquire gold, ivory and all materials of that kind. Is it not so?

Yes, he answered.

Then we must again enlarge the city, for the first, I mean the healthy one, no longer suffices but must be swelled and filled with the things that do not exist in a city for an essential purpose; I refer to all kinds of huntsmen, to imitative artists, many of whom exercise their art on form and colour and many on music, to poets and their helpers, rhapsodists, actors, dancers and contractors, to the manufacturers of every variety of goods including those used for women's adornment. Then again we shall require more servants. Or do you not think that we shall need attendants for our boys, wet-nurses, nurses, waiting-women, barbers, also chefs and plain cooks? Further, we shall also want swine-herds, for this class was not contained in our former city since it was not required. In our present city it will be needed like the others and so will a great quantity of cattle of every variety for the consumption of those who wish. Is it not so?

Of course it is.

Then we shall find ourselves in a far greater degree in need of physicians than in our former mode of life?

Decidedly.

I suppose the territory which sufficed to support the original inhabitants will no longer suffice but will be too small. Are we not right?

Certainly, he said.

Then must we not cut off a piece of our neighbours' territory if we intend to have sufficient land for both pasture and tillage, and they again must take of our land if they, like ourselves, pass the limit of necessary commodities and proceed to unlimited acquisition of wealth?

That is bound to happen, Sokrates, he said.

Will war, Glaucon, be our next concern, or how will it be?

Even so, he said.

Let us not yet state, I replied, whether the results of war are good or bad, but merely this, that we have discovered its origin and the chief causes from which disaster on various occasions overtakes cities, whether it be its individual members or the state as a whole.

Certainly.

Again, my friend, the city must be increased, not 374 slightly by any means, but by a whole army which shall go forth and fight with invaders in defence of all the city's property and of all the persons whom we lately enumerated.

How so? he replied. Are not the inhabitants themselves equal to that task?

No, I answered, not if you and all of us were right in the conclusion to which we came when constructing our city. We agreed, if you remember, that it was impossible for one man to practise many arts well.

You are quite right, he said.

Well then, I replied, do you not think that the practice of war should be reckoned among the arts?

It certainly should, he said.

In that case must not the art of war occupy our attention as much as the shoemaker's art?

Certainly.

Well, but we forbade the shoemaker to try to be a farmer or weaver or builder, but told him to be simply a shoemaker so that we might find the product of his art satisfactory; similarly we assigned to each of the others one vocation for which they were severally fitted by nature and in which each, if he did not meddle in the other arts, might by applying himself to it all his life and utilising his opportunities become really expert. Well, is it not of the highest importance that the operations of war should be expertly carried out? Or is this so easy a matter that a farmer or a shoemaker or any other sort of craftsman shall be a soldier too, though no one in the world would become a good chess- or dice-player if he treated these games as a secondary occupation instead of specialising in them from childhood? And grasping a shield or any other of the arms or tools used in war, will he the self-same day be an efficient combatant in a battle of heavy-armed troops or any other kind of military engagement, while merely to grasp other kinds of tools will make no man an efficient craftsman or athlete, nor is the tool of any use to one who has not grasped the knowledge of its use or practised assiduously?

If it were so, he replied, those tools of war would be of great value.

Thus, I said, inasmuch as the work of the guardians is of the greatest moment, insomuch it will need the most complete freedom from other pursuits and, besides that, very great skill and application.

I certainly think so, he said.

Then it will also need a disposition naturally suited to this vocation?

Of course

Thus it will presumably be our task to chose to the

best of our ability the dispositions naturally most suited in kind and character to be guardians of the city.

It will indeed be our task.

Then assuredly, said I, we have undertaken no trivial matter. Still, as long as our powers permit us to carry on, we must not shrink like cowards from the task.

We must not indeed, he said.

[The remainder of Book II. and the greater part of Book III. are devoted to the inquiry how these guardians are to be selected and how educated. After describing their education at considerable length, Sokrates asks who, now that the ideal city-state is complete, are to be its rulers. The answer is the guardians, who are now subdivided into the older men, who are the guardians proper and who will rule, and the younger men of the "guardian" class, now to be called auxiliaries, who will be the military class. The rest of the population are to form the third class in the state. Sokrates then proceeds to tell an old myth which is to be related to the citizens to justify this differentiation into classes and reconcile them to their inequality.]

414 D I will try in the first place to persuade the rulers themselves and the soldiers and then the rest of the citizens that when we reared and educated them all the things which they imagined that they were suffering and the experiences that they thought were theirs were but dreams; in reality they were then being fashioned and reared in the bowels of the earth, and not only they but their arms and the rest of the equipment that was being created for them. But when they were completed in every point the earth, being their mother, sent them up here, and now it is their duty to take thought for the land in which they live, as it were their mother and nurse, and to defend it and to regard their fellow-citizens as brothers and children of one earth-mother.

It was not without reason, he said, that you were so long ashamed to relate this lying tale.

415 Likely enough, I replied, but all the same listen to the rest of my story. "All ye that are in the city are brothers," so we shall say as we tell them the myth, "but God when he fashioned you mixed gold in creating those of you who are fitted to rule; therefore these are the most precious. Silver he used for those who are auxiliaries, iron and copper for the farmers and other craftsmen. Since then ye are all kinsmen, whereas ye will in general beget children like unto yourselves, yet sometimes a silver child will spring from a golden and a golden from a silver child and so forth, each arising from the others. Therefore God enjoins on the rulers first and foremost to be good guardians of nothing so much nor to watch over anything as much as the children, to learn which of these metals has been blent in their souls; and if one of their children be partly of iron or silver they shall in no wise pity it, but, assigning to it the value that properly belongs to its nature, they shall thrust it among the craftsmen or farmers; and, conversely, if from these there should spring a child partly golden or silver, they shall do it honour and raise it into the guardian or auxiliary class, since there is an oracle that foretells the destruction of the city when its guardians shall be of iron or copper." Do you know any device by which our citizens may be convinced of the truth of this myth?

None, so that these first citizens themselves would believe it. However, we might effect that their sons and the following generation and all subsequent descendants would do so.

Well, I said, even this would help towards assuring their greater love for the city and for one another; for maybe I understand your meaning and this in truth shall be as the people's voice shall decide. But, as for us,

let us arm these sons of earth and lead them forth under their rulers' guidance. When they reach the city let them look what part of it is the fairest site for their camp, a spot from which they can best keep the city-dwellers in check should any refuse to obey the laws, and can repel the stranger if he comes with hostile intent like a wolf to the fold. When they have encamped and sacrificed to the proper deities let them fix their sleeping-places. Or how else should they proceed ?

Even as you say, he answered.

Should these be of such a kind as to afford adequate shelter both in winter and summer ?

Of course. You are referring, I think, to dwellings, he said.

Yes, I replied, I am, but to the dwellings of soldiers, not of business men.

416 There again, he said, how do you suggest that one differs from the other ?

I will try to tell you, I answered. It would, I suppose, be a most monstrous and shocking thing for shepherds to rear dogs to guard their flocks, of such a temper and in such a way that under the influence of hunger or uncontrolled caprice or some other evil trait in their nature the dogs should begin to harm the sheep and should act like wolves instead of dogs.

It would certainly be monstrous, he said.

Must we then take every precaution that our auxiliaries, since they are stronger than the others, may not treat the citizens in this manner and act like pitiless masters instead of kindly allies ?

We must, he said.

Will they not be provided with the surest safeguard if they are truly well educated ?

Assuredly they are that already, he said.

I answered, That point then, my dear Glaucon, need not be emphasised; but another point, on which we lately touched, must be, namely that the education they receive must be the right one, whatever it may be, if they are to have the surest asset for ensuring gentleness amongst themselves and towards those whom they are guarding.

That is true enough, he said.

In addition to this education a reasonable man would say that they should have provided for them dwellings and other effects generally of a kind which will not prevent them from being in themselves the very best guardians and also will not incite them to harm the rest of the citizens.

He will certainly speak truly.

Consider then, said I, whether their lives and dwellings ought to be somewhat as follows, if they are to be of the character indicated: Firstly, unless it is absolutely necessary, no man should possess any property of his own; secondly, no man is to have a dwelling-place and storehouse of a kind to which other men shall not have access. Whatever necessaries men trained to war who are temperate and courageous require they shall receive from the rest of the citizens, fixing these as their wage for their guardianship; and there shall be just as much as will allow them to have neither a surplus nor a shortage on the year. They are to attend the common messes regularly and live a life in common like men on active service. Respecting gold and silver they are to be told that they have in their souls a divine, god-given species of these metals and do not require the earthly sort; further, that it would be impious to defile the possession of the former by combining it with the possession of earthly gold, since many and impious are the deeds

resulting from the money used by the majority of mankind, while their gold is undefiled. For them alone of the citizens it is unlawful to handle or to touch gold and silver, or to go under the same roof or to adorn themselves with them, or to drink from gold or silver vessels. In this way they will preserve themselves and the city alike. But when they shall acquire land and houses and money of their own, they will be household managers and farmers instead of guardians, and will become the hostile masters of the other citizens instead of their allies. Truly they will pass their lifetime in hating and being hated, in intriguing and being the victims of intrigue, and will feel a greater fear of the enemies within the state than of those without. Then indeed their course and the city's will be on the edge of ruin. For all these reasons, I said, are we to say that provision should be made in this way for the guardians in respect of dwelling-places and their other needs, and to legislate accordingly, or are we not?

Certainly we are, Glaucon replied.

BOOK IV

419 Adeimantus now intervened and said, Sokrates, what defence will you offer if it be said that you are not making the guardians in the least happy? And in fact it is their own fault if they are not, since the city in reality belongs to them and yet they derive no benefit from it as the others do who own lands and build themselves fine large houses and acquire furniture suitable for these and offer private sacrifices to the gods and entertain strangers, yes, and who, as you lately said, own gold and silver and in fact everything that the would-be-happy man is thought to have. In short, it would be said, they appear to be stationed in

the city just like hired mercenaries with nothing to do except to mount guard.

420 Yes, said I, and it is for this that they are given food and do not even receive a wage in addition as the others do; and so even if they wish to travel abroad on their own account, they will be unable to do so, or to give presents to courtesans or to spend money in any other direction that they may desire as men reputed happy do. These and many other similar counts in the indictment you are omitting.

Well, he remarked, let us include these too in the indictment.

What then, you ask, shall be our defence?

Yes.

If we pursue the same path as before, I answered, we shall, I think, discover a suitable reply. We shall say that it would cause us no surprise if even so the guardians enjoy great happiness. Nevertheless, in founding our city we do not look to this, that some one class should be exceptionally happy, but that as far as possible the whole city should be so. For we thought that in a city of this character we should be most likely to discover justice, and, conversely, injustice in the worst-administered city; then, on reviewing these we should come to the conclusion for which we have long been searching. In the present instance, then, we are, as we think, constructing the happy city not by taking and rendering a few persons happy there, but by including the whole city in our scheme. Presently we will consider the opposite type.

Suppose that we were statue-painters and someone came up and found fault on the ground that we did not apply the finest colours to the finest parts of the subject because the eyes, the finest part of all, were painted in

violet, not in black. It would be a reasonable defence on our part to reply: "My good sir, do not imagine that we must paint the eyes so beautifully that they cease to look like eyes, or similarly with the other parts of the figure, but consider whether, by giving the proper treatment to each part, we make the whole beautiful. Even so in our present inquiry do not force us to assign to the guardians the kind of happiness which will make them anything but guardians. We know that we might also dress the farmers in robes and put golden crowns on their heads and bid them cultivate the soil at their pleasure; and we might make the potters recline by the fire on our right (as at a banquet) to drink and feast while they set the wheel at their sides to ply their trade as far as they desired; by the same method we might render all the other citizens happy so that the whole city might enjoy felicity. But do not give this counsel to us, for if we hearkened to it, 421 the farmer would cease to be a farmer and the potter a potter, and none of the others would conform to any of the types of which the city is composed. True, in the other cases the argument is less strong; for if cobblers are poor, degenerate creatures and pretend to be what they are not, they do not endanger the state: but if the guardians of the laws and the city are not guardians in reality but only appear to be so, you see that they ruin the whole city utterly; conversely, they alone can ensure good government and happiness." Therefore if we create guardians truly so called, men who will do the least possible injury to the state, while our imaginary opponent creates a sort of farmers who are like happy banqueters at a national festival, not like members of a state, he is speaking not of a city but of some other thing. We must investigate, then, whether the object which we should have

in view in setting up our guardians is that they should enjoy the greatest possible degree of happiness or whether we are in this matter to regard the city as a whole and see if happiness exists there, inducing these auxiliaries and guardians by force or persuasion to strive to be the best possible craftsmen at their vocation, and to treat all the others in the same way; and so, while the whole state is increasing and being established on good principles, to allow each class to share in happiness in so far as nature bestows it on them.

I think, he said, that your argument is quite correct.

Well then, I continued, will you think the kindred argument to this reasonable?

To what do you refer?

Consider if the following agencies corrupt the other craftsmen and make them bad.

What agencies are these?

Wealth, I said, and poverty.

How so?

Thus: Do you think that a potter if he becomes rich will still consent to attend to his craft?

By no means, he said.

He will become more lazy and careless than he was previously?

Yes, much more.

Then he becomes a worse potter?

Yes, he said, very much so.

Then again, if he is unable owing to poverty to get himself tools or whatever else he needs for his craft, his wares will deteriorate and he will turn out his sons or anyone else whom he is teaching inferior craftsmen?

Of course.

Then through both agencies, poverty and wealth, the

products of the crafts and the craftsmen themselves deteriorate?

It seems so.

Then we have apparently discovered other things for which our guardians must be on the watch so that these may never slip into the city unobserved.

What are these?

422 Wealth and poverty, I said; for the one is productive of luxury, idleness and civil unrest, the other of servility and bad craftsmanship in addition to civil unrest.

That is true enough, he said. But consider, Sokrates, how our state will be able to carry on a war when it possesses no wealth, more particularly if it is compelled to fight against a large and wealthy state.

Clearly, I replied, to fight against one such state is difficult; against two such states it is easier.

What do you mean? he said.

Firstly, I answered, if fight they must, will not our citizens, whilst themselves trained to war, be fighting rich men?

That is quite true, he said.

Well then, Adeimantus, I replied, do you not think that one boxer as perfectly trained as possible would easily fight two other men who were not boxers but wealthy and fat?

Not simultaneously, perhaps.

Not even, I answered, if he could retire before the onset of the foremost assailant and then round on him and strike him, repeating these tactics constantly in the stifling heat? Would not such a boxer defeat an even greater number of opponents?

Doubtless, he said, it would cause little surprise if he did.

Well, think you not that rich men are more familiar with the science and technique of boxing than of the art of war?

I do.

Then in all probability our trained men will easily hold their own against three or four times their own number.

I will submit to you, he said, for I think you are right.

Well now, if they sent an embassy to one of the two states and spoke the truth thus: "We do not make use of gold or silver nor is it lawful for us to do so, though it is for you. Therefore combine with us in a joint offensive and be masters of the other people's property." Think you that a people who heard that would prefer to fight against sturdy lean hounds rather than in company with the hounds against fat succulent sheep?

I do not. Still, he remarked, if the wealth of the others were massed together in one city, beware lest it endanger the city without wealth.

You are fortunate, I replied, to be able to think that some city other than that which we are constructing, deserves the name.

Well, what should I say? he said.

You ought, I answered, to give the others a more grandiose name, for each of them is not one but many cities, as gamesters say. At all events these are two which are mutually hostile, the city of the poor and that of the rich. In either of these there are a great many others, and if you treated them as though they were one you would be completely in error; if you treat them as separate cities and give to one party the wealth and power and even the persons of another, you will always have plenty of allies and few enemies. So long as your city

is governed prudently on the lines lately laid down, she will be very great, I do not mean in point of renown, but great in the true sense, even if her defenders number but a thousand. You will not easily find a single city as great as this either in Hellas or among the non-Hellenic peoples, though you will find many that appear even many times greater than such a one. Do you not agree?

I certainly do, he said.

This then, I continued, will be the best limit for our rulers in respect of the size that they are to fix for the city and the amount of land that they are to mark off for a state of proper size, while relinquishing all territory beyond that.

What is the limit? he said.

It is this, I think, I replied: to let the state grow so long as it continues to be one, but not beyond that point.

Excellent, he said.

Then we shall impress this additional direction on the guardians, to take every possible precaution that the state is neither too small nor yet great only in semblance, but of proper size and a united whole.

Perhaps, he said, this will be a rather trivial direction to give them.

Well, I answered, we will give them one even more trivial, which we mentioned in the earlier part of our conversation, namely, that if one of the children of the guardians is a poor creature, he should be relegated to the other classes, and if one of the children from these other classes is of exceptional excellence he should be transferred among the guardians. The object of this regulation is to make it clear that the other citizens too should each individually be led to the vocation for which they are severally fitted by nature, so that as each follows

his single vocation he will become not many persons but one single person, and so the entire city will naturally become a united whole, not many cities.

This, he said, is certainly a slighter direction than the former.

My good Adeimantus, I replied, these directions of ours are not, as some might think, numerous and weighty, but all of trifling importance if the guardians observe the proverbial one great rule, or rather not great but adequate.

What is that? he said.

Education, I answered, and nurture. For if by good education the citizens become reasonable men they will with ease distinguish all these points and others too which are now being omitted by us, namely, the acquisition of women, marriage and procreation of children, and will 424 see that to all these the words of the proverb should apply, "Friends' goods are common."

That, he said, would certainly be the right method.

[The other matter which the guardians must strictly supervise is education. Regulations about minor matters can be safely left to the discretion of the magistrates holding office at any given period; in religious matters the guidance of the Delphic oracle must be sought. After this Sokrates reverts to the original subject of inquiry, the nature of justice, and in connection with this examines the moral qualities which must characterise the guardians. This investigation occupies the remainder of Book IV. At the beginning of Book V. Sokrates is pressed by all present to describe the guardians' community in women and children to which he has already alluded in passing. With considerable reluctance he consents to do so. Quoting, by way of analogy, the case of animals with whom the female not merely bears and rears the young but joins the male in his various pursuits, Sokrates would have the women and girls educated and trained on exactly the same lines as the men and boys, since the physical difference between the sexes does not exclude women from following the same occupations as men. Women will differ in their aptitude for one vocation or another just as men do. In fact the difference between the natural qualities of the sexes is one of degree, not of kind.]

BOOK V

455 D Well then, my friend, none of the duties that devolve on rulers of a state belong to woman as woman or to man as man, but natural ability has been distributed among both sexes equally, and woman can by nature follow all vocations even as man can, but in every case she is a weaker being than man.

Quite so.

Shall we then assign all duties to men and none to women?

How can that be?

Rather, I think, shall we have to say that by nature one woman has a bent for medicine, another not; one is musical, another unmusical. Why then, may not one 456 be talented for gymnastic or for war while another is unwarlike and no lover of gymnastic?

I suppose so.

Or again one may love and another dislike knowledge, one may be full of spirit, another spiritless?

That also is true.

Then one is fitted to be a guardian while another is not? For have we not picked out this particular disposition among the men to mark their fitness for the duties of guardian?

We have.

Then the same disposition makes both a man and a woman suitable for the guardianship of the state, except that it is weaker or stronger as the case may be.

So it appears.

Then women of this nature must be chosen to join in the life and guardians' duties of the men so fitted, since they are in their nature suited to the task and akin to the men.

Exactly.

But should we not assign the same duties to the same dispositions?

Certainly.

Then by a roundabout course we have returned to our former position and we are agreed that it is not against nature to train the wives of the guardians in music and gymnastic.

Most decidedly.

So after all our legislative proposals are not impossible or even chimerical, seeing that we framed the law according to nature: rather it is the existing customs which diverge from these that are, as it seems, unnatural.

It would seem so.

Well, our investigation was whether our proposals were possible and the best that could be made, was it not?

It was.

And we are agreed that they are possible?

Yes.

Then the next thing on which we must agree is that they are the best?

Clearly.

So if a woman is to become fit for a guardian's duties we shall not prescribe one sort of education for men and another for women, more particularly as the education takes over identical natures for training.

The education will be the same.

What then is your opinion on the following matter?

What is that?

The assumption in your own mind that one man is better, another inferior; or do you regard all men as alike?

Of course not.

Well then, in the city that we are founding, which of

the two have been fashioned the better men, the guardians, to whose lot has fallen the education which we described, or the shoemakers who have been trained for their craft?

Your question, he said, is absurd.

I understand, I replied. Well, are not these guardians the best of the citizens?

By far the best.

Again, will not this class of women be the best among the women?

They too, he said, will be by far the best.

Can there be anything better for a city than that it should contain the best men and women?

No.

457 This end music and gymnastic, operating as we have explained, will achieve?

Assuredly.

Well then, we have laid down a usage that is not only possible but best for the city.

As you say.

Then the wives of the guardians must strip for gymnastic, since in place of garments they will clothe themselves in virtue, and they must take their share in war and in the other guardians' duties in the city, and they must do nothing else. Of these duties we must assign the less arduous to the women rather than to the men owing to the weakness of their sex. But the man who jests at the nakedness of women practising gymnastic to attain that which is best is but

Plucking unripe fruit of laughter (PINDAR, *Frag.* 209), and knows not, it seems, at what he laughs or what he is doing. For this is and will remain the fairest maxim, that the useful is noble, the harmful ignoble.

Most certainly.

May we then say that this is one billow, so to speak, that we are safely passing over in discussing the laws about women, so that we have not been utterly submerged in postulating that our male and female guardians should perform all duties in common, but rather that the argument is in a way consistent that it proposes what is both possible and useful?

Yes, he said, and the wave over which you are safely passing is one of no small size.

Still, I replied, you will not call it great when you see the next one.

Say on, he said; let me see it.

This next law, as I think, follows hard upon the last and the previous ones.

Which is that?

That these women shall all be the common wives of all these men and that no woman shall dwell separately with any man; again that the children shall be common and that no parent shall know his child nor any child his parent.

This proposal, he said, arouses greater doubts than the last both in respect of its feasibility and its usefulness.

I do not think, I answered, that there could be any discussion about its usefulness, that is to say that it is not the greatest good that women as well as children should be common, provided that it is possible. But I think that there would be a mighty discussion whether it is possible or not.

Both points, said he, might well arouse dispute.

[Sokrates proposes for the moment to leave aside the question of possibility.]

458 c I think, said I, that if the guardians are deserving of

the name, and similarly the auxiliaries, the latter will be ready to carry out the orders they get, the former while issuing the orders will themselves be obedient to the laws; and in dealing with those matters which we have left to their discretion they will imitate the spirit of the laws.

That is likely enough, he said.

You then, I replied, as their legislator must select the women as you have selected the men, and you will put them together so that, as far as possible, they will have like natural characteristics. As they have houses and messes in common and none possess any property of their own, they will live together, and being thrown together both in the gymnasia and in the rest of their daily life, they will, I suppose, under the influence of compelling instinct form mutual unions; or do you not regard the result that I am naming as inevitable?

Not mathematical reasoning will make it inevitable but the compelling power of love, whose power to persuade and to attract to it the majority of men is far intenser than the former.

Exactly, I replied. However, Glaucon, the next point is that in a city of happy beings it will be against divine law and forbidden by the magistrates that indiscriminate unions should be formed or any other irregularities committed.

Yes, for it would be wrong.

Obviously our next task will be to render wedlock as sacred as possible; the unions that contribute most to the common good would be regarded as sacred.

Exactly.

459 How then will a union contribute most to the common good? Tell me this, Glaucon, for I observe that in your

home there are hunting dogs and a large number of well-bred birds. Have you, pray, studied at all the manner in which they mate or breed?

In what particular?

Well, firstly, in the case of these animals of yours, although they are all well-bred, are there not some which are or prove themselves to be better than the rest?

There are.

Then, do you breed from all alike or do you strive to do so only from the best?

Only from the best.

Well now, do you breed from the youngest or the oldest or preferably when they are in their prime?

When they are in their prime.

Well, do you suppose that the offspring of the birds and hounds will be greatly inferior if not bred in this way?

I do, he said.

What do you think of the case of horses, I replied, or the other animals? Do you think that their case is at all different?

It would be strange, indeed, if it were so.

Bless my soul, my dear fellow, what perfectly ~~AI~~ people our guardians ought to be, if the analogy applies to the human race.

It surely does; but what is your point?

Merely, said I, that they will have to use many drugs. When the body of a sick man does not require drugs but is ready to respond to a course of treatment without, we think that a physician of inferior skill suffices. But when drugs have to be given we know that a more courageous physician is required.

True, but what is the purpose of your remark?

It is this, I answered. Our rulers will likely enough

be obliged to make use of falsehood and deceit for the good of the ruled. Now we said, I think, that such means were of service after the manner of drugs.

And we were quite right, he said.

Well then, in the case of marriages and the breeding of children this principle, which you call right, may be supposed to apply with special force.

How so?

If we carry out the views on which we agreed, the best males must associate with the best females as often as possible, and the worst of both as rarely as may be; the children of the former must be reared and those of the latter not, if the flock is to be as perfect as possible. All these provisions must operate without the knowledge of anyone but the rulers if the herd of guardians too is to be as free as possible from dissension.

You are absolutely right, he said.

Then we must fix certain festivals by law at which we shall bring brides and bridegrooms together, and ordain 460 sacrifices; and our poets must compose hymns suitable for the marriages that are taking place. The number of marriages we shall entrust to the control of the rulers, so that, as far as they can, they may keep the number of men static, having regard for the effects of war, disease and similar occurrences, and that to the best of our ability we may ensure that our city will not become too large or too small.

You are right, he said.

Then, I suppose, we must arrange a system of lots cleverly so that the inferior man may at each marriage celebration blame not the rulers but chance.

Decidedly so, he said.

Further, to those young men who in war or elsewhere

prove their worth, various privileges and rewards must be granted, and in particular more frequent permission to associate with the women, so that under this pretext it may be from parents of this kind that the largest number of children may be born.

Exactly so.

Then the magistrates who have been put in charge of these matters, whether men or women or both, will take over the offspring that are born from time to time—for magistracies will, I presume, be open to men and women alike?

Yes.

Well, I suppose, they will take the children of good parents and bring them to a nursery and entrust them to certain nurses living in a special quarter of the city; the children of inferior parents or any deformed offspring of the others they will hide, as is proper, in some secret and obscure spot.

Certainly, if the breed of the guardians is to be kept pure.

[Sokrates proceeds to lay down regulations for the nurture of the new-born children and to fix the time of life during which men and women should be allowed to have children. In the case of the woman it is to be between her twentieth and fortieth year; in that of the man, the latest year is fifty-five. The earliest year is not expressly stated, but from the quotation with its metaphor from the racing-stable which Plato introduces here, "when he has outlived the swiftest prime of running," and in view of the fact that in the *Laws* Plato suggests both twenty-five and thirty, we may suppose that he means thirty or thereabouts to be the earliest age in a man for marriage and parenthood.]

461 E This, Glaucon, is the character of the community in wives and children practised by the guardians of your city. That it is in harmony with the rest of the constitution

and by far the best we must confirm in the sequel by the help of our argument. Or how else can we proceed?

462 Assuredly as you say, he replied.

Will not this then be the preliminary towards agreement, to ask ourselves this question: What can we describe as the greatest good for the constitution of a city, which should be the lawgiver's aim in framing his laws, and what as the greatest evil? Secondly, to inquire: Do the institutions described by us fit into our sketch of the supreme good and fail to fit into our sketch of the supreme evil?

Undoubtedly, he replied.

Can we find any greater evil for a city than that which causes its disruption and changes a single state into many, or a greater good than that which unites and unifies a city?

We cannot.

Community in pleasure and pain acts as a bond of union, does it not, when all citizens as far as possible experience joy and pain virtually at the same advantages and losses?

Most emphatically, he said.

Again, when these emotions are felt by individual persons (irrespective of their fellow-men) the effect is disunion, when some experience extreme grief, others extreme delight at the same incidents affecting city and citizens?

Certainly.

Then, such a condition results when the inhabitants in a city do not all alike utter the words "mine" and "not mine"? and when the same is true of the word "another's"?

Exactly so.

Then the city in which the greatest number of persons

call the same thing "mine" and "not mine" is the best governed?

By far the best.

A city, in fact, which most nearly resembles a single human being? Just as when one of us hurts his finger, the whole partnership which permeates the body up to the soul and is formed into a single ordered system controlled by the ruling element in the partnership feels the injury, and, as the member is hurt, suffers pain in sympathy; thus we say that the man has a pain in his finger. The same statement is true of any other part of the human body respecting the pain felt when any part is hurt or the pleasure when it is relieved.

Certainly, the same statement applies, he said, and respecting the subject of your inquiry the condition of the best governed state affords a close parallel to such a case.

Yes, I suppose when any of the citizens experience good or evil, that state will above all say that the affected part belongs to the state and will as a whole feel joy or sorrow in sympathy.

A state with good laws, he said, must necessarily do so.

It would seem, I answered, to be time for us to revert to our city and investigate whether it best fulfils the conditions on which we agreed in our argument, or whether some other city does so more.

We ought to proceed, he said.

463 Well then, just as other states contain both rulers and the people, so does this of ours, does it not?

It does.

And all these persons will address one another as citizens?

Of course.

Well, but in addition to the name of citizens what other name do the people in those other states apply to their rulers?

In the majority, masters, in those with a democratic constitution this very name, rulers.

But what of the people in our city? What name besides that of citizens will they give to the rulers?

Saviours and helpers.

What name will they give to the people?

Paymasters and nurturers.

But what name do rulers in the other states give them?

Slaves, he replied.

And the rulers one to another?

Fellow-rulers.

What will they say in our state?

Fellow-guardians.

Then, can you tell me whether one of the rulers in the other cities can call one of his fellow-rulers a friend and another a stranger?

This might happen in many cases.

Then he regards and speaks of a friend as part of himself and the stranger as not so?

Exactly.

What then will the guardians in your state do? Would any of them be able to regard or speak of one of his fellow-guardians as a stranger?

Certainly not, he said. For whenever he meets anyone, whoever he be, he will think that he is meeting either a brother or sister or father or mother or son or daughter or a child or parent of these.

Your reply is admirable, I said. But come now, answer me this too. Will you be content by your legislation to make merely their names familiar ones, or will

you make them act in every particular as their names imply? For example, towards fathers will a man act as the law bids him respecting reverence, filial duty and subjection of children to their parents, failing which he will incur punishment before gods and men on the ground that he would violate divine and human law if he acted otherwise than we have indicated? Shall these and similar popular opinions coming from all the citizens resound in the ears of the children respecting those who are pointed out to them as fathers and other relatives also?

These, he said; for it would be absurd if familiar names were merely uttered by word of mouth without corresponding behaviour.

In this city, therefore, more than in any other, all the citizens will, if any of their members experiences good or bad fortune, give united utterance to the words which we stated just now—"it fares well with mine" or "it fares ill with mine."

Very true, he said.

464 Then we said that side by side with these sentiments and words go pleasures and pains experienced by all in common?

And we were certainly right in saying so.

Then our citizens will as far as possible participate in the same thing which they will call "mine" and in participating therein they will thereby share grief and pleasure in common?

Decidedly.

Well then, the reason for this, in addition to the rest of their organisation, is the community in wives and children exercised by the guardians?

Most undoubtedly, he replied.

Now, in truth, we agreed that this was the highest good for a state, and we likened a well-governed state

to a body and its relation in respect of pain and pleasure to each of its members.

And we were certainly right in our conclusion, he said.

So the cause for the greatest good in the state has revealed itself to us as the community in wives and children observed by the "helpers of the people."

Certainly, he said.

And, what is more, we did not run counter to our earlier arguments. For we said, I fancy, that they should have neither houses nor land nor possessions of their own, but should receive food from the other citizens in payment of their guardianship and should consume it all in common if they intended truly to be guardians.

Quite so, he said.

Well then, do not, as I suggest, our previous ordinances and still more our present ones make of these men true guardians and prevent them from disintegrating their city by calling "mine" not the same but different objects in different cases and by severally dragging off to their houses whatever each can acquire apart from his fellows and by having separate wives and children and by rendering pleasures and sorrows personal feelings experienced by the individual? Instead, because there is but a single opinion about what is their own, they are led to strive unitedly after one aim and, as far as they can, to experience pleasure and pain simultaneously.

Exactly so, he said.

Well then, will not law-suits and indictments virtually disappear from amongst them because no man owns anything himself except his person, but all else is common? And will they thereby be rid of all those many factions to which mankind is led by the separate possession of wealth, children and kinsmen?

It is inevitable, he said, that they will be rid of them. Further, there cannot justly be amongst them actions for forcible seizure or assault. For we shall, I suppose, say that it is fair and just for men to defend themselves against men of their own age, compelling them to keep themselves fit.

That is right, he said.

465 Well, another right provision of the law is this : if a man were to be enraged with another, he could give his rage full rein in such an encounter and thus he would be less likely to proceed to more serious disturbances.

Exactly so.

Still, an older man will have been empowered to exercise control over and chastise all younger men.

Obviously.

However, we may presume that no young man, unless instructed to do so by the magistrates, will attempt to strike or commit any other violence against an older man, nor, I suppose, will he show him any disrespect in any other way. For twin guardians, fear and reverence, serve to hold him in check, reverence restraining him from laying hands on men whom he regards as parents, and fear that others may come to the help of the victim, whether it be those regarded as sons or as brothers or as fathers.

That will certainly be the case, he replied.

Thus, in every way, thanks to the laws the men will be at peace one with another.

Yes, very effectively.

Then if they do not quarrel amongst one another there is no danger that the rest of the inhabitants will ever be at variance with them or with one another.

None at all.

Some very insignificant evils moreover of which they

would be rid, I hesitate even to mention because of their sordidness ; the poor would be rid of the need to flatter the rich, and men in general of the difficulties and hardships incidental to the rearing of children and to money-making enterprises for raising the necessary funds to keep the members of a household, when men now borrow, now disclaim liability, now acquire wealth in any way they can and deposit it with their wives and servants and assign them the control thereof ; and then there are all the various troubles inseparable from these matters, which are obvious enough and mean and not worthy of mention.

Yes, even a blind man can see them.

Of all these evils they will rid themselves and live a life more full of bliss than the happy existence passed by Olympic victors.

How so ?

Well, I suppose such victors experience but a small portion of the happiness which our citizens enjoy ; for their victory is more glorious and their sustenance from the state is more complete. The victory that they achieve is the security of the whole state ; food and all the other needs of life are the crown that they and their children win ; in their life they receive gifts of honour from the state, and when they die an honourable burial is theirs.

Truly, he said, these are fine gifts.

Do you recollect, then, I replied, that in the earlier part of our discussion someone blamed us that we were not making the guardians happy ; since, though the power to possess all that the citizens had was theirs, they owned nothing ? We, I think, said that we would return to the consideration of that question if it came our way ; but that at the moment we were making our

guardians and the state as happy as we possibly could, but that we were not having regard for one class in the state and rendering them happy.

I remember, he said.

Well then, does not the life of our “helpers of the people,” if it is seen far to surpass that of Olympic victors in nobility and goodness, compare in any way with the life of the shoemakers or of other craftsmen or of the farmers?

I think not, he replied.

Still, as I also remarked on the former occasion, it is right to emphasise at this point that if a guardian shall strive so completely to attain happiness that he does not fulfil the functions of a guardian, and if a life that is thus temperate, secure and, as we said, the best will not content him, but a thoughtless and puerile view of happiness possesses him and, because he has the power, spurs him on to appropriate all that the state contains, he will learn that Hesiod (*Works and Days* 40) was truly wise when he said that, in a sense, the half is more than the whole.

If he follows my advice, he said, he will be true to this life.

Then, I replied, you approve of the women's equality with men, which we have described, in respect of education, children and guardianship of the rest of the citizens, and you agree that whether they remain in the city or go to war they are to be guardians jointly with the men, and hunters too, like dogs, and should take their share with the men in every way to the best of their power; and that if they thus conduct themselves, they will pursue the best course and one that is not opposed to the natural relationship between male and female, which should be the mutual bond between them.

I agree, he said.

PLATO

Laws

The *Laws* in twelve books is the last work composed by Plato, and there are good grounds for supposing that it was to some extent unfinished at his death in 347 B.C.; at least it is certain that he did not live to revise it. Though the earlier books are in the regular Platonic form of a dialogue,—the speakers are an Athenian stranger, Kleinias, a Cretan, and Megillus, a Spartan, the scene being laid in Crete—in Books v.—xii. the remarks of the second and third speakers become less and less, and instead the Athenian discourses continuously. The first three books, which are introductory, deal with the aim of the true law-giver, education and the political growth of states, illustrated from Greek legend and history. At the end of the third book the Athenian learns that Kleinias is about to legislate for a new colony in Crete, and all three proceed to consider suitable laws for this “city of the Magnetes.”

BOOK V

The speakers in this part of the work are the Athenian and Kleinias.

737 c **W**HAT, then, shall be the manner of the right distribution of land? First we must fix what the total number of citizens ought to be; then we must agree on their distribution, namely how many and how large the parts are to be into which we divide them; then again we must assign the land and the dwellings as fairly as possible. The total number of citizens can only be correctly fixed in relation to the territory occupied and to neighbouring states. The land must be such as adequately to support a certain number of persons of temperate life; more than this is unnecessary. The citizens should be numerous enough to ward off their neighbours if these do them an

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injury and to assist their neighbours when injured, lest these be completely helpless. When we have seen their territory and their neighbours we shall fix the boundaries in fact and give our reasons for what we do. But let our discourse proceed to legislation, that this may be completed in form and outline on the present occasion. Let there be five thousand and forty persons—to take a convenient number—to be land-holders and ready to fight for their land. In the same way let the land be divided into the same number of parts, so that one man and one lot make a pair. First, then, let the whole number be divided by two and then by three, for it can actually be divided by four and five and so on up to ten. It is, in truth, the duty of every law-giver to understand arithmetic sufficiently to know what number would be most serviceable for every city. Let us then choose the number which contains the greatest and most continuous series of divisions. The ideal whole number can be divided in every possible way and for every purpose, the number five thousand and forty however cannot be divided by more than fifty-nine divisors and of these one to ten are continuous; these numbers can be utilised for war, in time of peace, for business contracts and partnerships, for the collection of taxes and the distribution of allowances by the state. These numerical combinations, then, those persons whom the law appoints to this task ought to study and to grasp thoroughly. Assuredly they are just as I have said; moreover, they ought to be explained to a founder of a city for the following reason: whether he is founding a new city or re-establishing an old one that has decayed, with regard to gods and temples which should be erected in the city to the several gods or (in the case of restoring an old settlement) the gods or demi-gods whose name they

should bear, no man in his right mind will attempt to abrogate anything approved by the oracle at Delphi or Dodona, or by the god Ammon, or by venerable traditions, whatever the way in which they persuaded people, whether by telling of divine apparitions or divine inspirations;—thus by their influence they caused the institution of sacrifices joined to mystic rites which had their origin in the land itself or were transplanted from Etruria, Cyprus or other foreign lands ; and, again, by such stories they sanctified oracles, images, altars and shrines and allotted to each a sacred domain. Not even the most trifling of all these observances must the law-giver abrogate, but he must assign to each district its god or demi-god or else its hero. When he proceeds to distribute the land it is the gods whose sacred domains should first be chosen and all that is their due given to them, that gatherings of the several districts may take place at stated seasons and thus may facilitate the satisfaction of various needs, and, thanks to sacrifices, men may join together in friendly intercourse and become intimately acquainted with one another. No greater blessing can attend a city than that its citizens should be known one to the other ; for where men receive no light on the characters of their fellows but darkness prevails, no man could rightly attain to honour deserved or office, or secure the justice that is rightly his. So in every city every man should strive after this above all, namely that no falseness be in him, but that he be simple and true always, and that no other false person deceive him.

739 The next step in framing our laws, like the move in draughts of withdrawing a piece from the sacred line, is unusual and will perhaps cause surprise at the first hearing. And yet, if a man will reflect and put the matter to the

test, he will see that the organisation of our city will probably be second only to that of the ideal state. Again, perhaps someone will reject this second-best state because he is unfamiliar with the law-giver whose powers are not absolute. The most correct course is to specify the best constitution, the second-best and the third-best, and then in each case to leave the choice to the head of the community. Let us follow this division in our present inquiry and speak of constitutions that are first, second and third in point of excellence ; but the choice let us leave to Kleinias and to anyone else who may at any time, in selecting such a constitution, be inclined according to his disposition to bestow on it such characteristics of his own country as are dear to him.

The first type of state and constitution and the most excellent laws are those where the old adage holds good practically throughout the whole of the state ; the saying is that truly "friends have all things in common." Whether this complete communism exists anywhere at the present time or ever will exist,—that is to say, community in wives, in children and in all property—where by every means the term "my own" has been totally excluded from every department of human life and men have contrived to the best of their power that the things made "our own" by nature should be common in some kind of way—I mean that eyes, ears, and hands should appear to see, hear, and do as though they were common to all and not our own, and again all utter praise and blame as one man and all rejoice and grieve over the same things, and where whatever laws exist, as far as possible, unite the state to be one single whole—however that may be, no one, by setting a different aim before himself, will ever establish a state which will be

more upright or excellent, or will surpass this in virtue. And whether such a city be directed by gods or the children of gods, be it two or more, its citizens will dwell there passing their life in gladness. And so we need not look elsewhere for a model for our commonwealth, but should hold this one we have fast and seek for one most like it to the best of our power. The commonwealth which we have now tried to create will come nearest to immortality and will be the one that comes second. The third, if God wills, we will complete thereafter. But now we will speak of the nature and development of the second-best.

740 First, then, let the citizens divide up their land and houses, and let them not cultivate the former in common, since to do that is a proposal too difficult for them in view of their origin as we have stated it and of their sustenance and education. But let them effect the division with the following intention, that the man who has obtained his lot should regard it as the common property of the whole city; and since the country of which it is a part is his native land, he ought to care for it more zealously than children care for their mother, seeing too that the earth, herself a goddess, is mistress of all that is mortal. The same sentiments should also be his in regard to the native gods and demi-gods. That these ordinances may continue unchanged for all time, a further device should be introduced: whatever number of hearths is fixed by the present distribution ought always to remain the same and should not become either more or less. Such an arrangement could be firmly established in every city in the following way: let every lot-holder leave as sole heir to this dwelling whichever of his children is dearest to him, to be his successor and to do service to the gods

both of his family and of the city and to the living citizens as well as those that have passed away up to the time when he becomes heir. As for the other children, in cases where a man has more than one, the females are to be given in marriage according to the ordinance to be established later and the males are to be divided among the childless citizens to be their sons, if possible among friends ; but in the case of such as are without close friends or of citizens who have too numerous a progeny, be it male or female, or else too few owing to sterility, in all these cases the magistracy, which we shall establish as the highest and most honourable, is to consider how to deal with the superfluous or the deficient, and is to devise, so far as possible, a method by which there shall always be only five thousand and forty dwellings. Now there are many methods of effecting this. Thus those whose powers of reproduction are prolific may be restrained therefrom, and, contrariwise, there may be careful encouragement of large families, and both these things, being carried into effect by means of honours and disgrace and the counsel given by older to younger men in words of admonition, can bring about that of which we are speaking. And then, in the last resort, if the preservation of the five thousand and forty households at the same number causes insuperable difficulty, and, finding that there is an excessive overflow of citizens owing to the affections of those that live together, we are at a loss for a remedy, there is still the ancient device of which we have often spoken, namely the dispatch in all friendship of colonies of those whom it seems expedient to send. Again, if ever

741 a deluge of disease comes flooding upon them or the ravages of war, and owing to bereavement the total of citizens is less than the statutory number, they ought

not, if they can help it, to introduce into the citizen body those reared in some base semblance of education. Yet not even God, it is said, can struggle against necessity.

Let us then suppose the Argument just stated by us is exhorting the settlers on these points, saying: Most excellent of mankind, do not desist from honouring, as Nature does, similarity, equality, identity and congruity, both in number and in every activity that produces good and noble things. Thus too in this present instance firstly maintain throughout your lives the number (5040) that has been fixed ; secondly, do not disfigure the harmonious proportions of the property that has been assigned to you by buying and selling it to one another, for then neither the Divine Lot that assigned to you your lot nor the law-giver will be on your side. In truth the law lays this injunction on the disobedient, since it declares that any that would have it should receive a lot of land on these terms or else no lot should be assigned: Firstly, the earth is sacred to all the gods ; then, priests and priestesses at the first and subsequent sacrifices not exceeding three shall pray that any man who buys or sells homesteads or farms allotted to him may suffer punishment suitable to his offence. These prayers shall be inscribed on tablets of cypress-wood as a reminder for all time, and shall be deposited in the temples. But, besides this, they shall assign the task of seeing that these ordinances are carried out to the keenest-eyed magistracy, so that transgressions may in every instance come to their notice and they may punish him who has thus disobeyed both God and the law. In truth how great the good is that all states which pay heed and have an organisation conformable to it will derive from this ordinance, “no one” in the words of the old proverb, “who is a sinner shall know,” but only

the man whose habits have brought him experience and goodness. The accumulation of wealth has little place in such an organisation, and inherent in it too is the regulation that no man ought or may acquire wealth by any of the illiberal professions, inasmuch as men call these vulgar pursuits reprehensible in that they pervert the character of a free man, nor think it right at all to amass wealth from such a source.

742 Besides this, another law goes with all these enactments : no individual citizen, it says, may own any gold or silver, but only money as a medium of exchange necessary day by day in transactions with craftsmen or in payment of wages to persons, be they slaves or aliens, hired for such duties by all those who have need of their services. Consequently we say that they should possess money which is current amongst themselves but valueless among other men. But as for a currency common to all Hellenes for use on military expeditions and state - visits to other countries, as, for instance, embassies or any other occasions that may arise when the state must send out a herald, such a currency must be possessed by the state. But suppose a private citizen is forced to travel abroad, let him proceed after he has got the permission of the magistrates ; if, on his return home, he has any foreign money over, let him pay it into the state - treasury and receive the native currency in return at the proper valuation. But if he is found to make it his private possession, the money shall be confiscated, and any man who is aware thereof and fails to report it, shall be liable to a curse and disgrace jointly with him who brought the money, and, besides this, to a fine not less in amount than the imported foreign currency. And when any person marries or gives in marriage, he is not to give or receive a dowry of any

kind whatsoever. No one is to deposit money with another unless it be a trusted friend nor to lend money on interest, since the borrower will be within his rights in refusing to pay back either interest or capital. That these are the best habits for a state to follow is the conclusion to which any investigator would come if he compare them to the original intention of the state. Now the intention of a wise statesman, we say, is not what the majority would say it is, to wit that the good legislator should desire the state for whose welfare he is legislating to be as large and wealthy as possible, and, further, to own gold and silver mines and to have the greatest maritime and land empire; they would add a rider that the good legislator should desire the state to be as good and happy as possible. But, while some of these things are possible, others are not. Those that are, he who orders the city will desire, but as for the impossible he will neither indulge vain desires for it nor attempt to effect it. Doubtless the citizens must be both happy and good—this would be the legislator's intention—but they cannot be exceedingly rich and good as well, not rich at least as the majority understand the term. They call rich the small minority of mankind who own possessions worth vast sums of money, possessions which any rascal might own. But if this is correct, I, for my part, should never agree with them that the rich man is truly happy even though he be not good. If he is exceedingly good it is impossible that he should be exceedingly rich. Why so? it may be asked. Because, we should reply, wealth which is produced from both a just and an unjust source is more than double the wealth that proceeds solely from a just source, and the expenditures that hesitate to be made whether the object is good or shameful are but

half the number of those that are good and made with a good aim in view. Therefore, while in one man's case his possessions are double and his expenditure half, another, whose experience is just the opposite, could not possibly be richer than the former. Now while the latter is good, the former is not bad when he is thrifty, though at times he may be utterly bad, but good, as we have shown, he is never. For the man who acquires wealth both justly and unjustly and spends it neither justly nor unjustly is rich if he is also thrifty; but the wholly vicious man, since he is in most cases a waster, is very poor. But the man who spends for a good purpose and derives his wealth only from just sources could never easily be exceptionally wealthy nor yet utterly poor. Consequently our argument is correct, that very rich men are not good; it follows that, if they are not good, they are not happy either.

The principle underlying our laws has in view that the citizens should be as happy and as friendly to one another as possible, but citizens would never be good friends in a state where mutual law-suits abound and unjust deeds likewise, but only where such things are trifling and of rare occurrence. Now we say that neither gold nor silver should exist in the state nor yet much money-making by means of vulgar trade and lending of money and shameful traffic in live stock, but only the produce of husbandry and not more of this than will allow us, while engaged therein, to attend to the things for which wealth exists. These are the soul and the body, which without gymnastic and the other parts of education will never be anything but worthless. Consequently we have repeatedly said that care of wealth should be the last thing to have our regard. For there are three things that

are every man's concern: the third and last is rightly directed attention to wealth, the second, attention to the body, the first, attention to the soul. And truly the commonwealth which we are now describing, if it grades honours on this principle, has been founded on right laws. If any of the laws hereafter to be framed in the 744 commonwealth shall be seen to set health before temperance, or wealth before health and temperance, it will obviously be wrongly formulated. These, then, are the considerations which the law-giver should make clear to himself many times: "What is my purpose?" and again, "Am I succeeding or am I missing the mark?"

Thus, and by no other method whatsoever, he will perhaps complete the work of law-giving and release others from that task.

Let the man, then, who has received a lot own it on the terms which we have stated. It would have been well too for every settler to come to our colony with an equal quantity of property; but, as this is impossible and one will arrive with a greater, another with a smaller amount of wealth, for a variety of reasons, and particularly as there is in the state equality of opportunity, property qualifications must be unequal so that for magistracies, taxes and distributions by the state each man's value may be assessed not merely according to his ancestors' and his own merit or their physical strength and beauty, but also according to the use or absence of wealth, and that men may receive honours and offices on an unequal but proportional system in the most equitable manner possible and no differences may arise between them. To attain this they should be arranged in four classes according to the amount of their property, to be called first, second, third, and fourth class, or else by similar names, whether

their qualification remains the same or whether they change from poverty to wealth or from wealth to poverty when each is transferred to his appropriate class. With this purpose in view I should frame the law, which is the next step, in this way. For, as we said, in the state which is free from the greatest of all ills, which should more rightly be called disruption than discord, neither harsh poverty nor riches should exist among any of the citizens on the ground that both these conditions propagate both these ills. Therefore it is the legislator's duty to define the limit of poverty and wealth. Let the limit, then, of poverty be the value of the lot; the lot must remain unchanged and no magistrate shall permit it to be diminished in any instance, nor shall any other man who is ambitious after a virtuous name. The law-giver, fixing the lot as a standard, shall allow the citizens to acquire double or treble, but not exceeding four times this amount. If a man acquire more than this, whether it be that he has found it or received it as a gift from someone or made it by trade, or by some other chance occurrence has obtained an amount in excess of the standard, he shall assign the excess to the state and to its guardian deities, and thus he shall be well-spoken of and free from any penalty. But if a man disobey this law, whoever wishes shall disclose the fact and shall receive half the excess, and the offender shall pay out of his own property an amount equal to the excess and half thereof shall be surrendered to the gods. But all property other than the lot shall in every man's case be entered up publicly before the controlling magistrates to whom the law assigns this duty, so that all suits concerned with property may be easy and perspicuous.

The next step is for the law-giver to have the city

founded as far as possible in the centre of the country, after he has selected a site which also possesses all the characteristics advantageous to a city ; these are easily thought of and stated. Next, he should have the city divided into twelve parts, having first fixed a precinct sacred to Hestia, Zeus and Athena, called the citadel and encircled by a wall. From this citadel he is to mark out twelve parts, to include the city itself and the entire territory. The twelve parts are to be rendered equal in value by arranging that those whose soil is good should be smaller, those whose soil is poor larger. He is to divide the land into five thousand and forty lots, and each of these he is to halve again and combine as a lot for one man two parts, each joined with a distant or near half ; thus, the part near the city shall be combined to form one lot with that on the frontier, the part next nearest to the city with that next nearest to the frontier and so forth in every instance. In the case of the separate halves we must also adjust the relation, of which we lately spoke, between poor and fertile soil and equalise the value of the parts by assigning a greater or a smaller amount of land. Again, the law-giver should divide the citizens into twelve sections, ordering the distribution of other property as far as possible to make the twelve sections equal after registration of all the citizens has taken place. Furthermore after this they are to assign twelve lots to the twelve gods and consecrate the part allotted to each god and name it and call the tribes too by those names. The twelve city-sections, again, they are to divide in the same manner in which they apportioned the rest of the territory. Each man is to own two dwellings, one near the centre of the country, one near the frontier. This concludes the method of settlement.

BOOK VIII

846 D Now, respecting the craftsmen our procedure must be thus: firstly let no native nor yet the servant of a native belong to the class of men engaged on handicrafts. For the citizen, if he is engaged in protecting and preserving the public order of the state, has an art that is sufficient and needs much practice combined with knowledge in many subjects, and the public order does not admit of being treated as a secondary occupation. In virtually no case does a man's natural constitution enable him to practise two professions or crafts accurately, nor again can he adequately practise one himself and superintend another practising another craft. The following principle therefore must exist in the state at the very outset. Let no man, if he be a coppersmith, at the same time practise carpentry, or again, if he be a carpenter, let him not look after other men who are coppersmiths instead of after his own craft; excusing himself on the ground that as he is looking after many servants who are working for him, he looks after them better through their help, 847 because he derives a larger income from them than from his own craft; but let every man in the state be master of one craft and from that alone gain his living. This law the city-magistrates are to exert themselves to the utmost to uphold, and they are to punish with disgrace and loss of privilege any citizen who is diverted to some craft to the detriment of the pursuit of virtue, until they have guided him back to his own course. But, if any stranger practise two crafts, let them punish him with imprisonment, fines and expulsion from the city and compel him to be one man, not many. Respecting wages and contracts for work and in cases where one person

acts injuriously to others or they to someone else, if the sum involved does not exceed fifty drachmai (L2) let the city-magistrates give their decision ; if the amount involved is more, let the public courts decide in accordance with law.

No one in the city is to pay duty either on exported or imported goods. Frankincense and all other foreign spices used in the worship of the gods, purple and other dyes, if not produced in the country, and all materials for any craft which have to be imported from abroad and are not essential, these no one shall introduce, nor, conversely, shall he send out of the country those products which are required in the country. To deal with all these matters there are to be appointed controllers and inspectors from among the guardians of the law, being the twelve next in order to the five senior guardians. Respecting arms and all other implements used in war, if it be necessary to import any craft, or any plant or mineral product, or chains or animals of any sort for military purposes, the cavalry and infantry commanders are to control the import and export of these things. The state is responsible alike for sending them out of the country and for receiving them, but the guardians of the law shall frame proper and adequate laws to deal with these matters.

Retail trade in these or other products, with the object of amassing wealth, shall not be permitted in the country as a whole or in the city. With regard to food and the distribution of native produce, if a right arrangement closely similar to that of Cretan law were introduced, it would be satisfactory, for all ought to be required to divide all the produce from the country into twelve parts and to consume them on this principle. Let the

twelfth part—for instance of wheat and barley, to which the other products in their seasons shall be added and 848 also all animals that are for sale in each of the twelve divisions—be subdivided into three, proportionately to the size of the class, one for the free citizens, one for their slaves, the third for craftsmen and for strangers in general, whether they belong to the class of resident aliens and so require the necessities of life or whether they are persons who come on a visit from time to time to transact business with the state or one of its citizens. Let only this third part of all necessities be set aside for sale compulsorily, and let it not be compulsory to sell anything of the other two parts. How, then, is the distribution of all these products to be effected? It is manifest that, in one sense, we are dividing equal, in another, unequal things.

Kleinias. What mean you?

Athenian. It is inevitable that the earth should put forth and mature each species of produce in varying degrees of goodness or badness.

Kleinias. Certainly.

Athenian. In respect of value therefore, let no one of the three shares be greater than another when distributed to masters or slaves, or again in the case of the stranger's share, but let the division ensure to all fair and equal treatment. Every citizen, on taking his two shares, shall control the distribution both among slaves and free men, and fix the amount and quality he wishes to assign; what is over from these two shares should be distributed by him by measure and number in the following way: he should take the number of all the animals that have to be fed from the soil and apportion accordingly.

In the next place the citizens should have separately

appointed dwelling-places. The following is the suitable arrangement in a matter of that kind: there should be twelve villages, one in the centre of each of the twelve divisions; in each village there should first be chosen a square with temples of the gods and their attendant demi-gods. If there are any local gods of the Magnetes, or shrines of other divinities of ancient memory have been preserved, they should pay to these the same honours as the old inhabitants. Temples of Hestia, Zeus and Athena they are to found everywhere, and also of whichever of the other deities presides over each of the twelve districts. Round these temples, where is the highest-lying ground, houses shall first be built, so that the guards may have as securely fortified quarters as possible. The whole of the remaining country they must organise by dividing the craftsmen into thirteen sections; one of these they are to settle in the city and distribute among the twelve parts of the whole city, and these craftsmen are to dwell all round the outer parts of the city. Again, in each village they shall establish those classes of craftsmen who are of service to the farmers. The chief among the country-magistrates are to control all these persons and decide the number and character of them according to the needs of each district and the place where their presence will cause the least annoyance and be of the greatest benefit to the farmers. The city-magistrates on the same principle are to undertake and exercise control over the city craftsmen.

All matters connected with the market should engage the attention of the market-magistrates. Next to the supervision of the temples near the agora, that no man do any wrong there, their attention must in the second place be directed to the transactions between men; they

must be on the watch for intemperate and vicious conduct and must punish any man deserving of punishment. Respecting wares, the magistrates must in the first place control whether those that the citizens are required to sell to strangers are being dealt with according to the law. For each of these wares the law is that on the first of the month all the supervisors, whether they be foreigners or even slaves who perform this duty for the citizens, are to bring out the portion of goods that are to be sold to the foreigners, in the first place a twelfth part of the corn. The stranger may on the first market-day buy corn or anything else for the whole month. On the tenth of the month liquid substances sufficient for the whole month are to be sold and bought by the respective parties. On the twenty-third of the month let the sale of all live stock, that is to be sold or bought by those desiring to do so, take place ; also the farmers' sale of goods and products, such as skins, clothing of every kind whether woven or made of felt, and other similar articles, the stranger being obliged to buy and acquire these goods from others. But respecting retail trade in these articles or in barley or wheaten flour or even in other food-products as a whole, these let no man sell to citizens or their slaves or buy from any one of them. In the markets for foreigners let a foreigner sell to the craftsmen and their slaves, trading in wine and corn, which is what men generally call retail trade. When the live stock has been cut up, let butchers dispose of it to foreigners, craftsmen and slaves. Let any stranger who so desires buy firewood on any day wholesale from those in charge of it in the country, and let him sell to foreigners in whatever quantity and at whatever time he wishes. All other articles and utensils which the

citizens severally need are to be brought to the common market to their several places and sold. And wherever the guardians of the law and the market-inspectors, after marking out suitable places in conjunction with the city-magistrates, determine the boundaries within which goods are to be sold, there men are to exchange money for wares and wares for money, no man entrusting to another his part of the deal without receiving the equivalent. Any man who does so because he trusts the other, whether he gets his part of the bargain or not, must be content, since no law dealing with transactions of this kind will any longer be administered. But in so far as that which is bought or sold exceeds in amount or value what is permitted by the law, which has laid down the amount of increase or decrease beyond which a man may neither buy nor sell, it is to be registered at once before the law-guardians if it is an excess, and cancelled if it is a deficiency. The same regulations respecting registration of property shall also apply to resident aliens. Any foreigner, who so desires, may become a resident on stated conditions, since residence is allowed to any foreigner who desires and is able to take up a permanent abode. The terms are that he must be skilled in a trade and must not reside more than twenty years from the time of registration ; he is to pay no due, however small, to the state saving his own good conduct, nor any tax for the right of buying and selling. When the period of residence has elapsed, he is to take what property belongs to him and depart. But if during these years he chances to become noted for some considerable benefaction to the state and feels sure that he can convince the senate and assembly when requesting either that his departure be officially postponed, or even that he may reside for

his lifetime, if he comes forward and convinces the state of his claims, then whatever claims he establishes shall be fulfilled. In the case of the children of resident aliens, if they have learnt a trade and are fifteen years old, their period of residence shall be reckoned from the sixteenth year. Then, after residing for twenty years on these terms, let such a one go whither he likes, or, if he desires to remain, let him do so if he has made good his case by the same procedure as before. If he leaves, let it be after he has cancelled the entries which he has previously made in the register before the magistrates.

BOOK XI

916^D LET the man who exchanges coin for coin or barters animate or inanimate commodities in return for others, give and receive every article unadulterate in strict observance of the law. Let us approve a preamble, as we have done with other laws, dealing generally with this class of knavery. Everyone ought to class adulteration in the same category as deceit and fraud, actions on which the many are in the habit of making repute depend, though they are wrong in arguing that such acts, if committed at the right time, may severally often be right ; and they leave the occasion, the where and the when, undetermined and undefined, and by this method of speaking they inflict injury on themselves and others. But the legislator is not permitted to leave this matter undefined, but he must constantly state explicitly a limit, be it greater or smaller. Let a clear definition now be given : Let no man call upon the gods in committing any deceit, fraud or adulteration, unless he
917 would be an abomination to them. Such would be he

who disregards the gods by swearing false oaths, and, in the second place, he who lies before his superiors. Better men are the superiors of worse men, older men, speaking generally, of younger men, parents of their children, men of women and children, rulers of the ruled. It is fitting that the inferior should in every case reverence the superior, whatever the rule that they exercise, but particularly in the case of state-magistracies. It is from a consideration of these that our argument has taken its rise. Every man who adulterates an article sold in the market commits deceit and fraud, and calling on the gods he repeats the oath in the face of the regulations and safeguards of the market-magistrates, without feeling any shame before men or reverence for the gods. Assuredly virtuous practice shrinks from sullying the name of the gods and behaves as the majority of us do in respect of purity and holiness in their service of the gods. If, then, a man obey not, this shall be the law: whoever sells anything in the market is never to assign two prices to the wares he sells, but only one; if he do not obtain this, his proper course would be to remove his wares, and he is not to lower or to raise the price on this day nor is there to be any praising of or taking an oath about the article that is for sale. Should any man disobey this regulation, any citizen who chances to be near-by, provided he is over thirty years of age, may punish and strike the swearer with impunity; if he remains indifferent and disobedient to this behest, he is to be censured for betrayal of the laws. When any man sells an adulterated article and refuses to obey these ordinances, anyone who is present and understands that particular trade, if he is able to prove the charge and does so before the magistrates, shall, if he be a slave or resident

alien, take away with him the adulterated article ; if he be a citizen and fail to bring the charge, let him be pronounced bad on the ground that he is robbing the gods ; if he bring and establish the charge, let him dedicate the article to the gods of the market. Whoever is shown to be selling such wares, in addition to being deprived of the adulterated goods, is to be flogged, receiving a lash for each drachma (10d.), according to the estimated price of the article to be sold, at the hands of a herald who shall first have proclaimed in the market-place the offence for which the man is going to be flogged. The market-superintendents and the guardians of the law, when they have ascertained from men experienced in the several branches of retail trade the adulterations and dishonest practices of the sellers, are to post up notices saying what the seller must or must not do, and are to inscribe their laws on a pillar in front of the market-superintendents' 918 office, so that these may give clear information to persons engaged in the business of the market. Enough has already been said about the city-magistrates ; if anything further seems necessary, they are to take the guardians of the law into consultation and write down what seems to have been left out and put on a pillar in the city-magistrates' office the earlier and later ordinances governing their magistracy.

The practices of retail-trade follow close upon the practices of adulteration. Let us first give a word of advice with regard to retail trade as a whole, and follow this up with a statement of the law itself. In every city retail trade as a whole does not by nature exist for a harmful purpose, but quite the reverse. For is any man who renders property consisting of such and such goods, which is incommensurable and unequal, equal and

commensurable, other than a benefactor? This, it behoves us to affirm, is effected by the power of money and we must admit that the merchant has been detailed for this task. The worker for hire, the inn-keeper and other professions, some of which are more, others less, reputable, all have this aim, to supply the needs of all and to equalise their possessions. Let us then see why men regard retail trade as an ignoble and disreputable occupation, and what it is that has brought reproach upon it, to the end that we may remedy this by law, if not entirely, at least in part. It is, methinks, no trivial task but one that requires much virtue.

Kleinias. What is your meaning?

Athenian. My dear Kleinias, it is a small class of men, rare by nature and brought up by a first-rate training, that can show patience and moderation when involved in wants and desires, and, when the power to acquire much wealth presents itself, is yet temperate and prefers moderation to excess. Vast numbers of men follow the opposite course to these, their wants are continuous and measureless, and when they have the option of acquiring moderate gains they choose to seek after such insatiably. Hence it is that all matters appertaining to retail trade, commerce and inn-keeping, are in disrepute and included among base and shameful actions. Now if any man—God forbid it should ever be so, and it never will be—should oblige the very best men everywhere for a time to keep inns—an absurd suggestion, but still I will make it—or to become shopkeepers or to do anything of this kind, or if it should happen that owing to some inevitable necessity women should engage in such pursuits, we should realise how pleasant and satisfactory each of these businesses is; and if each of them were conducted

on principles of unswerving honesty, one and all would be honoured as men honour mother and nurse. As it now is, when a man travels to desert places for the sake
919 of trafficking and builds houses that are only accessible after long journeys, and receives other men at a pleasant caravanserai when they are needy or forcibly driven to that place by cruel storms, and affords them peaceful calm or shelter in intense heat ; and, thereafter, instead of treating them as guest-friends and showing them a friendly hospitality in keeping with his reception of them, uses them like enemies whom he has conquered and made prisoner and only lets them go in return for vast, unjust and filthy ransom—these and like to these are the misdeeds which have rightly brought reproach on the succour of those in need. Therefore the legislator must ever concoct a healing draught for such distempers. A true and old saying runs: “It is hard to fight two adversaries”; and so it is in the case of diseases and many other things. In the present instance too the fight is against two enemies, poverty and wealth ; the latter corrupts men’s souls by luxury, the former through pain is driven to complete shamelessness. What protection against this plague can be found in a right-thinking city? Firstly, the class of shopkeepers employed must be as small as possible ; secondly, this business must be assigned to those persons whose spoiling will do but little harm to the state ; thirdly, for those actually engaged in these practices a means must be found to prevent their disposition from being filled unrestrainedly and easily with shamelessness and illiberality. After the statements that we have just made, let the law be as follows and may good luck be ours : No owner of land among the Magnetes, whom the god is raising up again and settling in homes—I mean no one

belonging to the five thousand and forty households—is voluntarily or against his will to become a retail trader or a merchant, or to serve private citizens in any way whatsoever unless they do the same for him, save only his father and mother and the generations further back than these and all older than himself, doing a free man's service to free men. It is not easy to determine accurately by law what befits a free man and what is beneath him; still, let the decision rest with those who have won the highest reputation by their approval of the one and their detestation of the other. Whoever in any wise concerns himself with illiberal retail trade shall be denounced for bringing shame upon his race by anyone who wishes before those who have been adjudged pre-eminent in virtue; if he seem to besmirch his ancestral hearth by an unworthy vocation, he is to be imprisoned for a year
920 and then desist therefrom; if he repeat the offence, he is to be imprisoned for two years, and on each conviction let him serve in prison a period twice as long as that which preceded it. The second law is: Whoever intends to engage in retail trade, must be a resident alien or a stranger. Thirdly, here is our third law: In order that such an one may be as good or as little bad a denizen of the city as possible, it shall be the duty of the law-guardians to reflect that they are guardians not only of those whom it is easy to watch and prevent from becoming lawless and vicious, men in fact whose descent and education are alike of the best; but they must watch more closely those of a different disposition who are engaged in occupations which strongly weight the scale in the direction of evil ways. To secure this, with regard to retail trade, which is a wide subject and embraces many pursuits such as we have named, in so far as these are allowed to

remain because they appear to be highly essential in the state, it must again be the duty of the guardians of the law to come together with those who are experienced in each class of retail trade—as we ordained previously in the case of adulteration which is a kindred topic—and, when they have foregathered, to see what takings coupled with necessary expenditure ensure a moderate profit for the trader. The recurrent expenditure and takings are to be written down and fixed, and the market-superintendents, the city-magistrates and the country-magistrates are to keep a close watch thereon. It may be that in this way retail trade will benefit everyone and at the same time will do very little harm to those who engage in it in the city.

920 E The class of craftsmen who have provided our lives with the crafts are under the divine patronage of Hephaistos and Athena, and those who protect the works of the craftsmen by other arts, to wit the arts of defence, are under the patronage of Ares and Athena. It is right that this class of men should be dedicated to these deities. All these men continuously serve their country and their fellow-men; some take the command in the contests of war, others create tools and works in return for pay, and these should not be guilty of fraud in such matters but should reverence the gods who are their ancestors. If

921 any craftsman culpably fail to complete his work by an appointed time, thus showing disrespect to the god who has given him the means of life in the belief—though it is the view of a fool—that it is his own god who is of a forgiving disposition, firstly he shall be punished by the god, and, secondly, a law appropriate to his case

shall be effective. Let the transgressor owe the value of the works of which he has cheated the employer and let him make them again from the beginning without charge in the appointed time. To any man who contracts for any work the law gives the same advice that it gave to the seller, namely, not to take advantage by putting an excessive price on it, but as simply as possible to appraise it at the true value. This same command the law lays on the contractor, for, if any man does, the contractor knows the value of his work. And so in a city of free men no craftsman ought, by means of his craft which is by nature a plain thing without fraud, to deal craftily with private citizens; the man wronged shall be able to take legal proceedings against the wrong-doer. If a man gives work to a craftsman but fails to pay him his wages rightly according to the lawful contract, thereby dishonouring Zeus the city-guardian and Athena, who are partners of the commonwealth, and in his zeal for a trifling profit loosens the bonds that hold together larger associations (*i.e.* the state), let the law jointly with the gods be the champion of the bonds that unite the city. Whoever has received the work for which he has given a contract but fails to make payment for it in the time agreed, is to pay double. At the end of a year, although all other wealth advanced on loan is not to return interest, he is to pay an obol a month interest on every drachma that he owes to the contractor, and law-suits arising out of these matters are to be taken in the tribal courts.

ARISTOTLE

Politics

BOOK I

1 SINCE we see that every city is an association of persons, and that every association is formed for some good—for every action done by men has as its aim something that seems to them to be good—it is plain that all associations aim at some good, and particularly the most sovereign of all, which includes all others, aims at the sovereign good. This association is what is called the city-state and the social community. Now those who think that the statesman, the king, the householder, and the master of slaves are one and the same, argue falsely; for they hold that each of these differs only in the greater or smaller number of persons under his control, but not in kind; thus, if he has charge of a few, he is a master; if of a greater number, the head of a household; if of a still greater number, a statesman or king, since, as they argue, there is no difference between a large household and a small city. As for the difference between a statesman and a king, he will be a king, they say, if he presides absolutely himself, a statesman when he presides according to the principles of the kingly science, but takes his turn at ruling and being ruled. This reasoning is false, but our argument will be clear, if we proceed in our inquiry according to the method that has guided us before. For just as in other subjects the composite must be resolved into its simplest elements—for these are the smallest parts of the whole—so, if we study the parts of which

the city is made up, we shall more readily understand how the several types of ruler differ one from another, and whether it is possible to get a scientific account of each of these.

2 In the case of rulers, as in other subjects of inquiry, the clearest view will be obtained by regarding the growth of things from the very beginning. First, then, it is necessary for those who cannot exist without one another to pair, as for instance the male and the female for the purpose of propagation ;—this is not the result of deliberate choice, but as in the case of the other animals and of plants so in man desire is instinctive, namely, to leave behind him a being like himself ;—similarly the natural ruler and ruled must unite for the preservation of both. The being that is able to use rational foresight has by nature the characteristics of ruler and master, the being that is able to do with his bodily strength what the other designs, is ruled, and by nature a slave. Consequently master and slave have the same interest. Now nature has differentiated between female and slave, for she does not make her works meanly as the metal-workers of Delphi make knives to serve every purpose, but so that each thing has one use. In this way every instrument is most perfectly made, if it serves not many purposes but only a single purpose. Among non-Hellenic peoples the state of women and slaves is the same ; the reason is that the natural ruler does not exist there and their association is one of male and female slaves. Therefore the poets (*Euripides, Iphigeneia in Aulis*, 1400) say

Hellenes rightly rule barbarians,
as if they thought that by nature the barbarian and the
slave are the same.

The first product, then, of these two unions is the

household, and Hesiod (*Works and Days*, 405) was right when he wrote

First a house and a wife and an ox for ploughing,
for the ox supplies the place of a servant to the poor man.
The association, then, that has been formed in accordance with nature to satisfy daily recurring wants is the household ; its members are called by Charondas "sharers in one bread-chest," by Epimenides the Cretan "partners in a common plot of land." The association of a number of households, first formed to meet needs not recurring day by day is the village. In general the village is by nature a colony of the household and consists of those who are called foster-brothers, that is, children and children's children. Hence too city-states were at first ruled by kings, as is still the case among non-Hellenic races, for they were formed of persons ruled by a king. For every household is under the kingly rule of the eldest member of it, consequently the colonies of the household are also under that rule, owing to their kinship. This is Homer's meaning (*Odyssey*, ix. 114) when he says

Each man governs his sons and their wives,
for men's habitations were scattered. Thus they lived in olden times. Again for this reason all men speak of the gods as subjects of a king because they themselves were formerly so ruled, while some still are at the present time ; and, as men fashion the gods in likeness to themselves, so also they make the lives of the gods like unto human lives. The association formed by a number of villages, if it is complete, at length constitutes a city-state, since it has, so to speak, attained to entire self-completeness ; arising at first as a union for bare livelihood,

it exists to promote a good life. Consequently every city-state is in accordance with nature, if it is agreed that the first associations were so. For the city-state is the end to which those associations have attained, and nature is the end ; for whatever is the character of a thing when its growth is complete, that we call its nature, as for example when we speak of the nature of a man, a horse and a house. Further the final cause and the end are best, and self-completeness, which is the end of the state, is both the end and best. From this then it is clear that the city-state is a natural organism, and that man is by nature a social animal, and that the man who is a member of no state—I mean by nature, not owing to chance circumstances—is either worthless or a superman. Such is the man whom Homer (*Iliad*, ix. 63) chides as

Clanless, lawless, hearthless.

For such a man being naturally unsociable is also desirous of war, being isolated like an unprotected piece in the game of draughts. That man is a social animal in a greater degree than a bee or a beast that lives in herds is clear ; for, as we maintain, nature creates nothing without purpose, but man alone amongst animals possesses rational speech. Now the utterance of sound is a sign of pain and pleasure, consequently the other animals too have this power ; for their natural powers have developed to this extent that they can feel pain and pleasure and can indicate this to one another. But the purpose of rational speech is to make clear what is advantageous and what is harmful, as for instance justice and injustice. Man alone when compared with the other animals possesses this power, that is to say he alone perceives what is good and bad, just and unjust, and so forth. Community in these qualities produces the household

and the city-state; moreover by nature the city-state is prior to the household or to any individual one of us, for the whole must necessarily exist before the part; for if the whole body be destroyed except the foot and the hand, there will be no foot or hand unless it be in an equivocal sense, as when we refer to the hand of a statue. For the hand, when destroyed, will be like the stone hand, and all things are defined by their function and the power to carry that function into effect; so that when they are no longer able to perform it, they can no longer be said to be the same, but only to have the same name. Thus it is clear that the city-state exists by nature and precedes each member of it; for if each member when separate is not self-complete, he will be like the other members in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to associate with others or has no need to do so, because of his self-completeness, is no part of a state, for example a brute or a god. By nature therefore all men have an impulse towards an association of this kind, and the first creator thereof was the cause of inestimable benefits. Just as man is the noblest of animals when complete in all his attributes, so when he is without law and right he is the worst of all. For injustice that is armed is the most disastrous form of it; but man is born with arms for wisdom and virtue to use, arms which are particularly liable to be used for the opposite purpose. Consequently without virtue he is the most lawless and fierce of the animals, and the most unbridled in lust and greed. Now justice is bound up with the state; for adjudication, which is the determining of what is just, is the ordering of a political community.

3 Since it is plain what are the parts of which the city-state is composed, we must speak first of all of the science

of household management, since every city is made up of households. The departments into which this science falls are concerned with the parts of which the household is composed. A complete household consists of slaves and free men. Since every inquiry must begin with the smallest part—the first and smallest parts of the household being master and slave, husband and wife, father and children—we must examine these three pairs and see what each is and how it ought to be constituted, that is to say the relation of master and slave, the conjugal relation—for there is no definite term for the union of man and woman—and thirdly the relation of father and children; for this last again there is no specific name. However let the three that we have mentioned be these. Now there is a certain part of household management which some indeed regard as the whole of that science while others consider it the most important part thereof. We must examine the truth of this; I am referring, moreover, to the science of supply.

But first let us speak of master and slave so that we may see what has a direct relation to practical use, and then for our theory may acquire any information which will help to better existing views. Some regard mastership over slaves as a science and think that it and household management and the art of the statesman and of the king are identical, as we said at the beginning. Others regard it as against nature; for, according to them, it is convention which makes one man a slave and another free, and there is no difference between them by nature; consequently mastership over slaves, since it is the result of force, is unjust.

4 Now, property is a part of the household and the science of acquisition is a part of the science of household

management; for without the necessities of life it is impossible either to live or to live virtuously. Again, arts with a definite end require their particular instruments, if the work is to be carried out, and this is true also of the instruments of household management; of these some are inanimate, others animate, as for example in the case of a pilot the rudder is the inanimate instrument he uses, the look-out man the animate. For in the arts the servant is classed with the instruments. Consequently in household management an article of property is an instrument for the purpose of living, and property is a collection of such instruments, and the slave is, as it were, an animate article of property, and every servant is an instrument directing other instruments. For if every instrument when bidden, or if it anticipated a particular need, were able to complete its work, as was the case, so men say, with Daedalus' statues or Hephaestus' tripods which, in the poet's words (*Homer, Iliad, xviii. 376*),

Self-propelled entered the assembly of the Gods,

if shuttles could weave of themselves and plectra play the harp, builders would have no need of servants or masters of slaves. Now, the instruments that have been named are for production, but an article of property is for action. For by the weaver's shuttle apart from its use something else is created, but from clothing and a couch we get only use. Since production and action differ in kind and both require their instruments, it follows that these, too, must differ in the same way. Life is action, not production, consequently the slave is a servant for action. We speak of an article of property in the same way as of a part; for the part is not merely part of something else, but belongs absolutely to it. The

same is true of an article of property. Consequently the master is master only of his slave but not of another man, but the slave is not merely the slave of his master, but is wholly his. Thus, from the foregoing, it is clear what the nature and essential quality of the slave are. For he, who, though a man, belongs not to himself but to another, is a slave by nature; and a man belongs to another, when, though a man, he is an article of property and as such is an instrument for action and separable from the owner.

5 The question whether anyone is by nature of this character or not, and whether it is good or just for one man to be the slave of another or not, because all slavery is contrary to nature, must next be considered; nor is it difficult to speculate on the truth by abstract reasoning, or to ascertain it from concrete facts. For the state of ruling and of being ruled is not only necessary but expedient, and in some cases the distinction is apparent from the very moment of birth, some being fitted to be ruled, others to rule. And there are many kinds of rulers and ruled elements, and the rule is better according as the ruled element is better, as for instance rule over a man is better than over a brute. For the function performed improves as that which is ruled improves, and this process applies, wherever the relation of ruler and ruled exists. For in whatever is composed of a number of parts, whether these are conjoint or separate, and combines to form a single whole, the ruling and ruled element appears, and this duality exists in every living thing as the result of nature as a whole. For in truth in inanimate objects there is a certain ruling principle, as it were of systematic order. However, this question is, perhaps, rather outside the scope of our inquiry. Now,

in the first place, an animal is composed of soul and body, of which the former by nature rules, the latter is ruled. Moreover in studying the natural state one must use as subjects those that are by nature rightly constituted, not those that are warped. Consequently we must review the man who in body and in soul is best constituted; in him the rule of soul over body is clearly seen. In the case of the vicious, or those who are viciously constituted, the body would often be found to rule the soul, because the latter is mean and in an unnatural state. At any rate, we must, as I say, in the case of the animal first consider the rule of the master and of the statesman. For the soul rules the body as a master rules his slave, but the mind rules the appetites as a statesman or king. In these cases it is clearly natural and expedient for the body to be governed by the soul and for the passions to be governed by the mind and by the reasoning part, while, conversely, it is harmful that the body and the passions should be on an equality with or should have the mastery over the soul and the mind. Again, this is true of man taken in conjunction with the other animals. Tame animals are by nature better than wild, but it is better for all the tamed animals to be ruled by man; for thus they obtain security. Again, in the relation of male to female, the former is better, the latter inferior; the former rules, the latter is ruled. The same principle must apply in the case of mankind as a whole. Thus, those men who differ from their fellows in the same degree as the body does from the soul, and as the other animals do from man,—I mean those whose natural function it is to use their bodies and from whom this is the best that can be obtained—these it is who are by nature slaves, and it is better for them to be ruled in this way,

just as it appeared better in the cases already mentioned. The natural slave is one who can belong to another—and he does so for that reason—and who, without possessing reason, so far participates in it as to understand it; for the other animals do not understand with their reason, but obey their passions. The use made of the slave diverges but slightly from that made of tame animals, for from slaves and domesticated animals alike we derive bodily aid to acquire the necessities of life. Now, nature wishes to make the bodies of free men and slaves different, those of the latter strong to perform the necessary labour, those of the former upright and unfitted for toil of that kind, but adapted for the life of the citizen. This life comes to be divided into services for war and for peace.

Yet, the opposite often happens, that is to say slaves have the bodies of free men, free men the souls. This at least is obvious, that if all free men were superior only in physique to slaves, just as the statues of the gods are superior to human beings, everyone would say that those falling short of a certain standard of bodily stature ought to be the slaves of the others. If this is true in the case of the body, it is far more proper that this distinction should be made in the case of the soul. Still it is not nearly so easy to view the beauty of the soul as that of the body. It is clear, then, that by nature some men are free and others slaves, and that it is both expedient and just that the latter should be slaves.

6 Now it is easy to see that those who maintain an opposite argument are to some extent in the right, for the terms slavery and slave are used in two senses. A man may be by convention a slave and serving as such. This convention is a kind of compact by which men declare

everything conquered in war to be the property of the conquerors. This plea many jurisconsults, just as they might impeach a public speaker for unconstitutional proposals, impugn as illegal, on the ground that it is monstrous that the conquered should be the slave and subject of the man who is able to conquer, and is superior in might. Thus some hold this view, others the former, and this difference of opinion exists even amongst men of wide culture. The reason for this disagreement and the fact which makes the arguments of both overlap is that, in a sense, virtue, given the proper means, is able to compel by force as well as to conciliate, and the conqueror always has a greater degree of good of some kind; so it would appear that force is not without virtue, but that the dispute is merely concerning the nature of right. For this reason some consider that mutual goodwill is equivalent to right, others that the rule of the stronger by itself constitutes right. If these two views are quite separated and set opposite to one another, the arguments of either disputant lack force and carry no conviction, since they imply that the superior in virtue is not entitled to rule and to be master. Others, adhering to some principle of right—for that is what we mean by “law”—maintain that slavery, which is the result of capture in war, is universally right and at the same time deny that it is so. For it is possible for the origin of a war to be not right, and no one would maintain that the man who is undeservedly in a servile state is a slave. Otherwise it will follow that men who are considered to be of most noble birth are slaves and descended from slaves, if they happen to have been taken captive and sold as slaves. Consequently these thinkers are unwilling to describe Hellenes as slaves, but restrict the term to non-Hellenic

peoples. Yet, when they argue on these lines, all that they are trying to define is the natural slavery of which we spoke at the outset; for they are compelled to say that some men are slaves in any surroundings, others not, no matter where they be.

The same strictures apply to their remarks about nobility of birth. For themselves they consider noble not merely at home but in every place, non-Hellenic peoples only in their homes, as though there were on the one hand absolute nobility of birth and freedom, on the other hand only relative nobility. Thus, for instance, Helen in Theodectes' play says:

What man would dare a serving-maid to call
One sprung from parents both of stock divine?

When they argue thus, it is only in respect of virtue or badness that they distinguish between the slave and the free man, and between those of noble and those of lowly birth. For they suppose that, just as man springs from man and beast from beast, so good springs from good. Nature often wishes, without succeeding, to effect this. Nevertheless, it is clear that there is some reason for this difference of opinion, and that the weaker as such are not by nature slaves nor the stronger as such free men; and that, in certain cases, there is a clearly marked distinction of this kind. For where slavery is advantageous to one party and mastership over slaves to the other, it is also right, and the former should be ruled and the latter should exercise the rule for which they are by nature fitted, that is, they should be masters of slaves. A bad exercise of this rule, however, brings disadvantage to both; for the same thing is advantageous both to the part and to the whole, and the slave is a part of his master, as it were, an animate but separate part of his body. Conse-

quently there is both community of interest and mutual friendship between slave and master, where both are naturally worthy of their condition. Where this is not the case, that is, where men are slaves by convention and by force, the opposite result obtains.

7 From these considerations also it is clear that rule over slaves, and the science of the statesman, are not the same thing, and that all forms of government are not, as is sometimes maintained, identical with one another. For the one form of rule is over men by nature free, the other over slaves. Again, the science of household management is monarchy—for every household is ruled by one man—but the statesman's science consists in governing men that are free and equal. A master of slaves is not so called by virtue of his knowledge, but because of his natural disposition ; in a like way we speak of slave and free man. Yet there may be a science of the slave-master and of the slave, the latter being like what the Syracusan taught. It was in Syracuse that a certain man for payment taught the slaves their regular duties as servants. But there might be instruction over and above these duties, for example cookery and other similar kinds of service might be taught ; for one task depends upon another, one is more honourable, another more indispensable ; in fact, it is as the proverb says :

Master
Takes precedence of master, slave of slave.

Those that we have enumerated are all servile sciences ; the science of the slave-master consists in knowing how to use slaves. For the slave-master is characterised not by the fact that he acquires slaves, but by the use he makes of them. This science contains nothing in it that is great or impressive ; for it is the master's task to

instruct the slave to know what his duties are. Consequently, those who have it in their power to escape such irksome matters keep an overseer to perform this office, while they themselves engage in public affairs or in philosophic pursuits. The art of acquiring slaves differs from these two sciences, being in fact a kind of campaigning or hunting. In this way, then, we must distinguish between slave and master.

8 Let us now, following the method adopted, consider in a general way property as a whole and the science of supply, seeing that the slave also is a part of property. In the first place, a doubt may arise whether the science of supply is the same as the science of household management, or a part of it, or ancillary to it. If it is ancillary, it is so in the same way as the shuttle-maker's art is ancillary to the weaver's art or the bronze-worker's to the statuary's art. Clearly these do not perform a service in the same way, since one supplies the tools, the other the material. By material I mean the substance from which the finished article is made; for instance, for the weaver it is wool, for the statuary bronze. Clearly, then, the science of supply is not the same as the science of household management, for the function of the one is to acquire, and of the other to use. What then is the science which utilises the contents of a household, if it be not the science of household management? But there is some dispute whether the science of supply is part of the science of household management or a different kind of science. For if it is the function of one concerned with the science of supply to consider the source of wealth and property—and property includes many parts and so does wealth—then we must first inquire whether farming is part of household management or a different kind of

art, and in general which alternative is true of the production and possession of nutriment. But, further, there are many kinds of nutriment, consequently the lives of both beasts and men are of many kinds. It is not possible to live without nutriment, and so differences therein have resulted in different methods of life among beasts. Some of them live in herds, others are solitary, according to what they require in the matter of nutriment; for some are carnivorous, others vegetarians, others again omnivorous, so that nature has ordered their lives to enable them to find and capture their food. But as by nature the same thing does not satisfy each species, but different species have different requirements, the result is that the method of life of the carnivora themselves and of the vegetarians varies. The same is true of men, for their lives differ greatly. The idlest is the nomadic life, for in that case men, while living a life of leisure, derive nutriment from tame animals without toil; when the cattle are obliged to change their pasture-ground, their owners too are compelled to follow, like farmers dealing with live stock instead of land. Others, again, lead predatory lives, the prey varying in different cases; thus, some subsist by piracy, others by fishing, namely those who dwell by the shores of lakes, marshes, rivers or a sea suitable for fishing, others, again, by the chase of birds and wild beasts. However, the majority of mankind live by the land and its cultivated fruits. These approximately are the various kinds of life, those, that is to say, whose work is achieved by themselves alone and which do not acquire their nutriment by the help of barter and retail trade, to wit the life of the nomad, the agriculturist, the pirate, the fisherman and the huntsman. Some, too, exist agreeably by combining different pursuits, and so

eke out the deficiencies of one kind of life, in so far as it falls short of complete provision, by adding on another. Thus some combine the nomad's with the pirate's life, others the agricultural life with that of the hunter. The same principle applies in other cases, and men live in whatever way need combined with what is agreeable constrains them. Property of this kind is clearly given by Nature herself to all creatures, both immediately after their birth and again when they have reached maturity. For, on giving birth, some creatures at the same time produce nutriment sufficient to last till the young is able to forage for itself. This is the case with animals that produce worms or eggs. Mammals, to some extent, carry nutriment within themselves for their young, the natural substance called milk. Thus, similarly, it is clear that after these creatures are born, we must suppose that plants exist for the sake of animals and the other animals for man, the tame ones to serve him and provide nutriment, the wild, if not all at any rate most, for his nutriment and for other uses, so that he can obtain clothing and other materials from them. If, then, Nature creates none of the lower animals without purpose, or aimlessly, it follows that she must have created all these creatures for the sake of man. Consequently the art of war will also be by nature a kind of art of acquisition, for hunting is a part of the art of war which men ought to practise against wild beasts and those human beings who, though intended by nature to be governed, refuse to be so, since war of this kind may be regarded as naturally just.

One form of the science of acquisition is naturally a part of household management; this form must either exist or the latter science must provide for its existence,

since it is concerned with the storing of articles needful for life and serviceable for the civil or domestic community. These are the elements of which true wealth at least is composed, for the amount of such property sufficient without external aid for a good life is not unlimited, as Solon says in a poem :

No bounds to wealth have been revealed to man.

The limitation here is the same as in other arts, for no instrument of any art is unlimited either in quantity or size, and wealth is an agglomeration of instruments for the household and for the state. Thus, it is clear that there is a kind of natural science of supply at the disposal of the head of the household and of the statesman, and also what the reason for this is.

9 There is, however, a species of the art of acquisition which is especially called the science of supply, and rightly so called; it is because of this species that wealth and property are thought to have no limit, and many consider that it is one and the same as the science of supply already described because the two are nearly related. But it is not the same as the science of which we have spoken, nor yet an extension of it. The one is natural, the other is not, but arises rather through experience of some sort and art. However, let us begin our inquiry into this science at this point. Every article of property has two uses; both uses are proper to it, but not in the same way, for the one use is that for which the article was made, the other is not; for example, in the case of a shoe, there is the wearing of it and its use in exchange. Both uses belong to the shoe; for the man who gives it in exchange for money or for food to another who wants a shoe, uses it as a shoe, but not for the purpose for which it was

made, since it was not made as a medium for exchange. The same is true also of other articles of property. All things have a use in exchange, arising in the first place from that which is natural, because men have more than they need of some articles and less of others. Hence it is plain, too, that retail trade is not by nature part of the science of supply, for if it were, men would of necessity only have made use of exchange to satisfy their own needs. True, in the first association, that is to say the household, there is obviously no place for exchange, but only when the association has been enlarged. For of the same body of persons some had a share in everything, others, being separated from their fellows, had a share of many different articles, but not of all. These, according to their several wants, were forced to exchange articles, as is still done by many non-Hellenic races, by barter. For thus men exchange one actual commodity for another, but they do not go beyond this; for example, they give or receive wine in return for corn, and so on with every other article of this sort. This art of exchange is neither unnatural, nor is it in any way part of the unnatural science of supply; its purpose is simply to satisfy men's natural wants to the point of complete sufficiency. It is from this need that, as might be expected, exchange arose. For as the supply came to be more drawn from sources outside the state, because men imported commodities which they lacked and exported others of which they had a superfluity, the use of currency was necessarily devised, since the various natural commodities are not easy to carry about. In consequence, to effect exchanges men made a convention to give and to receive something which, while it was itself one of the useful articles, possessed utility of a kind easily manageable and adapted

to daily life, for example iron and silver, or some other similar material. At first this was simply defined by size and weight; last of all, men also impressed a stamp on the metal so that they could dispense with weighing, for the stamp was put on to denote the value of the coin. And so, once money had been invented as a result of necessary exchange, a second kind of the science of supply arose, to wit retail trade. At first this was perhaps conducted quite simply, but later it was more elaborated as men learnt by experience from what source and by what method of investment it will produce the greatest profit. And so the science of supply appears to men to be mainly concerned with money, and its function to be the ability to observe from what source abundance of money will be forthcoming. For they regard it as the science which produces wealth and money; moreover, they often define wealth as abundance of money because, in their view, the science of supply and trading are concerned therewith. Sometimes, again, it is argued that money is mere rubbish and no more than a convention, but in no way natural because, when the users of it change their currency, the old coin is worthless and of no use for the purchase of necessaries, and so a man, though rich in coin, may lack the food needful for life. And yet, they say, it is a strange kind of wealth which a man may have in abundance and yet die of starvation, as Midas did in the old legend, when, because of his insatiate prayers, everything that was set before him turned into gold. Consequently they try to show that wealth and the science of supply are something different, and they are right. For the science of supply and natural wealth are another thing altogether, and while the natural science of supply concerns the household, the other is commercial

and in no way produces wealth, but is only carried on by the exchange of commodities. And it is thought to deal with money, for money is the basis and goal of exchange. Moreover, this kind of wealth, derived from this perverted form of the science of supply, aims at an unlimited amount. For just as medical science is without limit in respect of health, and every art is limited in respect of its end—for every art seeks to attain that—while the means to the end are not limitless—for every art is limited by its end—so the end of the science of supply is unlimited, but its end is wealth of that sort and the acquisition of money. But to the acquisition of commodities in household management, not to money-making, there is a limit, for money-making is not the aim of the acquisition of commodities in the household. Therefore in one sense it appears that there must be a limit to all wealth, yet we see the opposite happening in actual practice. For every man engaged in trade will make money without limit. The cause of this apparent contradiction is that the two uses of the science of supply are so closely related. Either use being concerned with the same thing overlaps the other, for use is made of the same property but not for the same purpose. The one method of using it aims at increase, the other at something different. Hence some regard this as the function of the science of household management, and they persist in the belief either that they must hoard their wealth in money or augment it indefinitely. The reason for this attitude of mind is their anxiety about mere living instead of about good living. Therefore that craving is never satisfied and they crave for materially productive things without end. Those, again, who aim at all at good living seek a life devoted to sensual pleasures. Consequently, as they see

that this kind of life depends on wealth, they spend all their time on enrichment, and thereby has resulted the second kind of the science of supply. For as their enjoyment is excessive, they seek for the means that produce that excessive enjoyment ; and if they are unable to obtain it by the science of supply they strive to do so through some other cause, and so put their several faculties to an unnatural use. The end of manliness and generalship and medicine is not to make money, but in the first case courage, in the other two victory and health. But men like these put every faculty to a commercial use, as though enrichment were the end and everything ought to be directed to that end.

What the science of supply that is not devoted to the necessities of life is, and why we have come to need it, has now been explained ; so too has the natural form of this science, namely, that it is different from the other, that it is natural and concerned with the household and with nutriment, and that, unlike the other which is 10 unlimited, it has a limit. The question instituted at the outset can now also be answered, namely, whether the science of supply concerns the head of the household and the statesman or not, though wealth must be at his disposal. For just as the science of the statesman does not create men but obtains them from nature and uses them, so nature must provide land or sea or something else for sustenance. The materials being at hand, it is the householder's duty to dispose over them in the proper manner. For it is not the function of the art of weaving to make wool, but to use it and to know what is of good quality and serviceable, or of bad quality and useless. If this were not so it might be asked why, if the science of supply is a part of household management, medicine

is not; and yet the members of the household need to be healthy just as much as to exist, or as much as they need any of the other necessaries. Thus, just as in one sense it is the part of the householder and the statesman to see to health, but in another sense it is not, but the physician's duty, so in one sense the householder is concerned with property, in another he is not, but it concerns the science of supply. In general, as we have previously remarked, the means of subsistence should be supplied by Nature, for it is her function to provide creatures after their birth with nutriment, and every creature has for its nutriment the remainder of the matter out of which it grows. Consequently the science of supply for all men has its natural source in the fruits of the earth and in animals. Now as there are two forms of this science, as we said, the one commercial, the other concerned with household management, the latter being necessary and approved, the former rightly censured because it is not natural but derived from men's transactions at the expense of their fellows, a third form, the trade of the usurer, most properly arouses our hatred because profit results from money itself and not by employing money for the purpose for which it was invented. For money came into use for the purpose of exchange, but interest multiplies money itself. From this fact too it has got its name, for as children resemble their parents, so interest is money that is the child of money. Consequently of methods of acquisition this one is especially unnatural.

11 As we have adequately defined the science of supply in its general principles, we must now examine the practical application of it. All such matters allow of liberal speculation, but their practical application is

necessary. The parts of the science of supply that are useful are: knowledge of farm stock, namely what kinds are most profitable and where and how they are used to the best advantage, for instance, what course should be followed in acquiring horses or cattle or sheep, and so on with other animals;—experience is necessary in appraising the suitability of one or the other under given conditions and deciding which are most profitable in various places, for different animals thrive in different localities—secondly, knowledge of land-cultivation, and here I refer both to agriculture proper and to fruit-farming; thirdly, acquaintance with bee-keeping and the management of other creatures that live in the water or the air, from whom man may derive sustenance. These, then, are the parts and leading elements of the science of supply in its most proper form. Of exchange the most important part is commerce, of which there are three divisions, provision of ships, conveyance of cargo and offering for sale; they differ one from another, the one being safer, the others more remunerative: secondly, there is lending money on interest; thirdly, labouring for hire; this may be either employment in the vulgar trades or the labour of men unskilled and useful only for their physical strength. A third kind of the science of supply lies between this and the first form, for it has certain characteristics both of the natural science of supply and of exchange, and is concerned with things won from the earth and from products of the earth that are useful, though they do not yield fruit, to wit, forestry and mining in general, which again includes many different forms, since many products of various sorts are extracted from the earth by mining. We have now referred to each of these pursuits in a general way; to deal with them in

detail would be useful towards carrying them into practical effect, nevertheless it would be irksome to dwell on them. The most highly skilled industries are those where chance is eliminated to the greatest extent, the most sordid are those in which the deterioration of men's bodies is greatest, the most servile those where physical strength is chiefly required, the most ignoble those where there is least need for virtue. As some works have been written on these subjects, for instance, by Charerides of Paros and by Apollodoros of Lemnos on agriculture and fruit-growing, and by others on other matters, anyone interested therein may consult their treatises. We must however collect certain scattered notices which show by what means some men have succeeded in enriching themselves. All such stories are of use to those who value the second form of the science of supply. For example, there is the feat of Thales of Miletus; it is a kind of commercial device which is attributed to him because of his wisdom, but which is of general application. Thales was taunted by his fellow-men for his poverty; it showed, they said, the uselessness of philosophy. Now Thales, we are told, through his knowledge of the stars ascertained that there would be a heavy olive crop in the next year; so, before the winter was out, as he had a little money at his disposal, he paid deposits in advance for the rent of all the oil-presses in Miletus and Chios, getting them at a low rental because no one bid against him. When the olive season came many tenders reached him at once and without notice, and he let the presses out on whatever terms he liked. Thus, by making much money, he demonstrated that it is easy for a philosopher to become rich if he likes, but that this is not his aim in life. This, then, is the way in which Thales is said to

have given proof of his wisdom, but, as we said, his feat, namely, the ability to procure a monopoly for oneself, is a general principle of the art of money-making. In consequence some states too adopt this plan, when they are short of money, that is to say, the state establishes a monopoly of commodities. In Sicily a man with whom a sum of money had been deposited bought up all the iron from the iron-works; afterwards, when merchants came from trade-centres, he controlled the entire sale, and, though he did not charge much more than the usual price, in addition to his outlay of twelve thousand pounds he made twenty-four thousand pounds more. However, when Dionysius heard about him, he told him to take his money away with him, but forbade him to stay any longer in Syracuse on the ground that he had found a source of income detrimental to the state. However, Thales' discovery and the Sicilian's are the same, since both succeeded in setting up a monopoly. It is, moreover, of value for statesmen to be acquainted with these facts, as many states need revenue and such methods of acquiring it as much as, or rather more than, households. For this reason some statesmen even specialise on finance.

[The remainder of Book I. deals with the other two relations which exist in the household, that of man and wife and that of father and child. The nature of virtue as it appears in ruler and ruled is also examined.]

BOOK II

[In order to agree on the question, what form of political community is the best, it is necessary, says Aristotle, to examine not only existing states and constitutions, but also the political theories of other writers. He therefore proceeds to criticise the views of Plato, Phaleas and Hippodamas.]

1, 2 We must begin with the natural starting-point of this inquiry. Either all the citizens must have community

in everything, or in nothing, or in some things but not in others. That they should have nothing in common at all is clearly impossible, for the commonwealth is a kind of association, and the first essential is common participation in one locality; the locality of the one city is one and the citizens are members of the city. However, is it better for a city which is to regulate its life aright to have community in everything that it is possible to hold in common, or better that it should have community only in some things and not in others? Thus it would be possible for the citizens to have their women, their children and their property in common, as is the case in Plato's *Republic*; for there Sokrates argues that women, children and property ought to be common. Is it then better that things should be as they are at present, or should follow the convention laid down in 2 the *Republic*? The truth is that community in women brings with it many other difficulties and particularly this, that the purpose for which Sokrates maintains that this practice should be legally established, clearly does not result from his proposals; further, to attain that which he says should be the end of the state, it is quite impracticable as set out in the dialogue, nor has it been clearly laid down there how the scheme should be more nearly determined; I mean the proposition that it is best for the whole state to be as far as possible one, for this is Sokrates' fundamental aim. Yet it is plain that the state, if it goes too far in this direction and becomes more and more of a unity, will cease to be a state. For, in its nature, the state is as it were a collection of things; if it is too much unified, it will be changed from a state into a household, and from a household into an individual being; for we should maintain that the household is

more of a unity than the state and the individual than the household, so that, even if a man could effect this object, he ought not to do so, for by so doing he will abolish the state. The state is composed not merely of a large number of men, but of men differing in kind, for it cannot be formed of equals, a confederation being distinct from a state. The former is useful merely for its size, even if it is the same in kind,—since the natural purpose of a confederation is to give mutual aid—just as a greater weight depresses the scale more than a less; it is moreover in something similar that a state will differ from a nation, whenever at least the nation is not scattered in a number of villages but united in a confederacy like the Arcadians. In the case of a city-state, the parts which are to be united differ in kind. Thus it is that a state is kept together by reciprocal proportion, in the manner previously explained in the *Ethics*. This reciprocity must exist even among free men and equals, for they cannot all hold office at once, but must do so year by year or by some other order of succession or official period. The result of this is that all hold office, just as all would be shoemakers and carpenters if the shoemakers and carpenters exchanged occupations and the same men were not always shoemakers and carpenters. But as it is better that the existing practice should obtain in a political community, it is clearly better that the same persons should, if possible, always rule. Where it is not possible because all are naturally equal, it is at the same time just, whether the rule is good or bad, that all should take their turn at it. This principle is followed where equals retire in rotation and, outside office, are all alike; for some rule and others are ruled, by turns, as it were, changing their personality. In the same way, even

amongst those who rule, some fill one office, others another. From these considerations it is obvious that it is not in accordance with nature for a city-state to be so completely one, as some say, and that what is described as the highest good in the case of cities, in reality makes them cease to exist; and yet it is surely the good of a thing which keeps it intact. It is clear also, if we follow a different line of inquiry, that to strive after excessive unity of the state is undesirable. Thus, the household is more self-complete than the individual, and the state than the household, and only then is the true meaning of the state realised, when the association of a multitude of persons is self-complete. If then a greater degree of self-completeness is preferable, a less degree of unity 3 is also preferable to a greater degree. However, even granted that this is best, I mean the greatest possible unity of the association, this does not appear to be proved in connection with the expression used when all simultaneously speak of "mine" and "not mine." Sokrates thinks that this is a test of the perfect unity of the state. "All" has two meanings; if it is used in the sense of "each individual," this is perhaps more what Sokrates purposes, for each individual will call the same man his son and the same woman his wife, and so on in the case of property and the various events of life. But, as it is, those who have wives and children in common do not use the term in this way, but all collectively, not each individually, say "mine" of the women and children and similarly of property. Clearly then there is some ambiguity in saying "all," for the terms "all," "both," "odd" and "even," because of their twofold significance, cause contentious syllogisms even in dialectic disputation; that all should call the same thing "mine"

is a noble ideal perhaps, but impossible, if the meaning is that "each" does so; if "all" is used in the other sense, the result of the proposal will be dissension. Furthermore this use of "mine" and "thine" has another disadvantage. That which is held in common by the greatest number receives least attention; for men care for what is their own, but do so in a far less degree for what is common to all, or at least only so far as it affects themselves. Besides other reasons, their neglect is due to the fact that someone else is looking after the common object, just as, in the case of domestic duties, work is sometimes less well performed by many servants than by few. Now each citizen comes to have a thousand sons not in the sense that each of them is his exclusively but that every son is as much the son of one citizen as of another. Consequently all alike will neglect the sons, since each citizen, when he uses the term "my son" to another citizen in good or bad fortune, uses it only fractionally, even as he is only a fractional part of the citizen body, that is he says "my son" or "so and so's," and he speaks in this way of each of a thousand citizens or of whatever number composes the state. Even this he does hesitatingly, for it is uncertain which citizen happened to have a son and whose son, if born, survived. And yet is it preferable that of two thousand or ten thousand citizens each should speak of "mine," addressing the same thing by his name, or should use the term as is now done in states? For the same man is called by one his own son, by another his own brother, by another his cousin, or according to some other degree of kinship whether by blood or by affinity and relationship to himself or to his kin; again another is addressed as clansman or tribesman; for it is better to be true cousin to a man

than his son in Plato's way. Not but what some could not possibly avoid recognising their brothers and children and father and mother, for men must draw their conclusions according to the resemblance which children bear to their parents. This actually happens, we are told by some of those who travelled round the world. Thus they tell us that some of the inhabitants of southern Libya have wives in common, but that the children that are born are distinguished by their likeness to their parents. There are in fact some women and the females of other animals, for example mares and cows, who are naturally pre-disposed to bear offspring like their sires, for instance the 4 mare called the True at Pharsalos. Again, the advocates of this form of communism will not find it easy to guard against the following abuses, wounding, involuntary and voluntary homicide, fighting and slander; all these offences when committed against father and mother and blood-relations are against divine law and are never, as may happen against strangers, justified. Such crimes must take place with far more frequency when men are ignorant of their relatives than when they know them, and when they occur it is possible to exact the customary expiations from the doers if they know their relatives, but it is not if they know them not.

It is likely that community in women and children amongst the (third or) farmer class would be more advantageous than among the guardians, for if their women and children are common, friendship amongst members of the third class will be less close; the ruled ought to be less united in this way, so that they may be obedient and not create civil disturbance.

In general, with such a law what is bound to happen is the very opposite to what should be the result of well-framed laws, and to that which was Sokrates' reason for assuming that the regulations regarding women and children ought to be laid down on those lines. For we think that friendship is among a state's greatest goods—where it exists there will be little danger of civil strife—and Sokrates above all is full of praise for the unity of the state, a thing which appears to be, and Sokrates says it is, the work of friendship, even as we know that Aristophanes in the Discourse about Love (Plato, *Symposium*, 192 c) says that lovers because of their intense love yearn to grow together and instead of being two to become one person; in that case either both must be spoiled or at least the one (who is absorbed in the other). In Plato's state, owing to the communism that we have described, friendship must needs become watery, and there is little likelihood that a son will call his father "my father" or a father his son "my son." For, just as when a little sweet wine is added to a great quantity of water the mixture is imperceptible by the taste, so also it happens with the mutual affection implied in these names, since there is little necessity in such a commonwealth for one man to care for another as father for son, or son for father, or as one brother for another. There are two things above all which cause men to feel affection and friendship, that which is their own and that which is highly valued. Neither is possible among the citizens of Plato's state. In truth too, with respect to the transference of children that are born, to wit, of the farmers' and craftsmen's children into the guardian class and conversely of guardians' children into the lower class, one is greatly perplexed how this will be done. Those

who give the children and effect the transference must know to whom they entrust them severally. Besides, the abuses of which we spoke, to wit wounding and homicide, would necessarily be more liable to occur in the case of these children; for those entrusted to the lower class of citizens would no longer be using the terms brother, son, father and mother of guardians, nor again would those placed among the guardians be using them of the other citizens, so as to beware, because of the possibility of kinship, of committing any of these offences. Let these then be our conclusions with regard to community in women and children.

5 The next question for consideration, nearly related to the preceding one, is that of property; namely, in what manner it is to be made available for the prospective citizens of the ideal state or, in short, whether there is to be community of property or not. This question might be considered quite independently of the ordinances laid down about women and children; but as regards property I mean, whether, even if women and children are separate, as is now the case, it is better that ownership of property, as well as the use of it, should be common. Thus there are several alternatives: the estates may be held separately but the produce collected in a common store for consumption—this is actually done by some races; or, conversely, the land may be common and likewise its cultivation, but the produce divided for the use of individual households—this form of communism is also said to exist among some non-Hellenic races; or again, both estates and produce may be common. Now, when the cultivators are a class distinct from the citizens, the system will be different and also simpler, but when the citizens themselves till the soil, the question of

property will cause numerous disagreements. For when men, both in their enjoyments and in their work, are not on an equality but rather to the contrary, accusations are bound to be brought against those who have much opportunity for enjoyment but do little work by those who do most of the work but get little for it. In general, life in common and community of all things human, particularly of anything connected with property, is difficult. Association of fellow-travellers illustrates this, for it is the things near at hand that cause disagreement among the vast majority of men and trifles that cause mutual quarrels. Again, in the case of servants, it is those whom we constantly employ on daily duties who cause us most irritation. Community of all property brings with it these and similar annoyances. The existing order of things, if, further, it is improved by good habits and the direction of wise laws, would be greatly superior, for it will partake of the advantages of both systems—I mean of community of property and private ownership. In certain respects property should be common, but in general it should be held severally. For when men's duties and interests are separate, mutual complaints will be abolished and prosperity will increase, because each man feels that he is concentrating on his own business. On the other hand, it will be through civic virtue that for use "friends' goods" will, in the words of the proverb, be "common goods." In fact, at the present time a scheme has been outlined in this manner in some states, which implies that it is not impossible, and it exists or might come into existence particularly in the best governed states. For while each man has his own property, he partly affords his friends the use of it, partly he allows the community as a whole its use. This happens, for example,

in Lacedaemon, where men make use of each other's slaves, though these are, so to speak, severally owned, and also of their horses and dogs and travelling supplies, when they need them, in the farms throughout the country. It is clear then that the better course is that property be owned severally, but used in common. How men should be brought to this point of view is the peculiar task of the legislator. Again, in relation to the pleasure felt, the difference it makes to regard a thing as one's own is unspeakably great. For, I suppose, it is not without a purpose that every man feels a love for himself, rather it is natural. Selfishness is rightly censured, and this is not simply self-love, but self-love to an undue degree. In the same way men censure the man who is too fond of money, for, after all, men do love themselves and money and so on. Again it is in the highest degree pleasurable to do a kindness to and to assist friends and guests and comrades, which is possible where property is privately owned. But those who seek to unify the state unduly have not these opportunities, and besides, they visibly destroy the functions of two virtues, continence in man's relation to woman—for it is a noble function through continence to abstain from a woman who belongs to another—and liberality in relation to property. In that type of state no man will be seen to be liberal or to perform any liberal action, for the exercise of liberality centres in the use made by a man of his property. Still, legislation of that kind will appear plausible and humane. The hearer welcomes it with pleasure, because he thinks that all men will be filled with a wondrous love for each other, more especially when the charge is brought against the abuses at present inherent in constitutions that they are caused by private ownership. I mean

actions about commercial contracts, trials for perjury and flattery of the rich. But none of these evils is due to the fact that property is not held in common, but to viciousness, since we see that it is just those persons who possess and use things in common who quarrel to a far greater degree than those who hold their property severally. We consider those who quarrel as the result of common ownership to be few because we compare them to the many who are separate owners of property. Further, it is right to enumerate not merely the abuses of which men are rid where they have made all things common, but the advantages of which they are deprived. Their life appears to be wholly impossible.

[In the remaining portion of this chapter Aristotle brings forward other objections of a more general character against Plato's ideal commonwealth. Some of these are quite unjustified, as, for instance, when he criticises Plato for not stating whether the third class in the citizen-body are to have community of wives and property, and then proceeds to point out difficulties that will arise if communism is extended to that class. Plato, however, expressly states (*Republic* iii. 417A and iv. 419) that community of property is not to apply to the third class, but only to the guardians and auxiliaries.

In the next chapter, after recapitulating very briefly the main points in the communism of the *Republic*, Aristotle proceeds to examine the state proposed by Plato in the *Laws*.]

6, 4 Of the *Laws* the greater part is concerned with legislation, though Sokrates has made a few remarks about the constitution, and, while wishing to render it more within the reach of existing states, he insensibly leads it back to the form indicated in the earlier work. For apart from the community of women and property, the other proposals are common to both commonwealths. The education is the same and the ordinance that the citizens should abstain from the labours necessary for existence, similarly

that dealing with common messes. He does, however, say in the *Laws* that there should also be women's messes and, while in the *Republic* the number of persons bearing arms is a thousand, in the *Laws* it is five thousand. Now, all Sokrates' discourses are full of genius, cleverness, novelty of view and the spirit of inquiry, but it may well be difficult to be right on every point. Thus, in the case of the population specified, we must not forget that so many persons will require a country as large as Babylonia or some other land unlimited in size, on which five thousand persons can live in idleness, and around them a miscellaneous host of women and servants besides. True, one may theorise at will, but not postulate the impossible. We are told that the legislator ought, in framing his laws, to keep two things in view, the territory and its inhabitants. One may well add "and neighbouring territories," if the state is to live the life proper to it. For the state must employ such arms for war as are serviceable not merely against foes in its own territory but against foreign lands. If anyone is averse to a life of this kind, either as it affects the individual or the state as a whole, still it is just as necessary that the citizens should inspire their enemies with fear, not only when these have marched against the country, but also when they have retired back to their own. We ought also to review the amount of wealth, to see if it should not be defined in a way which differs in being more perspicuous. For Sokrates says that the amount of wealth should be such as to enable the inhabitants to live temperately, as though it had been said "to enable them to live well." This statement is too general, since it is possible to live temperately and yet wretchedly. A better definition would be "temperately and liberally," — for, if we

separate the two, liberal living will be attended by luxury and temperate living by hardship — since these are the only virtues which are concerned with the use of property; that is to say, it is impossible to use an estate gently or courageously, but one may do so temperately and liberally. Thus, it is these habits of mind that are necessarily connected with property.

It is odd too that, though he equalises the landed property of the citizens, he does not regulate their numbers but leaves the birth-rate undetermined, as though the numbers would adjust themselves in relation to the adult citizen-body owing to the childlessness of some persons, since this actually appears to be the case in states at the present day. But fixed numbers must be maintained far more strictly in that ideal commonwealth than now. For now no one is destitute because estates are divided amongst an indeterminate number of persons, but in the state in the *Laws*, as the estates are indivisible, those supernumerary to the established number, whether they were few or many, would have nothing. One would suggest that the birth-rate should be regulated rather than property, so that the citizens would not have more than a certain number of children. In regulating this number the element of chance must be taken into account, namely, the fact that some of the children may die, and the childlessness of some persons. To leave the matter unregulated, as is the case in the majority of states, inevitably leads to the destitution of the citizens, and destitution breeds civil faction and knavery. Now, Pheidon of Corinth, one of the very early lawgivers, thought that the households should always remain at their original number and also the citizen population, even though at first all had lots which were unequal in

size; but in the *Laws* the opposite is the case. We must later explain how we think that an improvement could be effected in these matters.

Sokrates has also omitted to explain in the *Laws* how the rulers will differ from the ruled; for he says that, just as the warp differs from the woof, though both are essential, so should be the relation of rulers and ruled. Again, as he permits a man's whole property to be increased fivefold, why should not an increase in the case of and up to a certain maximum be permissible? Again, the distribution of homesteads must be reviewed to see whether it is incompatible with the management of the household; for he allotted two homesteads to each man and made them distinct and separate, and it is difficult to manage two households.

[The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a criticism of Plato's constitutional reforms in the *Laws*. Aristotle then goes on to consider the theories of Phaleas and Hippodamas.]

7, 2 Certain thinkers are of opinion that careful ordinances about property are of the greatest moment, for it is about property, they say, that all men begin civil strife. The first to make proposals with this danger in view was Phaleas of Chalcedon. He maintains that the landed property of the citizens should be equal. He thought that there would be no difficulty in effecting this at the time when a city was being founded, but that it would be a more arduous task where cities were already inhabited. Nevertheless he said that the quickest way to bring about equalisation would be to enact that the rich should give dowries but not receive them, while the poor should receive but not give them. Plato, when composing his *Laws*, thought that there should be no restrictions on

property up to a certain point, but that no citizen should be authorised to acquire more than would leave his property five times greater than the smallest. This I have already explained. Those who legislate on these lines must bear in mind a point which nowadays they tend to forget, namely, that when they fix the amount of property tenable individually, they ought also to fix the number of children in a family. For if the number of children becomes too great for the size of the estate, the law is bound to be nullified and, quite apart from its annulment, it is a defect that many persons after being wealthy should become poor. It is difficult to prevent such men from becoming revolutionary.

That equalisation of property has some influence on a political community, some of the older legislators have clearly recognised. For instance, there is Solon's enactment, and elsewhere there is a law which debars men from acquiring as much property as they wish; further, there are laws which forbid the sale of an estate, as does the law among the Locrians which does not allow sale of an estate unless misfortune can be clearly proved; or again, there is a law which makes old allotments of land inalienable, for example at Leucas, where abrogation of this law resulted in an unduly democratic constitution; for it was then no longer the case that election to office was conditional on a fixed property qualification. However, there may be equality of property and yet the property may be too large, in which case luxury ensues, or too small so that a shabby existence is the result. Clearly, therefore, it is not enough for the legislator to equalise property, he must also aim at a mean. Besides, even if he assigns a moderate estate to each man, it does not help matters. He ought rather to equalise men's

desires than their estates, and this is impossible unless they are adequately educated by the laws. Still, Phaleas might argue that this is what he meant; for he thinks that equality of two things should exist in states, property and education. He ought, however, to say what the education will be; to say that it will be one and the same for all is no help. For the education may be one and the same for all and yet be such as to lead men to prefer the accumulation of wealth or honours or both, since men indulge in civil strife not merely because property, but because honours are unequally distributed. In either case opposition exists—from the proletariat because of the inequality of property, from men of culture about office, if property is the same for all. Hence Achilles' words (*Homer, Iliad, ix. 319*):

Honour alike from his fellows is his, be he craven or hero.

But men commit wrongs not merely because of the necessities of life, wrongs which Phaleas considers will be remedied by equalisation of property, so that men will not steal because they are cold or hungry, but that they may also feel pleasure and not be consumed by desire. For if men have a desire which goes beyond the necessities of life, they will do wrong in order to cure it: in fact, not only to cure the desire, but that they may enjoy painless pleasures. What then is the cure for these three kinds of transgression? Some think limited property and regular employment, others self-restraint; a third possibility suggests itself. The man who would feel pleasure without being dependent on others, would seek his remedy in culture and nowhere else, for all other pleasures need the aid of other persons. In fact men commit serious wrong not because of the necessities of life but on account of the pursuit of excess, just as

men do not become tyrants to avoid the cold. Thus it is that the reward is great, if a man slay not a mere thief but a tyrant. In short, the manner of Phaleas' constitution avails only to cure insignificant wrong-doing. In general his proposals are intended to effect a good internal government of the state, but he ought also to look to his immediate neighbours and to all foreign powers. Thus, it is essential in organising the commonwealth to take military strength into account; Phaleas passes it over in silence. Similarly with property, for the state must adequately provide not only for domestic needs, but against danger from outside. Consequently there ought not to be so large an amount of property as will cause more powerful neighbours to become covetous, while the owners will be unable to repel the invaders, nor yet so small that the state will be unable to carry on a war even against an enemy of equal or similar resources. It is true that Phaleas has made no proposals about these matters, but still it must not be forgotten that abundant wealth is an advantage. Perhaps, then, the best limit to wealth is that it should not be so excessive as to make it profitable for a stronger power to make war on the state, but should leave no grounds for attack which would not have existed even if the wealth of the state had been less. For example, when Autophradates was planning to besiege Atarneus, he was advised by Eubulos to consider how long it would take him to capture the place, and to calculate the expenditure needed for this period. Eubulos added that, in return for a smaller sum than this, he was ready to evacuate Atarneus forthwith. By this statement Eubulos induced Autophradates to reflect and to abandon the siege. However, equal property among the citizens is in some measure useful for avoiding civil strife, though not greatly so. For even then the cultured citizens

would be annoyed, on the ground that they deserved more than an equal share; for this reason they are in fact often seen to begin hostilities and start a revolution. Again, the viciousness of men knows no bounds, and, at first, they are satisfied with a payment of two obols festival money; then, when this has become a traditional thing, they continue to crave for more, till they pass all bounds; for it is the nature of desire, for the fulfilment of which the majority live, to be boundless. The source for contentment in the state is therefore not so much equalisation of wealth, as to render those who are naturally moderate indisposed to aggrandise and the baser sort powerless to do so. This last will be the case if they are in an inferior position and at the same time suffer no injustice. Phaleas, however, has not even arranged the equalisation of property well, for he applies it only to property in land, but wealth also includes slaves, cattle, money and a large selection of what are called movable effects. Either then equalisation must include all this, or some moderate maximum must be fixed, or things must be left unchanged. From his legislation it is clear that Phaleas is constructing his city on a small scale, seeing that all craftsmen will be public slaves and will not go to swell the citizen-body. But if all craftsmen employed on state-property are to be public slaves, the system ought to be like that in force at Epidamnus; Diophantos once made a similar proposal at Athens. As regards Phaleas' commonwealth, one can perhaps judge from the foregoing remarks whether he has made any good or bad proposals.

8 Now Hippodamos, the son of Euryphon, a native of Miletus—it was he who invented symmetrical town-planning and laid out the Piraeus. Owing to his love of ostentation he was a remarkable man in his life in general as well as for his inventions, so that some thought that

his life was unduly affected. For his hair was abundant and ornamented in an expensive manner, as also were his clothes; these were of cheap but warm material which he wore not merely in winter but even in the summer. His ambition also was to be learned about nature as a whole —Hippodamos, then, was the first man not practically engaged in political affairs to attempt to theorise about the best constitution. His scheme was a city-state of ten thousand inhabitants divided into three sections. One of these was to be composed of craftsmen, one of farmers and one of fighters who were to bear arms. He also divided the territory into three parts, one part to be sacred, one public and one private. The sacred land would supply the means to perform the customary sacrifices to the gods, the public the sustenance of the fighters, the private would belong to the farmers. Further, he thought that there should only be three kinds of laws. The offences to be tried in the courts were to be three, crimes against the person, crimes against property, and homicide. He also legislated for one sovereign court, to which all cases which did not appear to have been equitably decided were to be referred. This court he constituted from an elective body of elders.

[The other proposals of Hippodamos are concerned with jurisprudence and constitutional law. It may perhaps be mentioned that he advocated state-maintenance, during their minority, of the orphans of citizens killed in war, a practice actually observed in Athens and in other Greek states, as Aristotle observes. Aristotle then proceeds to criticise Hippodamos' schemes.]

These proposals form the bulk of Hippodamos' scheme and are the most noteworthy. The division of the citizen-population is the first point that will cause perplexity. For craftsmen, farmers and soldiers all participate in the citizenship, though the farmers have not arms and the

craftsmen have neither arms nor land, so that both classes virtually become the slaves of the class that owns arms. Consequently it is impossible that they should participate in all offices, for generals, city-wardens, in fact the most influential magistrates, must be appointed from amongst those who bear arms. If the other two classes do not share the citizenship, how can they be well-disposed to the constitution? But, it may be said, those in possession of arms ought to be stronger than both the other classes. That is difficult, unless they are a numerous body; and supposing that they are, why ought the others to share the citizenship and exercise a controlling influence over the appointment of magistrates? Again, what use are the farmers to the state? Craftsmen there must of course be—for every state needs them—and they can subsist here as elsewhere from their crafts. Now the farmers, if they supplied the armed class with food, would plausibly enough be a part of the state; as it is, they own private land and till this for their own benefit. Further, as regards the public land from which the fighters will get their sustenance, if they are to till it themselves, the warrior class and the agricultural class will no longer be distinct, and yet the legislator wishes it to be so. If those farmers who cultivate their own land and the warrior farmers are to be kept separate, then there will be a fourth class in the state without a share in and alien to the constitution. On the other hand, if the cultivators of the private and the cultivators of the public land are to form the same class, it will be difficult to raise enough produce for each to support two households; and why should not one class, the farmers, straightway raise from the land and their own allotments sufficient to keep themselves and to supply the warriors? All these proposals of Hippodamas are very confused.

THE IDEAL CITY OF ARISTOTLE

Politics

BOOK IV (VII), 4, 3

Most persons are of opinion that the ideal city should be large ; if this is true, they show their ignorance of the character of both large and small states. They judge by mere numbers and regard a large body of inhabitants as a large state, but they should rather look to resources than numbers. For the state, like other things, has a certain function to perform, and so we ought to regard as a great state one that is best able to perform that function, just as in calling Hippocrates greater than someone who may surpass him in stature, we refer to him not as a man but as a physician. Not but what, even if we ought to look to numbers in forming our judgment, we must not do so in respect of any and every multitude,—for it may be necessary in a state to have a large number of slaves, metics and strangers—but in respect of those who actually form part of the state, or of the parts of which the state is properly composed. An excessive number of such persons is the mark of a large state, but it is impossible to regard as great a state from which large numbers of common tradesmen but only a few warriors go forth. A great state is not synonymous with a populous state. But it is certainly also evident from the functions to be performed that it is difficult, perhaps impossible, for a state with an unduly large population to enjoy a good constitution; at least we do not find any of the states which are thought to be well governed

without restrictions in respect of numbers. Reason also demonstrates the same thing clearly. For law is a kind of order and good laws must necessarily be good order, but order cannot exist among an excessively great number; for the ordering of a vast number is the function of a divine power, which holds together even this universe. The beautiful is usually found in connection with number and magnitude, consequently the state which answers to the definition which we have given, combined with a certain magnitude, must be the most beautiful. There is, however, a certain measure of size in a state, just as in everything else, animals, plants and instruments. Each of these will best fulfil its proper function if it is neither too small nor of excessive magnitude; but sometimes a thing will be deprived entirely of its proper nature, sometimes it will be quite insignificant, just as a boat a span long is not a boat at all, nor yet one that is two furlongs in length; when it has assumed a measured size, it will render navigation difficult, in one case because of its smallness, in the other because of its undue size.

In the same way also the state with too few members is not self-complete—but a true state is a self-complete organism—while the state with too vast a population is self-complete, it is true, in the matter of necessaries like a nation, but it is not a true state; for in it a constitution cannot easily exist. Who will be general of so excessive a host, who its herald, unless he should have the voice of a Stentor?

Consequently the primitive state must be one composed of a certain number, and this primitive number must be self-complete for a good life in connection with the political community. It is further possible for a larger state to exist which exceeds the former in respect of

numbers, but, as we said, there is a limit to the number. What the maximum is, is easily determined from the functions proper to a state. The activities of the state concern the rulers and the ruled. The function of the ruler is to command and to judge. To be able to give judicial decisions and to allot magistracies according to merit the citizens must know each other's character, for, where this does not happen to be the case, the procedure with regard to magistracies and legal judgments must necessarily become worthless.

In either matter it is not right to decide hastily, which is what patently occurs in the over-populated state. Then too it becomes easier for strangers and resident aliens to share the citizenship, since detection is difficult because of the large number of inhabitants. It is clear, then, that the best standard of size for a city is this: the citizen population should be the largest possible with a view to completeness of life and yet such that it can be taken in at one view. Let this, then, be our definition with regard to the size of the state.

5 Similar considerations apply to the choice of territory. Respecting the nature of the territory the most self-complete would clearly have universal approval; such a one must necessarily be all-productive, for completeness implies the existence of everything requisite, and the lack of nothing. In extent and magnitude it must be sufficiently large to enable the citizens, though at leisure, to live liberally and temperately. Whether we are right or wrong in fixing this limit we can subsequently inquire in more detail, when occasion arises to speak generally about property and the production of wealth, and how and in what way the production of wealth should be related to its use. There are many controversies

concerning this inquiry because of those who push use to one of two extremes in life, to meanness in one case, to luxury in the other.

The character of the country is easily stated:—in some matters too we must pay attention to those versed in military science—it must be difficult for an enemy to invade, but easy for the citizens to quit. Again, just as we said of the number of inhabitants that it ought to be easily taken in at one view, so too with the territory; by this is meant that the country should allow of the easy transport of troops for its defence.

If we are to fix the site of the city perfectly, it should be placed accessibly both for maritime and land communications. One defining principle is that of which we have spoken, namely, that the city must be equally approachable for defensive purposes from every part of the country, the other is that the city be conveniently situated for the transport of food-stuffs and, further, of material for timber and for any other industry which the country happens to possess.

6 Now whether proximity to the sea is advantageous or harmful to well-ordered states has been much disputed. It is argued that the residence of foreigners reared under different laws is subversive of good order and, secondly, that a very large population is the same; for this is the result of sea-traffic with its constant despatch and reception of large numbers of merchants, and is prejudicial to good government. Still, apart from these two results, it is obviously better, both for its security and for the abundant supply of necessaries, that the city and the country should have access to the sea. For in order more easily to resist hostile attacks the defenders ought to have means of succour in both ways, by land and by sea;

and as regards inflicting damage on the assailants, if it is not possible to gain help easily by both ways, it will be easier to do so in one way or the other, if the state has access to both.

It is one of the necessary conditions for a state to be able to import products which do not exist in its own territory and to export any superfluous commodities of its own, for it ought to trade in its own interests and not in the interest of others, as is done by those who for the sake of revenue constitute themselves as a universal mart. The ideal city should have no truck with greed of this kind, nor ought it to possess such a mart. However, as we see even at the present time that many countries and cities possess seaports and harbours admirably situated in relation to the city, so as neither to occupy the same ground as the city nor to be too far distant, but to be kept under control by means of walls and similar defensive works, it is plain that if any advantage happens to result through participating in ports and harbours, the city will reap the benefit; while, if harm results, it is easier to take protective measures by stating and defining legally who ought, and who ought not, to be allowed mutual intercourse. That a naval force not exceeding a certain number is highly desirable is evident, for the state should inspire not only its own members but also some of its neighbours with fear, and should be able to render assistance not merely by land but also by sea. When we consider the amount and magnitude of this power, we must take into consideration the life of the state. If it is to have a life of supremacy and one spent in relations with other states, the naval power must be commensurate with those activities. There is no need for cities to be burdened with the vast population which arises in connection with

the crowd of seafaring folk, for these ought not to form part of the body politic. The marines are free men and form part of the military force, and they are in charge and control the navigation ; but as there will exist a large body of dependents and agricultural workers, there must also be plenty of oarsmen. This arrangement we see in force at the present day in certain states, for example at Heraclea ; for, though the people of Heraclea own a city with a more modest population than others, they can man a large fleet.

7 Let these then be our conclusions respecting territory, harbours, city and seaports, sea and naval power. Turning now to the citizen-body, we have previously said how far it should be limited ; let us now state what the natural characteristics of the citizens are to be. This question will perhaps be best understood after reviewing the best-known Hellenic cities and then the inhabited globe in general and how it is apportioned among races. For the nations that inhabit cold countries, especially those in Europe, are full of spirit but deficient in intelligence and contriving skill ; consequently, while they maintain their freedom, they have no settled constitutions and are incapable of ruling their neighbours. The Asiatic nations are intelligent and highly skilled, but they are lacking in spirit ; consequently they continue to be enslaved to their rulers. The Hellenic race, just as it is geographically situated between the two, so it partakes of the characteristics of both. For it is spirited and intelligent ; consequently it continues to preserve its freedom, enjoys the best government and is capable of ruling all mankind, if it happened to be under one constitution. The Hellenic peoples differ from each other in the same way, for some of them have a one-sided nature, while in others both

the above-named qualities are well blent. It is clear, then, that men who are to be easily guided by the law-giver on the road to virtue, must be naturally both intelligent and spirited. For as to the quality which certain persons (*cf. Plato, Republic, ii. 375 D*) say is characteristic of watch-dogs, that they are friendly to those they know but fierce to strangers, it is spirit which produces this feeling of friendliness; for spirit is that faculty of the soul with which we love. A proof of this is that the spirit is roused to greater anger against intimates and friends than against strangers, if it thinks that it has been slighted. Thus Archilochus, when chiding his friends, aptly addresses his spirit:

'Tis friends that throttle thee.

Now the principle of rule and of freedom also comes to men from this faculty of the soul; for the spirit is imperious and unconquerable. But it is wrong to say that men should be harsh to strangers, for one should not be such to any man, nor are men of noble soul naturally fierce except to wrong-doers. This feeling is, however, harsher towards friends, as we said above, when men think that their friends are doing them a wrong, and this is a reasonable occurrence. For men think that, in addition to the actual injury, they are being robbed by those from whom they feel a requital for past kindness is due. Hence the sayings:

Bitter the strife of brothers

and

Strongest in love are strongest too in hate.

The number of the citizens, then, and their natural disposition, and further, the size and character of the country, have been approximately defined—for we must not look for the same degree of accuracy by means of

theoretical inquiry as is possible by means of what reaches us through sense-perception. But since, as in the other things that are composed according to nature, not all those things are parts of the whole structure without which the whole would not exist, it is clear that not all those things that must be possessed by a state ought to be defined as parts of it, nor ought it to be so in any other association which results in some unity of kind. For the associates, whether they are on an equality or not, must have something that is the same for and common to all; for example, this may be food or a portion of land or some similar thing. But when one thing is the means and the other the end, in that case there is nothing common to both, except that the one acts and the other receives the result of this activity—I mean the relationship of every instrument and craftsman to the object to be made. Thus there is no common element between a house and a builder, but the builder's craft exists for the sake of the house. A state therefore needs property, yet property is not part of the state; but there are many animate parts of property. The state, however, is an association of equals and exists for the sake of the best possible life. Since happiness is the highest good, and happiness is the operation and perfect use of virtue, and it is the case that some are able to share therein, while others are little or not at all able to do so, it is plain that this is the reason for the origin of many kinds of states and for the differences between them and for the existence of numerous constitutions. For, as each in a different way and by different means goes in pursuit of that end, men make different lives and also different constitutions for themselves. We must also consider how many are the things that are indispensable to a state, for what we call parts of the

state must of necessity be included therein. We must enumerate the services required by a state; from these the answer to our question will be clear. In the first place, then, the state needs food; secondly, crafts—for existence requires many instruments; thirdly, arms—for the associates in the state must have arms within their own body because of the disobedient, to make their rule effective, and against strangers who try to injure them; fourthly, abundant wealth to use for their own needs and for military requirements; fifthly, and first in excellence, the care of religion, what men call the priestly office; sixthly, and most indispensable of all, a body to decide state policy and the mutual rights of the citizens. These, then, are the services required by virtually every state, for a state is not a haphazard collection of persons but, as we said, an association self-complete for existence. Thus, if any of the services is lacking, it is impossible for an association in which this occurs to be entirely self-complete. The state must therefore be composed in accordance with these occupations: there must be a body of farmers to provide the food, craftsmen, fighting men, a wealthy class, priests, and persons to decide what is necessary and expedient for the state.

9 As these classes have been defined, it remains to consider whether all should participate in all these functions—for it is possible for the same men all to be farmers and craftsmen and to take part in matters deliberative and judicial—or whether one should postulate a different class for each of the services enumerated, or whether some must necessarily be peculiar to one class and others common to all. Now the same system is not in force in every constitution; for, as we said, it is possible for

all to share in everything, and again for not all to do so, but only some in some things; for it is these differences that also produce different constitutions. In a democracy all men participate in everything, in an oligarchy just the opposite is the case. As we are considering the best possible constitution, it will be that by which the state enjoys the greatest possible happiness. But we have previously stated that happiness cannot exist apart from virtue; from this it follows that in the state which has the best constitution and possesses men who are just absolutely, and not relatively to the principle on which the state is founded, the citizens ought not to lead the lives of tradesmen or shopkeepers—such a life is ignoble and opposed to virtue—nor should the prospective citizens be farmers, for they need leisure both for the development of virtue and for the activities of civic life. But since the soldier class and the class which is to deliberate on state-policy and to decide questions of justice exist in the state, and it is clear that they more especially are parts of it, should these services be distributed between them, or should the same persons be entrusted with both? The answer is clear enough; in one way the same persons will perform both services, in another way these will be severally distributed. In so far as each of these duties belongs to a different prime of life, the one requiring practical wisdom, the other physical strength, different classes will perform them; but in as far as it is impossible that those who are able to use force and impede the rulers should always remain the ruled class, in so far the same persons must exercise both functions; for those who have control of arms also control the continuance or abolition of the constitution. It remains then to bestow these constitutional rights on

the same persons and on both classes, but not at the same period of life. Now it is natural for strength to repose in the younger men and wisdom in the older; consequently it is both expedient and just that the division between both classes be made in this manner, for this distribution recognises desert. Moreover, property ought also to be in their hands, for the citizens must possess wealth, and these are the citizens. The tradesmen class are not citizens, nor is any other part of the state which is not engaged in the creation of virtue. This is evident from the principle on which the state is founded, for happiness must exist side by side with virtue, and, when we call a state happy, we look not only to some part of it but to all the citizens. It is also manifest that it is the citizens who own the landed property, if, as is the case, the farmers must be slaves, or of non-Hellenic stock, or dependents. Of the classes that we have enumerated there remains for consideration the priestly class. The ordering of the priesthood is obvious also, for neither farmer nor tradesman must be made a priest, since it is the citizens whose proper duty it is to honour the gods. Now as the citizen-body has been divided into two parts, the military and the deliberative, and it is moreover fitting that those who have become infirm from old age should render service to the gods, and in so doing enjoy relaxation, it is to these that priesthoods should be assigned. Thus the indispensable constituents of a state and the number of its parts have been named: the farmers, craftsmen and the whole class of labourers must exist in states, but the integral parts are the military and deliberative classes; moreover each of these is distinct, in the one case permanently, in the other only for a time.

10, 6 Now we must first speak about the distribution of property and about the farmers, namely, who and of what character they ought to be, since we stated that property should not be held in common, as has been proposed by some, but that there should be community in use as among friends, and also that no citizen should want for sustenance. Also, with regard to common messes it is universally agreed that it is advantageous that these should exist in well-ordered states. The reason why we too join in this general agreement we will state hereafter. Now all the citizens must participate in the common meals, but it is not easy to arrange that needy persons should from their own resources both bring their contribution and manage their household as well; furthermore, expenditure in honour of the gods is a common charge on the state as a whole. The land, then, must be divided into two parts, of which one is to be state-domain, the other to be the private property of the citizens. Each of these parts is to be divided once more; then, of the state-lands one part is to be devoted to the service of the gods, the other to defraying the cost of the common meals. Of the privately-owned land one part shall be near the frontiers of the state, the other near the city, so that each citizen may have two lots assigned to him and may own one in either district. Equality, fairness and a greater degree of unanimity in face of hostile neighbours are thus assured, for where a different system is in force, one half of the citizens underrate the danger of hostilities with neighbours, the other half are unduly and culpably anxious. For this reason there is in some states a law to the effect that those citizens who live nearest to a neighbouring power should not participate in war-councils directed against those neighbours, on the ground that, owing to

their private interests, they would not be able to give sound advice. The land, then, should be divided in this manner for the afore-mentioned reasons.

Those who are to cultivate it should, if the arrangement is to be ideal, preferably be slaves and consist neither of men of the same tribe nor of men of spirit: if that is so, they will be serviceable for work and at the same time give no occasion for fearing a revolution. The second-best arrangement is that they should be non-Hellenic serfs, with natural characteristics like the slaves of whom we have spoken. Of these, those employed on private estates are to be the private property of the estate owners, those employed on state lands are to be state property. The method in which slaves should be employed and the reason why it is best to hold out to all slaves as their ultimate reward their liberty, we will explain later.

11 That the city ought to be in every possible way accessible equally by land and by sea and from every part of the state itself has been previously stated. We must pray that the situation of the city in relation to itself may be satisfactory, if we pay due attention to four things: firstly, as is essential, to health, for cities that face east and are exposed to east winds are more healthy than others; next best are those that are sheltered from the north wind, for they are healthy in winter; for the rest, the city should be well situated for political and military activities. As regards the latter, it should be easy of access for the citizens but difficult for an enemy to approach or to invest. There should be in it preferably a native supply of waters and springs; if not, means of assuring this have been discovered by building an ample number of large reservoirs for rain water, so that, even if the inhabitants are cut off through war from the

surrounding country, the water supply may not fail them. But as we ought to look after the health of the inhabitants, this is assured, if the city is placed in a healthy spot and faces a healthy quarter, and secondly, by the use of a wholesome water-supply. To secure this must be a primary consideration, for everything that we use for our bodies in large quantities and with great frequency has a most important bearing on our health. Now the influence of water and air on us is of this nature; consequently, if all the springs are not equally wholesome, and if there is not a plentiful supply of wholesome springs, the water used for consumption and that used for other purposes should be kept apart in every wisely-administered city.

With respect to sites strong for defence, not all governments have the same requirements. Oligarchies, for instance, and monarchies require an acropolis, democracies a more level district, aristocracies neither of these alternatives, but a large number of fortified posts. The disposition of private dwelling-houses is regarded as more agreeable and more practical for men's activities other than those of war, if it is effected symmetrically in the new fashion—I mean that introduced by Hippodamos. But for security in war-time the opposite plan as it existed in olden days is preferable, for houses disposed irregularly render the retirement of foreign troops and exploration by an enemy difficult. In consequence the arrangement of houses in our city must participate in both these advantages,—this is feasible, if the disposition be on a principle similar to that on which among farmers what are called clumps of vines are planted—and the symmetrical order must not extend to the city as a whole, but must be carried out by groups and districts. In this

way the arrangement will be good both as regards security and appearance. Respecting walls, those who maintain that cities which pride themselves on their valour should dispense with them, hold an unduly old-fashioned view, and this though they see cities proud of their unwalled state proved wrong by the test of experience. In face of an equal force, or one little superior in point of numbers, it is cowardly to try to secure safety by the strength of walls. But as it may, and does happen, that the superior numbers of an enemy are too strong for the valour of mere men, and, what is more, men inferior in number, if these are to save themselves and escape injury and violence, walls of impregnable strength must be regarded as a military precaution, more particularly in view of the fact that, at the present time, missiles and engines have been contrived that ensure accuracy in siege operations. To decide not to surround a city with walls is the same as seeking that the country shall be easily invaded and stripping off from it the mountainous tracts, or again, it is like refusing to build walls round private dwellings, on the ground that the inmates will otherwise be cowards. Moreover this at least should not be forgotten, that those who have built walls round their city for themselves can treat it either as a fortified or an unfortified town, but in the case of cities that possess no walls this is impossible. This being so, not only should walls be constructed round the city, but care must be bestowed on them, so that they may be worthy of the city in appearance and satisfactory with a view to military operations, both those long in use and those lately invented. For just as an assailant must carefully attend to the means by which he is to gain an advantage, so, while some procedures have been invented, others must be sought

and studied by the defender; for men do not so much as attempt to attack other men, if these are well prepared.

12 Next, as the citizen-body must be distributed among the common messes, and the walls must be provided at intervals with guard-houses and towers in the most suitable places, it is evident that these facts invite us to establish some of the messes in the guard-houses. A suitable distribution might be arranged on these lines; further, it is proper that the buildings assigned to the Gods and the highest messes of the magistrates should occupy an appropriate site, and, what is more, the same site, except in the case of shrines set apart by law or by some oracle of the Pythian God. An appropriate site would be one which is sufficiently conspicuous for the enthronement of virtue, and, relatively to the neighbouring portions of the city, is of greater strength. It is proper that below this site a square should be laid out of the kind so named by the Thessalians, what they call a "free agora." This kind of square must be one that is kept quite unspoilt by market wares and no tradesman or farmer or any person of that sort may intrude there, unless bidden by the magistrates. This place would be full of charm, if the gymnasia of the older men were also laid out here; for it is proper that the arrangement of gymnasia, like that of the messes, should be separate according to age, and that certain magistrates should tarry among the younger men, while the older men would be in the presence of the senior magistrates; since it is the visible presence of the magistrates, above all, which induces true modesty and the awe which is proper to free men. The market square for the sale of goods should be separate and distinct from this square, and should

occupy a site suitable for the collection both of sea-borne commodities and those coming from the country.

Now as the governing body of the state has been divided into priests and magistrates, it is proper that the common messes of the priests should also be disposed round the quarter where are the sacred edifices.

All the magistrates whose duty it is to superintend commercial transactions, law-suits, prosecutions and similar matters of administration, and further, those charged with the inspection of markets and the control of what are called public works, should be settled near a square and place of common resort; the suitable site is near the market square, for it is for the pursuit of leisure that we are planning the upper square, the lower square for the necessary activities of life. In the country also there should be a distributive arrangement following the plan indicated. There there must exist for the magistrates, whom some call inspectors of woods and forests, others land-controllers, both guard-houses for the protection of the land and common messes; further, shrines should be distributed throughout the country, some in honour of the Gods, others in honour of heroes.

ARISTOTLE

Ethics

BOOK V, 5

(Cf. General Introduction.)

B 31 Now in unions for exchange it is this kind of justice,
1132 to wit requital on a proportionate not an equal basis,
that acts as the bond of union. It is by proportionate
requital that the state is held together. Men either seek
1133 A slavery—or to requite good. If they fail to do this no
interchange results, and it is by interchange that they hold
together. Therefore, too, they build a shrine of the Graces
for all to see, that there may be reciprocity, for reciprocity
is characteristic of grace. One must in turn requite the
bestower of grace, and again, oneself take the lead in bestow-
ing it on another.

The conjunction of diametrical opposites effects proportionate exchange: for instance, let A be a builder, B a shoemaker, C a house, D a shoe. It follows that the builder should receive from the shoemaker some of the latter's products and must himself give some of his own to the other in exchange. If, then, this proportionate equivalence exists in the first place, then reciprocity takes place and a fair exchange will result; otherwise the result is not fair and the association is dissolved. For nothing can prevent the product of the one surpassing that of the other in quality, consequently these must be equated. This holds good also in the case of the other crafts, for they would be destroyed if the impression in quantity

and kind on the passive part did not correspond exactly to the effort in quantity and kind of the active part. Thus no association results between two physicians but between a physician and a farmer, or speaking generally, between persons who are different and not equal. But these (like their products) must be equated. Consequently all commodities which can be exchanged must in some degree be comparable, and it is to this end that money has been invented and serves as a sort of medium. For it measures everything, amongst other things excess and deficiency; for example, how many shoes correspond in value to a house or to food-stuff. It follows that as the builder is to the shoemaker so is the given quantity of shoes to the house or to the food. If this is not so, neither exchange nor association will be possible. Again, it will not be possible unless the commodities are equated in some degree; in short, everything must be measured by a single standard, as we said before. This standard in very truth is demand which unites society; for, if men wanted nothing or had not the same wants, either exchange would not exist or it would not be the same as it is now. Money, then, is a kind of conventional exchangeable representative of demand. For this reason, too, it is called money (*nomisma*), since it exists not naturally but as a result of convention (*nomos*), and it is in our power to change it and to render it valueless. Reciprocity will come into play when the terms have been equated in such a way that the product of the shoemaker will be to the product of the farmer as the farmer is to the shoemaker. The two parties must not, however, be introduced into the figure of proportion after they have effected an exchange—otherwise one of the extremes of the figure will have both excesses—but when either party still

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holds his own products. Thus they are equal and can associate because this equivalence can be fixed between them; thus, let A be the farmer, C the corn, B the shoemaker, D the shoemaker's goods which are equated to the corn. If it were impossible to achieve reciprocity in this way no association could exist. That demand like a unifying force holds society together is demonstrated by the fact that when men—whether it be both parties or only one—have no need of each other, they do not exchange; but when man is in need of what another has, for instance wine, the two effect an exchange, the wine being given in return for the right of exporting corn. Here then an equation between the two commodities must be effected. Now for the sake of future exchange, supposing we are in want of nothing at the moment, money serves us as it were as a pledge that if we do want anything it will be forthcoming, for with money in his pocket a man must be able to obtain what he wants. Now money is affected in the same way as other commodities, that is to say its value fluctuates; still it is a great deal more stable than other things. Consequently all things should be valued in terms of money and so exchange will always be possible, and in that case association also. Money, like a standard of measurement, by making commodities commensurable equates them, for without exchange no association would be possible, nor exchange without equation, nor equation without commensurability. Now in strict accuracy it is impossible for commodities so widely different to become commensurable; still, for practical purposes, they can do so approximately. Some one standard then must exist and this will be the result of convention; hence its name (*nomisma*), for it is this which makes all commodities commensurable,

seeing that everything is rated in terms of money. For example, let A be a house, B forty pounds, C a couch; A is half of B if the house is worth, that is to say is equivalent to, twenty pounds. Further, the couch C is the tenth part of B; it is obvious, therefore, that the number of couches equivalent to a house is five. It is also obvious that exchange existed in this way before the introduction of money, for it makes no difference whether five couches or the value of five couches are given in exchange for a house.

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
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